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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the consequences of public policy on the opportunities of underserved
students. It focuses on three policy environments: child welfare, education, and the labor
market. In each chapter, I use a rigorous quantitative methodology and large administrative
data to understand how public institutions are—or are not—improving the wellbeing of
historically disadvantaged children and youth.
The first chapter focuses on placement into foster care, which is experienced by 6% of
children in the United States between birth and age eighteen. Using administrative data
from Michigan, I estimate the effects of foster care on children’s outcomes by exploiting
the quasi-random assignment of child welfare investigators. I find that foster care reduced
the likelihood of being abused or neglected in the future by 50%, increased daily school
attendance by 6%, and improved math test scores by 0.34 standard deviations. Gains
in safety and academics emerged after children exited the foster system when most were
reunified with their birth parents, suggesting that improvements made by their birth parents
was an important mechanism. Given recent federal legislation to reduce foster placements,
these findings indicate that child welfare systems must invest in more effective interventions
to keep vulnerable children safe and thriving in their homes.
Chapter two, with Silvia Robles and Robert W. Fairlie, examines course availability, a
frequently cited yet understudied channel through which money matters for college students.
Open admissions policies, binding class size constraints, and heavy reliance on state funding
may make this channel especially salient at community colleges, which enroll 47% of U.S.
undergraduates in public colleges and 55% of underrepresented minority students. We use
administrative course registration data from a large community college in California to test
this mechanism. By exploiting discontinuities in course admissions created by waitlists, we
find that students stuck on a waitlist and shut out of a course section were 25% more likely
to take zero courses that term relative to a baseline of 10%. Shutouts also increased transfer
rates to nearby, but potentially lower quality, two-year colleges. These results document
that course availability, even through a relatively small friction, can interrupt and distort
community college students educational trajectories.
The third chapter, with Brian A. Jacob and Kelly Lovett, evaluates a summer youth
xiii
employment program, a popular way for municipalities to provide adolescents with skills
and experiences thought to improve labor market outcomes. While research evidence on
such programs has grown in recent years, it is still limited. In particular, it is not clear how,
if at all, participation influences key educational outcomes. We study the program in Detroit,
Michigan using a selection on observables identification strategy. In addition to controlling
for a rich set of covariates, including baseline educational measures, we match participants
to their classmates of the same race and gender who applied for the program but did not
participate. We find that participation is associated with a modest increase in educational
attainment. Specifically, it increased the likelihood of enrolling in public school after the
program by 1.5% and of graduating high school by 4%, relative to comparison means of
94.5% and 85%. Youth with the weakest academic skills benefited the most, as participation
increased school enrollment by 2.2% and high school graduation by 5.5% for this group.
Falsification tests of whether participation predicts pre-program characteristics, as well as
robustness checks which account for omitted variable bias, as proposed in Oster (2016),




Temporary Stays and Persistent Gains: The Causal
Effects of Foster Care
“There are two powerful, emotional story lines in child welfare...There’s a strong pull
for us to reject the disruption of families by governmental authorities. But children are
sometimes harmed by their parents.”
— Dr. Matthew Stagner, Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management
Presidential Address, 2019
1.1 Introduction
About 250,000 children entered the foster system every year in the United States from
2000 to 2017 because they were abused or neglected at home (AECF, 2017; USDHHS, 2018a).
By age eighteen, 6% of children—including over 10% of black children and 15% of Native
American children—will have entered foster care (Wildeman and Emanuel, 2014). Among
historically vulnerable groups, foster children experience the worst life outcomes (Barrat and
Berliner, 2013). Despite this, there is little causal evidence on the impacts of foster care.
Pathbreaking research in Doyle (2007, 2008) studied placements nearly two decades ago in
Illinois and concluded that foster care was damaging for children. Yet the foster system in
Illinois was not representative of other states at the time (USDHHS, 2003) and nationwide
child welfare policy and practice has since changed (ChildTrends, 2018). Especially given its
increased use in response to the opioid epidemic (Talbot, 2017; Neilson, 2019), it is critical
to understand the effectiveness of current foster care systems.
This paper makes several contributions. First, it provides new estimates of the causal
effects of foster care on crucial indicators of child wellbeing: safety, education, and crime.
Identifying causal impacts is challenging because foster children differ from their peers along
1
a variety of dimensions. To overcome selection bias, I leverage exogenous variation in
placement created by the quasi-random assignment of child welfare investigators who vary
in their propensity to recommend foster care. Using administrative records from Michigan,
which link public school students to child welfare involvement and juvenile court filings, this
study analyzes over 200,000 maltreatment investigations of school-age children between 2008
and 2016.
I find that foster care improved children’s outcomes. It reduced the likelihood that
children were alleged as victims of abuse or neglect in the future by 13.2 percentage points,
a 52% reduction relative to a baseline mean of 25.5%. In addition to improving child
safety, placement had large, positive impacts on academic outcomes; it increased daily school
attendance by 6.0% and standardized math test scores by 0.34 standard deviations. I also
find a substantial yet less precise reduction in juvenile delinquency. Taken together, these
estimates indicate that foster care had benefits in cases where investigators might disagree
about placement, which is a critical population for child welfare policy (Berrick, 2018).
The results contrast Doyle (2007, 2008) which use the same research design but find
that foster care reduced earnings and increased crime for Illinois children investigated in
the 1990s and early 2000s.1 There are several possible explanations for this discrepancy. A
likely reason is that children’s experiences while in the Illinois foster system were especially
harmful. For example, foster children in Illinois remained in the system longer than in
any other state at the time and they changed foster homes at a higher rate than all but
two (Figure 1.1). Therefore, placement in other states may have been less damaging than
in Illinois and perhaps beneficial. Importantly, evidence from this study is more likely to
be representative because the system in Michigan functions similarly to others across the
country. A second explanation is that shifts in child welfare practice over time may have
helped foster systems improve nationwide, such as increasing placements with relatives and
decreasing length of stay in care (ChildTrends, 2018). A third potential reason could be that
Illinois placed too many children in foster care, removing those who faced little risk in the
home, while Michigan better targeted placement. This is unlikely, however, because Illinois
placed children at a similar rate during the early research setting as Michigan more recently
(Figure A.1).
The second contribution of this study is that it explores mechanisms by exploiting the
1They also differ from a sizable correlational literature which tends to find a negative association between
foster placement and children’s outcomes (Pears and Fisher, 2005; Ryan and Testa, 2005; Pecora et al., 2006;
Scherr, 2007; Trout et al., 2008; Wulczyn et al., 2009; Berzin, 2010; Zlotnick et al., 2012; Barrat and Berliner,
2013). Interestingly, however, they are consistent with recent evidence on parental incarceration in the United
States from North Carolina (Billings, 2019) and Ohio (Norris et al., 2019), which is a somewhat analogous
form of family separation.
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fact that foster care is a temporary intervention. In my setting, children were in the foster
system for nineteen months on average. During this initial period, there were no discernible
differences in outcomes between children placed and not placed in foster care. Instead, the
gains in safety and education emerged in the range of three to five years after placement, when
most children were reunified with their birth parents.2 One explanation for this surprising
pattern is that birth parents, who worked closely with social workers following child removal,
improved their parenting skills. Accordingly, I find that perpetrators of child maltreatment,
almost always a parent, were less likely to abuse or neglect children even years later if their
initial child victim entered foster care. I also rule out several alternative mechanisms that
could, in theory, drive impacts. For example, though by definition, children moved to new
homes when they were removed, and prior work highlights the large impacts of geography on
child outcomes (Chetty et al., 2016; Chyn, 2018), I find no evidence that placement caused
lasting improvements to children’s neighborhoods or schools.
Third, this paper provides causal evidence on the impacts of child welfare interventions
that target adults, which are an understudied channel through which foster placement can
impact children. Specifically, the birth parents of foster children received community-based
services, like referrals to local drug rehabilitation groups or food pantries, as well as more
intensive, targeted services, like substance abuse treatment or parenting classes. A careful
examination of mechanisms requires disentangling the role of these adult services from the
dramatic changes that occurred in foster children’s own lives, yet doing so is challenging
because they take place at the same time. To address this, I leverage the fact that quasi-randomly
assigned investigators could also offer services to families whose children were not removed.
Therefore, I separately identify the impacts of community-based services and targeted services
from the combination of adult services and placement by using investigator tendencies over
each as instruments. Though limited by statistical power, I find that the impact of child
removal together with adult services is considerably larger than the individual effects of
either adult intervention alone. Overall, these results suggest that child removal enhanced
the efficacy of child welfare interventions for adults, perhaps through increased incentives to
comply or temporary relief from parenting.3
2I refer to the adult/s with legal custody of the child before foster placement as the child’s birth parents
throughout, even though in some cases the adult/s may not be their biological parent, e.g., stepparents or
grandparents.
3An important limitation of this exercise, however, is that it identifies the effects of community-based
services and targeted services for children who were not candidates for foster care. For example, I estimate
the effect of community-based services for cases in which investigators might disagree about referring families
for these light-touch interventions, which represents a relatively low-risk group. Even so, to the extent that
these services have similar impacts for struggling families, the results indicate that child removal was a crucial
component of the foster care intervention.
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The fourth contribution of this study is that it is the first to show that a common form
of incomplete data coverage substantially biases estimates from the examiner assignment
research design in practice. Specifically, this paper improves upon contemporaneous studies
from Rhode Island (Bald et al., 2019) and South Carolina (Roberts, 2019) which offer
quasi-experimental estimates of foster care, yet do not follow children from the start of
their child welfare investigation.4 The data in these studies contain only the subset of
substantiated allegations, those in which investigators found a preponderance of evidence
to support the maltreatment allegation, which represent just 40% of the caseload in Rhode
Island and 25% in South Carolina (AECF, 2017). Since the same investigator who determines
foster placement also makes subjective decisions around substantiation, the set of children
in censored data may not be balanced across investigators even if their cases were initially
assigned at random. I replicate my primary analysis using only the sample of substantiated
investigations and find estimates much smaller than the true effects. As the examiner
assignment design becomes increasingly common—and similar data restrictions appear in
studies of crime and education—this exercise cautions against its application with incomplete
data.5
This study is especially relevant given the dramatic changes to child welfare policy
introduced in the Family First Prevention Services Act. The legislation, which took effect in
2019, makes reducing the use of foster care a federal priority by allowing states to redirect up
to eight billion federal dollars from the foster system toward services aimed to prevent foster
care entry (Wiltz, 2018). My analysis, which finds that foster care in Michigan improved
children’s outcomes, suggests that the effectiveness of this new federal policy hinges on
whether states identify and invest in high-quality prevention services.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.3 details the child welfare
investigation process in Michigan and describes the state’s foster system. Section 1.3 introduces
the sources of administrative data and the analysis sample. Section 2.3 outlines the research
design. Section 3.6 reports the main findings and explores mechanisms, and Section 1.6
describes bias from incomplete data coverage. Section 1.7 concludes and discusses implications
for public policy. Appendix A provide supplemental results.
4Bald et al. (2019) studies about 12,000 children between zero and seventeen years old and finds
substantial gains for girls younger than six years old but imprecise null effects for other gender-age groups.
Roberts (2019) examines about 17,000 children between age two and seventeen and finds positive impacts
on on-time grade progression, yet noisy estimates on daily school attendance and test scores.
5Furthermore, I find that the method proposed in Arteaga (2019) to identify impacts when restricted to
censored data does not resolve bias in the current context.
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1.2 Overview of the Child Welfare System in Michigan
About one in five public school students in Michigan were the subject of a formal
investigation of child abuse or neglect by third grade (Ryan et al., 2018). One in ten were
the subject of more than one investigation and one in sixty experienced foster placement.6
This section reviews the maltreatment investigation process in Michigan and describes the
state’s foster system.
1.2.1 Child Maltreatment Investigations
Figure 1.2 describes the maltreatment investigation process in Michigan, which is similar
to most other states. It begins when someone calls an intake hotline to report child abuse
(e.g., bruises, burns, or sexual abuse) or neglect (e.g., unmet medical needs, lack of supervision,
or food deprivation).7 A hotline employee, who does not participate in the investigation
process, transfers relevant reports to the child’s local child welfare office.8 The office assigns
the report to a maltreatment investigator who has 24 hours to begin an investigation, 72
hours to establish face-to-face contact with the alleged child victim, and 30 days to complete
the investigation.
Critical to my research design, maltreatment investigators are selected for cases according
to a rotational assignment system rather than their particular skill set. Reports cycle through
investigators based on who is next in the rotation.9 Since investigator assignment occurs
within each local office, and within local geography areas in some larger counties, all of the
analysis includes zip code by investigation year fixed effects to compare children who could
have been assigned the same investigator.10
6These statistics reflect my calculations using the same sample as (Ryan et al., 2018), which consists
of over 700,000 third grade students born between 2000-2006. The cumulative risk of placement statistic
in Michigan by third grade is smaller than the nationwide estimate in Wildeman and Emanuel (2014) for
a number of reasons: it reports placement by third grade rather than by age eighteen; Michigan removes
children at a rate slightly lower than the national average; it represents only the population of public school
students rather than the universe of children; and it follows the same students from birth to third grade
rather than using a synthetic life table approach.
7While anyone can call the hotline to report suspected maltreatment, the most frequent reporters are
people who are mandated by law to do so, such as education personnel, police officers, and social service
workers. The intake process is the same regardless of the reporter.
8Reports are screened out if, for example, the perpetrator is younger than eighteen years old or the
victim is older than eighteen. I observe only screened-in reports, which will not affect the validity of the
research design since investigator assignment occurs after this initial screening.
9Though investigators may vary slightly in completion time, even those who take somewhat longer are
assigned new reports according to the rotation. In fact, despite a legal maximum caseload size of twelve
instituted in 2013, two-thirds of investigators reported having a caseload of thirteen or greater after 2014
(Ringler, 2018).
10There are two exceptions to the rotational assignment of investigators, which I exclude from my analysis.
First, given their sensitivity, reports of sexual abuse tend to be assigned to more experienced investigators.
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Investigators make two crucial decisions that influence the intensity of child welfare’s
involvement. First, they must decide whether there is enough evidence to substantiate the
maltreatment allegation. Investigators interview the people involved, examine the home,
and review any relevant police reports, medical records, or notes from prior maltreatment
investigations. 75% of reports in 2016 went unsubstantiated (USDHHS, 2018b, Tables 3-1
and 3-3), meaning child welfare offices did not follow up with the family further.
Second, investigators decide how much risk the child faces by continuing to live in their
home. They complete a 22 question risk assessment to compute a risk score, which is used to
determine whether foster placement is appropriate. Many of the items require simple yes or
no answers, such as “primary caretaker able to put child’s needs ahead of own” and “primary
caretaker views incident less seriously than the department.” Even with guidance on how
to interpret these questions, some are inherently subjective. Moreover, Bosk (2015) offers
detailed qualitative evidence that investigators often manipulate their responses to ensure
risk scores that match their priors. Therefore, even with a standardized system in place,
investigators yield immense discretion over foster placement.
Investigator judgment over both evidence and risk jointly determine the outcome of the
investigation. If the investigator substantiates the allegation and the risk level is low, they
must refer the family to community-based services like food pantries, support groups, or
other local non-profits. These cases require no further follow-up by child welfare. If the
investigator substantiates the allegation and the risk level is high, the family also receives
more intensive, targeted services, such as substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, or
counseling. Local, state, and federal funding, from Title IV-E, covers the costs of these
targeted services. Lastly, substantiated allegations with especially high risk not only trigger
targeted and community services but also require the investigator to file a court petition
for child removal.11 The main analysis in this study examines the combined effects of child
removal and these adult interventions on children’s outcomes, yet additional analysis explores
their individual contributions.
Second, new reports involving the same child as a recent prior report are usually assigned to the original
investigator since they have familiarity with the family. Anecdotally, such reports tend to re-enter the
rotation after a few months. I exclude those within one year of a prior investigation from the analysis to be
conservative.
11Unlike investigators who no longer work with the family after completing the investigation, the same
judge may interact with the family throughout the child’s stay in foster care. Since this repeated judge
involvement violates the exclusion restriction, my research design leverages investigator discretion rather
than judge discretion over foster placement.
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1.2.2 Foster Care System
Foster care is a family intervention; children are temporarily removed from their homes
while their birth parents receive services to improve their parenting. Removal occurs quickly,
just ten days pass between the start of an investigation and the median placement. In
Michigan and across the country, best practices recommend a strict ordering of placement
settings: placement with relatives, with an unrelated family, and in group homes or institutions.12
In many cases, though, children do not have suitable relatives available. In 2015, 41% of
foster children in Michigan were living with an unrelated family, 35% lived with relatives, 9%
lived in group homes or institutions, and 14% lived in other settings, such as pre-adoptive
homes or supervised independent living.13 It is common to switch placement settings while
in the foster system—60% of children in Michigan lived in more than one setting, and 17%
lived in at least four. Michigan looks very similar to the rest of the country along these
statistics (ChildTrends, 2017).
After placement, child welfare caseworkers meet with birth parents to create a reunification
plan stating the conditions under which the child can return home. These plans might require
the parent to secure housing, overcome drug addiction, or keep enough food in the home.
Birth parents receive targeted services to address the challenges in their own lives, which
can include substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, counseling, and job training.14
Caseworkers monitor their progress and make changes to the reunification plan as needed.
Family reunification only occurs if a court decides that birth parents made sufficient changes
for their child to be safe in their home.
Ultimately, children in Michigan, including those outside of the analysis sample, spend
seventeen months in the system on average, after which 47% were reunified with their birth
parents, 34% were adopted or had legal guardianship transferred, and 9% exited the system
as independent adults upon turning age eighteen. The remaining 10% fell into less common
exit categories, such as informal guardianship with relatives, incarceration, or transfer to
another agency. Section 1.5.3.1 offers evidence on how the foster care experience of the
12There is limited causal evidence on the effects of each placement type, and the instrumental variables
design in this study cannot separately identify each effect. However, OLS analysis in Supplemental Appendix
A.1.2 finds a larger positive association between kinship placement and children’s outcomes than other
placement types.
13There is limited data available both nationwide and in Michigan on foster families, those who takes
in foster children. Estimates from the American Community Survey (ACS), which have known limitations,
suggest that households with foster children tend to be larger and lower-income than other households with
at least one member younger than 18 years old. Supplemental Appendix A.1.3 provides summary statistics
and discusses the limitations of using ACS data to identify families with foster children.
14Though limited local supply or high adult demand may constrain access to these services—e.g., there
may be a shortage of providers or long waitlists for care—caseworkers do their best to meet the needs of
their families and sometimes have priority access.
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overall population of foster children compares to children at the margin of placement.
1.3 Data Sources and Sample Construction
1.3.1 Administrative Data Sources
This study uses administrative data from the Michigan Department of Health and Human
Services (MDHHS), Michigan Department of Education (MDE), Center for Educational
Performance and Information (CEPI), and Michigan State Court Administrative Office
(SCAO) to test the effects of foster placement on children’s outcomes. Since there is no
common identifier, these files were linked using a probabilistic matching algorithm based on
first name, last name, date of birth, and gender. Overall, 84% of child welfare investigations
of school-age children matched to a student enrolled in a Michigan public school in the year
of their investigation. This match rate is quite high given that many investigated children
should not have matched to an enrolled public school student, e.g., private or homeschool
students, high school dropouts, and those who were not permanent Michigan residents.
Specifically, I estimate that if there were a common identifier, just 87.1% of investigated
children would have matched to a currently enrolled student.15 Supplemental Appendix
A.1.4 describes the match process and match rate in greater detail.
Child welfare data from MDHHS consists of the universe of maltreatment investigations
in Michigan between August 1996 and July 2017. It includes details of each investigation,
such as the allegation report date, allegation types as coded by the investigator, the child’s
zip code, substantiation, and foster placement. Conditional on placement, it contains limited
information on placement settings and permanency outcome—e.g., reunified with birth
parents, adopted, etc. Critical to my analysis, the files also include unique investigator
identifiers beginning in 2008.
Education data from MDE and CEPI covers the universe of public school students in
Michigan, including charter school students, between the 2002-2003 and 2016-2017 school
years. These records include demographic information, such as race/ethnicity, gender, and
free or reduced-price lunch eligibility, as well as indicators of academic progress like daily
attendance rate and standardized test scores. They also include the census blocks where a
student lived during the school year, which I link to publicly available census block group
characteristics from the United States Census Bureau.
Juvenile justice data from SCAO includes all juvenile court petitions filed in almost every
15I estimate that the remaining 12.9% of investigated children consist of private school students in
Michigan (4.6%), non-Michigan residents (3.4%), homeschool students in Michigan (2.6%), and students
who dropped out of high school in Michigan (2.1%).
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county in Michigan between 2008 and 2015. A court petition is an official document filed
following juvenile arrest in cases where youth are not immediately diverted from the courts.
Petitions can be dismissed by the court after filing and need not indicate that there was
ever a formal court hearing. The SCAO data covers 75 of Michigan’s 83 counties, including
Detroit and the metro-Detroit area but excluding the following five urban and three rural
counties: Kent, Washtenaw, Ingham, Ottawa, Kalamazoo, Berrien, Delta and Keweenaw.16 I
exclude the 19% of investigated children who lived in these eight counties from my analysis of
juvenile delinquency, and the conclusions on other outcomes are similar when these children
are excluded.
Using these administrative data sources, I assess the effects of foster care on child
wellbeing across three dimensions: safety, schooling, and crime. Given that I study a variety
of outcomes, I construct an index of child wellbeing according to Kling et al. (2007) to create
a summary measure, increase statistical power, and help address multiple hypothesis testing.
The index consists of unweighted means of standardized versions of seven primary outcomes,
described in detail below: two measures of child safety, four academic outcomes, and one
indicator of juvenile delinquency. I reverse code “bad” outcomes and impute missing values
according to group means.
To measure child safety, I create indicators for whether children were the alleged victim in
a subsequent maltreatment investigation and whether they were a confirmed (substantiated)
victim in a subsequent investigation. Second, I examine schooling by studying daily attendance
rates, grade retention, and standardized math and reading test scores. Daily attendance rates
are the fraction of days that a student showed up to school during the school year, and grade
retention is a binary indicator equal to one if the student repeated the previous year’s grade
level. Standardized test scores are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one
within year-grade-subject cells across the full population of public school students.17 Finally,
I measure juvenile deliquency as the filing of a juvenile court petition.
1.3.2 Overview of Analysis Sample
The analysis sample consists of public school students who were the alleged victim in a
maltreatment investigation between 2008 and 2016. I exclude cases where investigators were
unlikely to have been quasi-randomly assigned: allegations of sexual abuse and allegations
involving children from a recent prior report. I also restrict the sample to children enrolled
16These counties include three of the state’s ten most populated cities: Grand Rapids, Lansing, and Ann
Arbor, and three more of the top thirty: Kalamazoo, Wyoming, and Ypsilanti.
17These educational outcomes are included in the analysis only if they occur after a child’s investigation.
That is, I exclude scores from students investigated in the middle of the state testing cycle from the outcome
analysis since the exact dates of test administration for a given school-grade-subject are not publicly available.
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in grades one through eleven in the school year of their investigation to observe baseline
characteristics and at least one follow-up year.18 Appendix A.1.4 describes the sample
restrictions in greater detail. Overall, I focus on 242,233 investigations of 186,250 students
and follow students for at most nine years after their investigation.
Table 3.1 describes the sample. Column 1 consists of all public school students in
Michigan during the 2016-2017 school year, while column 2 consists of the investigations
of children in the analysis sample. Black and low-income children were disproportionately
involved in the child welfare system; 29% of investigations were of black children and
83% were of low-income children, despite making up just 21% and 49% of the population
respectively. Children with child welfare involvement had noticeably lower baseline daily
attendance rates and scored about a quarter of a standard deviation worse on standardized
math and reading tests. Column 3 describes children involved in the 2% of investigations that
resulted in foster placement. Relative to the overall sample in column 2, foster children were
also disproportionately black and low-income, had much lower daily attendance rates, and
scored about a tenth of a standard deviation lower on math and reading tests. Overall, these
descriptive statistics caution against a causal interpretation to mean comparisons between
investigated children who were and were not removed.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
A naive analysis of foster care might regress children’s outcomes, like daily school attendance
rates or their score or standardized test scores, on a binary treatment variable equal to
one if the child’s investigation resulted in foster placement. Even with controls for a wide
range of observable characteristics, estimates from such a regression are likely biased because
foster children differ along unobservable dimensions from those who were not removed. For
example, they may have lived in more difficult home environments or been more severely
maltreated. Such unobserved features would bias OLS estimates to understate the benefits
of foster care and overstate the costs.
18The analysis sample excludes children who were too young to have entered school at the time of their
investigation. Though these younger children appear in the child welfare data and, years later, may appear
in public school records, I find that foster placement caused a large and statistically significant reduction in
the likelihood that they ever enrolled in a Michigan public school. A likely explanation for this finding is that
about one-third of foster children were adopted upon exiting the foster system and may have legally changed
their last name prior to enrolling in school, meaning that the administrative child welfare and education
records were unlikely to match. It is also possible, however, that young children differentially moved out of
state or enrolled in private schools. Importantly, I find no evidence of differential attrition out of Michigan
public schools for currently enrolled students (Table A.1).
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1.4.1 Research Design
In order to overcome omitted variable bias, I use the examiner assignment research
design, which has been applied to other studies of foster care (Doyle, 2007, 2008) as well
as research on incarceration (Kling, 2006; Aizer and Doyle, 2015; Mueller-Smith, 2015),
disability insurance (Dahl et al., 2014), and evictions (Collinson and Reed, 2019; Humphries
et al., 2019), among others. Specifically, I instrument for placement using the removal
tendencies of quasi-randomly assigned investigators. By chance, children assigned to especially
strict investigators—those with high propensities to remove—were more likely to enter foster
care than they would have been if they happened to be assigned to a more lenient investigator.
In order to extract signal from noise in a measure of removal tendency, I restrict the
analysis to children assigned to investigators who worked at least 50 cases, inclusive of
quasi-randomly assigned cases outside of the analysis sample.19 This leaves 3,073 investigators
assigned to 315 cases on average. Following the literature, I calculate the instrument as the
fraction of all other investigations, both past and future, assigned to the same investigator








where nw equals the total number of cases assigned to investigator w and FCk is an indicator
equal to one if investigation k resulted in foster care.20 This instrument is equivalent to the
investigator fixed effect from a leave-out regression where foster placement is the dependent
variable.
The instrument has a mean of 0.030 and a standard deviation of 0.024, indicating
considerable variation in investigator tendencies. Crucial to the research design, there is
variation even among investigators who worked in the same local office. Figure 1.3 shows
the distribution of the instrument net of child zipcode by investigation year effects; an
investigator at the 10th percentile removed at a rate 2.1 percentage points less than others
in their local team while someone at the 90th percentile removed at a rate 2.4 percentage
points greater. Relative to the average removal rate of 3%, this represents a 150% increase
in the likelihood of foster placement.
I use the following instrumental variables specification to measure the causal effects of
19Table B.11 shows that the results are robust to both larger and smaller thresholds.
20There are other reasonable ways to measure removal stringency. For example, this approach does not
allow for investigator tendencies to change over time. Section 1.5.3.3 describes several alternatives and shows
that the results are robust across measures.
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foster care:
FCiw = γ0 + γ1Z
R
iw + γ2Xiw + θr + ηiw (1.2)
Yiw = β0 + β1 ˆFCiw + β2Xiw + θr + εiw (1.3)
where Yiw is a child outcome, such as their daily school attendance rate or their score
on a standardized math test, and Xiw is a vector of baseline covariates which includes a
variety of socio-demographic and academic characteristics.21 θr represent child zip code by
investigation year fixed effects to control for the level of investigator rotational assignment,
restricting the comparison to children who could have been assigned to the same investigator.22
There are 7,534 unique rotation groups, consisting of thirteen investigators on average.
Finally, I cluster standard errors at the investigator level.23
β̂1 is the local average treatment effect (LATE) of foster placement where compliers are
children for whom investigators might disagree about removal. Given likely heterogeneous
treatment effects, this study cannot speak to how foster care influences always takers—children
so clearly in danger at home that all investigators would remove—and never takers—those so
clearly safe that no investigators would remove. Even so, compliers represent a population
that is especially relevant for child welfare policy. As Dr. Jill Duerr Berrick, Zellerbach
Family Foundation Professor at the University of California Berkeley School of Social Welfare,
writes in The Impossible Imperative: Navigating the Competing Principles of Child Protection,
“Few professionals (if any) believe that large proportions of American children should be
taken from their parents, and few professionals (if any) believe that children should be kept
21Specifically, it includes controls for socio-demographic features, such as gender, grade level fixed effects,
race/ethnicity, and free or reduced-price lunch receipt. It also controls for baseline academic characteristics
measured in the year before the investigation, including attendance rate and receipt of special education
supports, as well as an indicator for ever retained in grade. It flexibly controls for a student’s most recent
baseline standardized math and reading test scores by including linear, quadratic, and cubic terms, as well
as the interaction of baseline math and reading performance. It consists of some information about the
maltreatment report, such as whether the allegation was for physical abuse or neglect, the child’s relation
to the perpetrator, and an indicator for whether the child was previously the subject of an investigation.
Furthermore, it controls for characteristics of the school that the child attended during the investigation,
such as indicators for whether they were enrolled in a charter or an urban school, the fraction of white, black
and Hispanic students, and the fraction who were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. It also controls
for characteristics of the child’s neighborhood, as defined by their census block group, including median
household income, employment rate, the fraction of adults with at least a bachelor’s degree, the fraction of
residents that were white, black and Hispanic, an indicator for whether the child experienced homelessness,
and the number of times the child moved neighborhoods. Lastly, it includes indicators for any missing
covariates.
22Child welfare staff from several local offices explained that some investigators only work in the northern
part of the county while others only work in the south, for example. However, such geographical boundaries
are neither publicly available nor observed in administrative data. Importantly, Table B.11 shows that the
results are robust to instead defining rotational assignment at the child county by investigation year level.
23The results are robust to clustering standard errors at the child level or using two-way clustering at the
investigator and child level. Results are available upon request.
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at home in dire circumstances...The debate is not, and should not, be at the ends of the
continuum. The divisions typically are animated not in the cases that are black and white,
but in the cases that occupy the center, gray area of child welfare” (Berrick, 2018).
1.4.2 Identifying Assumptions
Three assumptions are necessary for the LATE to be unbiased.
1. Relevance: γ1 6= 0. The instrument must predict foster placement. Table 1.2 shows
the first stage regression of foster placement on the removal stringency instrument. The
correlation between the instrument and foster care is 0.48 (Column 1) and a one standard
deviation (2.4 percentage points) increase in removal stringency increased the likelihood of
placement by about one percentage point (Column 4). The F-statistic of 439 indicates that
there is not a weak instruments problem.
2. Exclusion: E[Y |FC,X, θr, ZR1 ] = E[Y |FC,X, θr, ZR2 ]. The instrument can only
influence outcomes through foster placement. Though inherently untestable, the quasi-random
assignment of investigators lends credence to this assumption; a rich set of socio-demographic
characteristics and baseline academic measures are not jointly predictive of the instrument
despite being highly predictive of placement itself (Table 3.3). As further evidence, the first
stage F-statistic in Table 1.2 is stable with the inclusion of covariates and the instrument is
unrelated to the number of cases that investigators were assigned, which is a useful proxy
for investigator experience or thoroughness (Table A.3).
A potential concern is that investigators might have influenced children’s experiences
in the foster system, conditional on placement. However, investigators did not work with
children after the investigation; cases that required follow-up were transferred to other child
welfare caseworkers. Accordingly, the instrument does not predict the initial placement
setting or the number of days spent in the system (Table A.3).24
3. Monotonicity: E[FC|X, θr, ZR = j] ≥ E[FC|X, θr, ZR = k] or E[FC|X, θr, ZR = j] ≤
E[FC|X, θr, ZR = k] ∀j, k. Children who were removed by a particularly lenient investigator
would also have been removed by a stricter one and vice versa. Recent advances note,
however, that such pairwise monotonicity is neither realistic in most contexts nor necessary
to estimate local average treatment effects (Norris, 2019; Frandsen et al., 2019). Instead,
identifying the LATE requires a weaker assumption of average monotonicity, which states
24Another potential concern is that investigators vary along dimensions of the investigation process other
than foster placement that may influence outcomes (Mueller-Smith, 2015). I discuss this in detail in Section
1.5.2.2, as the impacts of these other dimensions, e.g., adult interventions, are themselves of substantive
interest.
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that for each child, the covariance between their investigator-specific removal treatment
status and investigator stringency is weakly positive.
It follows from average monotonicity that removal stringency and foster placement should
be positively correlated for all child subgroups. There are two complementary ways to probe
this implication. First, the first stage should be non-negative for all subgroups (Dobbie et al.,
2018), which holds for gender, race/ethnicity, age, and prior child welfare involvement groups
in my setting (Table A.4, Panel A).25 Second, investigators who were strict for certain groups
should also have been strict for others (Bhuller et al., 2018). For example, amidst serious
concerns of racism in maltreatment investigations (Clifford and Silver-Greenberg, 2017),
monotonicity asserts that investigators who were particularly likely to remove children of
color should also have been weakly stricter than their colleagues in their investigations of
white children. In support of the assumption, the first stage remains positive and statistically
significant when I re-calculate the instrument as a leave-subgroup-out measure (Table A.4,
Panel B).
1.5 Causal Effects of Foster Care on Children’s Outcomes
Table 1.4 shows the effects of foster care on several critical indicators of child wellbeing
covering the areas of safety, education, and crime. It reports the results from both the
OLS and 2SLS models using panel data spanning all of the school years following a child’s
investigation.26 The OLS results suggest that removal had a near-zero impact on the index of
child wellbeing. In contrast, the 2SLS estimate reveals that removal improved the wellbeing
index by 16.4% of a standard deviation, an effect statistically significant at the 5% level.
Two expected findings stand out from comparing the OLS and 2SLS results on the index
of child wellbeing. First, the OLS estimate is smaller than the 2SLS estimate, suggesting that
unobserved features, like the severity of maltreatment for example, lead OLS to understate
the benefits of removal. Second, the control mean, the mean outcome among all investigated
children who were not removed, is larger than the control complier mean, the estimated
outcome for compliers who were not removed. Specifically, the control complier mean is
25I do not create groups based on the type of maltreatment such as abuse or neglect because investigators
code this information after they begin their investigation. However, to the extent that different types of
maltreatment are related to observable child subgroups, the exercise offers an indirect test for non-monotonic
tendencies based on these features.
26Specifically, I construct an unbalanced panel at the investigation-school year level and restructure
non-educational outcomes to follow the school year calendar. For example, I define maltreatment reports
and juvenile petitions occurring between September 2010 and August 2011 as the 2010-2011 school year.
Children age out of the panel for certain outcomes—e.g., the age at which young people are tried in the
adult court system is sixteen years old in Michigan, so seventeen-year-olds are ineligible for the juvenile
delinquency outcome.
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6% of a standard deviation less than the control mean, indicating that children at-risk of
placement were worse off by remaining in the home than the average investigated child. While
the index provides a useful summary, I turn to the effects on each of the seven components
next in order to understand what drives the improvement as well as more easily interpret
magnitudes.
1.5.1 Effects on Child Safety, Academics, and Crime
Table 1.4 shows that foster children were safer than they would have been had they
remained at home, indicating that the foster system achieved its primary objective. The
2SLS estimates show that removal reduced the likelihood of being an alleged victim of
maltreatment in a subsequent investigation by 13.2 percentage points, a 52% reduction
relative to a complier mean of 25.5%. Similarly, it reduced the likelihood of being a confirmed
victim of maltreatment by 5.3 percentage points, a 56% reduction.
Although in theory these effects may represent a reduction in reporting behavior without
a change in underlying safety, the data does not support this interpretation. For example,
suppose that teachers were less likely to report minor bruises to child welfare if they knew
that the bruised student was, or had been, in foster care. We would still expect them
to report especially severe abuse against foster children though, since teachers and other
mandated reporters are required by law to report suspected maltreatment. Therefore, if
placement only reduced reporting, then the reported abuse against foster children should be
more serious than the reported incidents against children who were not removed. However, I
find that foster placement did not influence the likelihood of substantiation among children
with a subsequent investigation. Moreover, caseworkers, who are also mandatory reporters,
visited foster children regularly, both during their time in the system and after they exited,
suggesting that actual maltreatment against foster children should have been reported (USDHHS,
2016b).
Consistent with an improvement in child safety, I find large gains in academic outcomes.
Removal increased daily school attendance rates by 5.4 percentage points which, for the 180
day school year, is equivalent to showing up for ten additional days of school. I also find
that foster children were less likely to be retained in grade, though the effect is imprecisely
estimated. Furthermore, removal had a very large positive effect on standardized math test
scores of about one-third of a standard deviation.27 This estimate is statistically significant
at the 10% level, yet I can rule out decreases greater than 6% of a standard deviation.
27As a benchmark, Goodman (2014) estimates that each additional student absence reduces math
achievement by 0.05 standard deviations, suggesting that the estimated math score effect is roughly in
line with the increase in daily school attendance.
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In addition, while the point estimate on standardized reading test scores is positive and
substantively large, about half the size of the effect on math, it is not statistically significant.
This is not particularly surprising because reading skills are considered less malleable than
math at older ages.28
Lastly, I examine the effect of removal on juvenile delinquency, defined by the filing of
a juvenile court petition. The point estimate suggests a large decrease in juvenile crime—a
55% drop relative to a control complier mean of 5.1%—yet the estimate is imprecise. Overall,
the results across dimensions of safety, academics, and criminality consistently suggest that
foster care improved children’s outcomes.
1.5.2 Mechanisms
I examine the channels through which placement improved child outcomes through two
complementary exercises. First, I explore the impacts of placement over time, which help
understand the mechanisms at work because foster care is a temporary intervention. I focus
on four key dynamics: whom children lived with, where they lived, where they went to
school, and how their outcomes evolved. Second, I evaluate interventions targeted at birth
parents as a potential channel through which placement influences children.
1.5.2.1 Evidence from the Timing of Impacts
40% of children who were removed had exited the foster system after one year and nearly
all had exited after two years (Figure 1.4).29 I create an index of neighborhood and school
characteristics according to Kling et al. (2007) in order to explore the effects of placement
on childhood environment. The index consists of three neighborhood components: median
household income, the fraction of adults with a bachelor’s degree, and employment rate. It
also includes two school components: average math and reading test scores and the share of
free or reduced-price lunch eligible students. There was a large and statistically significant
increase in the index during the first year after placement (Table 1.5, Panel A).30 Given that
moving to lower-poverty areas can improve child wellbeing (Chetty et al., 2016; Kawano
et al., 2017; Chyn, 2018), such exposure might lead to contemporaneous gains in children’s
outcomes. However, there were no discernible differences in year one outcomes between
28Removal did not influence the likelihood of taking standardized tests (Table A.5). In addition, Table
A.6 shows the effects on high school graduation and college enrollment. However, the sample of children old
enough to be eligible for these outcomes is small and the analysis can not rule out considerable positive or
negative effects.
29They spent nineteen months in foster care, on average (Table A.7).
30This was driven by exposure to more highly educated neighborhoods and higher-income classmates
(Table A.8).
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children placed and not placed in foster care (Table 1.5, Panel A).31 That foster children
were no more or less likely to be abused or neglected in the first year may be especially
surprising since maltreatment in foster homes is extremely rare. It is possible, however, that
the threat of child removal reduced the maltreatment of children who were not removed in
the short-run.
Nearly all (85%) marginal foster children had exited the system after two years and the
vast majority were reunified with their birth parents.32 Upon exiting, foster children returned
to similar neighborhoods and schools as untreated compliers; I do not detect differences in
the characteristics of their neighborhoods or schools after the first year (Table 1.5, Panel B).
Despite this, gains in safety and academic outcomes emerged several years after removal.
Specifically, the index of child wellbeing increased by 19% of a standard deviation across all
years after the first, driven by gains in safety, daily school attendance rates, and standardized
math test scores (Table 1.5, Panel B). Figure 1.5 shows the effects separately by year,
revealing that there were steady improvements in most outcomes that persist for several
years. For example, the likelihood of being the victim of maltreatment only began to decrease
after four years and continued to decrease every year for three more.33
A likely explanation for this surprising pattern is that children returned to more safe
and nurturing homes after exiting the system. Given that most children were reunified
with their birth parents, this can largely be interpreted as parental improvement. There
are several institutional features which support this channel. First, after their children were
removed, birth parents worked closely with social workers to address challenges in their own
lives, such as confronting drug addiction, finding stable employment, securing housing, or
strengthening parenting skills. Second, birth parents received fully funded services to help
with these challenges, like substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, or counseling.34
Lastly, a judge needs to approve that it is safe for children to return home before they can
be reunified with their birth parents. In addition to these institutional reasons, I also find
statistical evidence of birth parent improvement. Perpetrators of child maltreatment, almost
always a birth parent, were less likely to abuse or neglect children even years later if their
31For ease of interpretation, Table 1.5 and all further analyses report only a set of the outcomes that were
statistically significant at the 10% level from Table 1.4. Additional results are available upon request.
32Table A.9 shows that of the remaining 15% who exited: 8% were adopted, 5% had guardianship
transferred, and 2% turned eighteen years old and legally exited foster care as adults.
33These estimates represent time-since-treatment effects rather than age-of-treatment effects because all
specifications include fixed effects for student grade level at the time of the investigation.
34There is no reliable measure of the cost of services for the birth parents of foster children because
they are funded by many different sources. They may be covered through Medicaid, funded by the state,
or contracted through individual counties. For reference, Stacie Bladen, the Deputy Director of MDHHS’
Children’s Services Agency, communicated via email that the state’s costs associated with serving parents
of children in foster care was at least $16 million in 2019, or roughly $1,200 per child.
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initial child victim entered foster care (Figure 1.5e).
Though I can not definitively rule them out, I find little evidence for two alternative
explanations of the pattern of impacts. First, it is possible that moving to lower-poverty
areas during placement improved child outcomes. However, credibly identified studies of
mobility find that such effects increase with duration (Chetty et al., 2016; Chyn, 2018),
yet exposure in my context was only temporary. Furthermore, Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006)
and Jacob (2004) find that the long-run benefits of moving do not run through schooling
channels, yet foster care had large impacts on educational outcomes.
Second, it could be that children’s experiences while in foster care benefitted them only
years later, i.e., foster care could trigger additional supports whose benefits take time to
manifest. In particular, if the costs related to family separation are high in the short run
yet fade over time, even the benefits from channels that have more immediate impacts may
appear only years later. However, I find no evidence that foster care increased supports in
school either during placement or after exiting, as proxied by receipt of special education
services (Table 1.5, Column 6). Moreover, while children may have benefitted from placement
in other ways, perhaps through access to better counseling, new role models, or more
nutritious meals, credible estimates of these channels for school-age children consistently
find effects on standardized test scores of less than one-tenth of a standard deviation, much
smaller than the 0.34 standard deviation increase in math test scores found in this study.35
Therefore, evidence from the timing of impacts suggests that positive changes made by
birth parents were a key channel through which foster placement improved children’s safety
and schooling. This finding begs the question of how child removal influenced birth parents,
which I describe in detail in the next section.
1.5.2.2 Evidence from Adult Interventions
Following child removal, birth parents received two broad types of services: light-touch,
community-based services, like referrals to food pantries and local drug rehabilitation groups,
and intensive, targeted services, like funded substance abuse treatment, parenting classes,
and employment programs. What were the roles of these services in explaining the large,
positive effects of foster care on children? It is challenging to disentangle this channel from
the dramatic changes occurring in children’s own lives because they both happen at the
same time. However, a useful comparison group exists because quasi-randomly assigned
35See, for example, Carrell and Hoekstra (2014) and Mulhern (2019) for the effects of school counselors,
Dee (2004) for the effects of teacher role models, Heller (2014) for the effects of summer jobs and mentors,
Anderson et al. (2018) for the effects of healthier meals, and Figlio and Winicki (2005); Leos-Urbel et al.
(2013); Imberman and Kugler (2014); Frisvold (2015); Schwartz and Rothbart (2017) for the effects of greater
access to food.
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investigators could offer these services to adults even if their children were not removed.
To study the role of adult interventions, I exploit the fact that quasi-randomly assigned
investigators had discretion over adult services in addition to child removal. As shown
in Figure 1.2, investigators placed families on one of four tracks based on the strength of
evidence that maltreatment occurred and the child’s risk of future harm: (1) no services, (2)
community-based services, (3) community-based and targeted services, and (4) child removal
plus community-based and targeted services.36 As such, I create two new instruments
according to Equation 1.1: investigator propensity to recommend community-based services
alone and investigator propensity to recommend both community-based and targeted services
without child removal. Together with the main removal stringency measure, I use these new
measures to simultaneously instrument for tracks two, three, and four.37
Table 1.6 shows the three distinct local average treatment effects estimated from this
exercise, which yield two key takeaways. First, I find large, positive effects of child removal
plus targeted and community services relative to both types of services without child removal
that are nearly identical to the main analysis in Table 1.4, though less precise. This addresses
a potential violation of the exclusion restriction in that by having discretion over adult
services, investigators may influence children in ways other than foster care (Mueller-Smith,
2015). For example, a violation of the exclusion restriction arises if investigators who were
more likely to remove children were also more likely to recommend targeted services, and
tendencies over targeted services are not included in the estimation. Since the point estimates
for foster care are very similar to the main specification, this exercise suggests that the
removal stringency instrument operates through foster placement.
Second, though limited by statistical power, I find that the individual impacts of targeted
and community services are qualitatively smaller than the combined effect of both types
of adult interventions together with child removal. This offers suggestive evidence that
child removal was a crucial component of the foster care intervention. Of note, however, a
limitation of this exercise is that, unlike the main analysis of cases where investigators might
disagree about placement, it identifies effects for children who faced lower risk and were not
candidates for foster care. For example, the LATE for community-based services identifies
effects for families at the margin of receiving any services. However, to the extent that these
services have similar impacts for struggling families, the results indicate that child removal
36While I observe track assignment in the child welfare records, I do not observe the specific types of
services received — e.g., substance abuse treatment or parenting classes.
37The three instruments are positively, but not perfectly, correlated with each other, indicating that there
is independent identifying variation from each. Within local office teams, the correlation between the removal
instrument and the propensity for community services alone is 0.14, between the removal instrument and
tendency for both targeted and community services is 0.24, and between the two non-removal instruments
is 0.60.
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was necessary for adult interventions to be effective.
There are at least two explanations as to why adult interventions may have been less
effective while children remained in the home. First, they might have lacked sufficient
intensity. Unlike services offered to the birth parents of foster children, which lasted up
to 24 months and were monitored by both the child welfare office and the courts, services
lasted at most twelve months and participation was tracked only by the local child welfare
office when the child was not removed. A second potential explanation is that child removal
was critical to ensure adult compliance. For example, temporary relief from parenting may
have provided birth parents with the time and space needed to overcome challenges in
their own lives. Child removal might also have increased adult incentives to engage with
these programs. Prior work highlights that services like drug rehabilitation or job training
programs often have high failure rates overall (SAMHSA, 2009; Barnow and Smith, 2015),
yet birth parents of foster children may have put in more effort than the average participant.
Overall, this section highlights the importance of framing foster placement as a family
intervention. Evidence from the timing of impacts as well as from an analysis of adult
services suggests that improvements made by birth parents were an important mechanism
to explain gains in children’s outcomes.
1.5.3 Compliers Analysis, Subgroup Effects, and Robustness Checks
1.5.3.1 Contextualizing Children at the Margin of Foster Placement
The estimates in this study represent effects for children at the margin of placement, those
in which investigators might disagree over whether foster care is appropriate. In order to
better understand how these children compared to the overall population of foster children,
I report complier characteristics in Table A.10, estimated according to the methodology in
Dahl et al. (2014). I find that 5% of investigated children in the sample were compliers.
Compliers were younger than the average foster child—61% were ten years old or younger at
the start of their investigation relative to just 51% of foster children overall—yet otherwise
looked similar in terms of demographic and baseline academic characteristics.
To contextualize the positive effects of placement, it is also useful to explore how marginal
children experienced the foster system. Table A.11 compares the experiences of these
children, calculated using the instrumental variables design, to the overall population of foster
children, defined as the mean among all foster children in the sample. While these groups
were initially placed in similar types of homes—e.g., 57.2% of children at the margin were
initially placed with relatives compared to 58.2% of all placements— their experiences varied
in terms of placement stability, length of time in foster care, and permanency outcomes.
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Children at the margin had more stable placements; 51% experienced just one or two
different placements compared to 44% of all foster children in the sample. They also spent
about 38 fewer days in the system and were more likely to be reunified with their birth
parents. Therefore, marginal children had more stable placements, quicker exits, and higher
reunification rates than the overall population of foster children, all of which are important
objectives for foster care systems.
1.5.3.2 Heterogeneity by Child Age and Gender
Previous work highlights disparities in how children respond to environmental changes
by age, finding that young children benefit from moving to lower-poverty areas more than
older youth (Chetty et al., 2016; Chyn, 2018). I find similar effects for foster placement.
Table A.12 shows that foster care improved the index of child wellbeing for young children,
those ages ten and younger at the beginning of the investigation, by 19.6% of a standard
deviation, an effect statistically significant at the 5% level. This was almost twice as large
as the point estimate for older youth, which was not statistically significant. Though the
positive effects of placement were qualitatively driven by young children, the estimates are
not statistically different from each other.
In addition, previous work shows that males are often more vulnerable than females to
childhood disadvantage or disruption (Kling et al., 2005; Bertrand and Pan, 2013; Autor
et al., 2019). However, Table A.12 shows that the impacts of placement were similarly
positive for both groups. Further exploring this heterogeneity using age by gender groups
reveals that the effects were qualitatively larger for young male children than for young female
children, yet qualitatively larger for female youth than for male youth. Taken together, this
exercise indicates that the intersection between age and gender may play an important role
in determining the impacts of placement.38
1.5.3.3 Robustness Checks
Table B.11 shows that the main results are robust in both sign and magnitude to a variety
of design decisions. I conduct the analysis using alternative samples (Panel A). First, I limit
the sample to only the first investigation of each child. Next, I test sensitivity to the number
of cases an investigator must have been assigned to be included in the sample. The main
analysis excludes children assigned to investigators who worked fewer than 50 cases, so I
relax this threshold to 25 and also strengthen it to 75. The results are similar to those in
38Though LGBTQ youth are over-represented in foster care (HRC, 2015) and have especially traumatic
experiences in the system (Sullivan et al., 2001), this study is unable to examine differences along this margin
because the administrative data sources do not include information on sexual orientation or gender identity.
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the main analysis across these three alternative samples. Lastly, I restrict the analysis to a
balanced panel consisting of the first five follow-up years for students that could be observed
in the public school system for five years after their investigation based on their grade level
and year of investigation—those investigated in seventh grade or below in 2012 or earlier.
The impacts of foster placement were nearly twice as large in the balanced panel as the main
analysis. This is consistent with the previously discussed results. Specifically, the effects in
the main analysis could not have been driven by the placement of older children or those
investigated later in the sample period because Section 1.5.2.1 shows that impacts appear
only several years after removal. Similarly, the subgroup analysis in Section 1.5.3.2 shows
qualitatively larger effects for younger children.
I also check for robustness using other reasonable ways to measure investigator removal
tendencies (Panel B). First, I randomly split the sample in half and define the instrument as
the investigator’s removal rate from the other half of the sample. Second, I allow tendencies
to vary over time by creating a leave-out-other-years measure. Third, I address concerns
that removal decisions occurring around the same time may be correlated by constructing a
leave-out-same-year measure. Lastly, I use an empirical Bayes shrinkage procedure, following
the measure of teacher-value added in Chetty et al. (2014).39 Though they vary in precision,
I find large, positive effects of foster care across all of the alternative instruments.
Finally, I test sensitivity to the definition of rotational assignment (Panel C). The main
analysis includes zip code by investigation year fixed effects because some of the local offices
in Michigan divide investigators into teams based on small regions. A tiny fraction of zip
codes in Michigan cross county lines, however, which could create measurement error in the
main analysis. Importantly, the results are very similar when I instead include county by
investigation year fixed effects.
1.6 Potential Bias in Examiner Assignment Research Design from
Censored Data
The examiner assignment research design used in this study has been widely applied
recently as increased access to large administrative datasets allows researchers to exploit
discretionary decision-making. It has been used to study a variety of interventions other than
39Specifically, I randomly split the sample in half and create a shrunken measure using investigations
from the other half of the sample. The procedure first regresses foster placement on investigation year fixed
effects and investigator fixed effects and stores the investigator fixed effect plus the residual term. I collapse
the data to the investigator by year level, keeping the mean of this stored value for every cell. Then, I regress
this stored value in year t for each investigator on their stored value in years t − 2, t − 1, t + 1, and t + 2,
along with missing indicators where necessary. The shrunken stringency measure is the predicted value of
this final regression.
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foster care, such as juvenile incarceration (Aizer and Doyle, 2015; Eren and Mocan, 2017),
adult incarceration (Kling, 2006; Mueller-Smith, 2015), disability insurance (Dahl et al.,
2014), student loan repayment (Herbst, 2018), and evictions (Collinson and Reed, 2019;
Humphries et al., 2019), among others. In many of these settings, treatment assignment
is a two-step selection process in which individuals are assigned to treatment only after
crossing an initial decision threshold. For example, in the context of foster care, children
can only be removed if their maltreatment allegation is first substantiated. Similarly, in the
criminal justice setting, defendants can only be incarcerated conditional on being convicted.
Whether due to restrictions from data partners or privacy considerations, some studies apply
this design using partially censored data that contains only individuals that cross the initial
decision threshold, e.g., only substantiated investigations or only convicted defendants. Such
restrictions appear in two recent studies of foster care (Bald et al., 2019; Roberts, 2019) as
well as in other contexts (Kling, 2006; Eren and Mocan, 2017; Herbst, 2018), and may
introduce bias.
To understand the source of potential bias, consider decisions made by investigators
in the context of foster care. Substantiation decisions are based on the strength of the
evidence while placement decisions are based on the child’s risk of future harm.40 The
research design assumes that, due to random assignment, the distribution of risk is identical
across investigators and therefore identifies impacts using exogenous variation in investigator
tolerance over risk. However, if investigators also vary in their stringency over evidence, the
set of substantiated cases may not be balanced across investigators. Therefore, restricted
data access can create a violation of the exclusion restriction.41
In addition to the usual instrumental variables assumptions of relevance, exclusion,
and monotonicity, at least one additional assumption must be satisfied for the examiner
assignment design to produce unbiased estimates from censored data (Arteaga, 2019). Either
investigators must not vary over substantiation—i.e., investigators always agree over evidence—or
the investigator’s substantiation decision must be uncorrelated with the child’s potential
outcomes. The former assumption is at odds with the motivation of the research design,
given that the design hinges upon variation in investigator tendencies. Moreover, at least
in Michigan, there is a large amount of variation in substantiation tendencies.42 The latter
40These two decisions may be correlated, yet they are distinct margins. For example, there can be clear
evidence for an allegation when the child faces little risk of future harm or less clear evidence in a higher
risk scenario.
41The exclusion restriction is inherently untestable. Though standard balance tests offer one way to probe
whether it holds, they may be underpowered or not fully capture unobservable differences. Balance tests are
most reliable when backed with institutional evidence about the randomization process.
42Investigators at the 10th percentile substantiated at a rate 8.4 percentage points less than others in
their local team while investigators at the 90th percentile did so at a rate 8.9 percentage points greater.
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assumption is also very strong; it would be surprising if the substantiation decision—which is
based on how much evidence there is that the reported maltreatment actually occurred—was
unrelated to children’s potential outcomes.
Though this is not the first study to describe the potential for bias from censored data,
it is the first to shed light on how much it can matter in practice. Using data containing
the universe of child welfare investigations in Michigan, including both unsubstantiated and
substantiated allegations, I replicate the main analysis as if I only had access to substantiated
cases. After reconstructing the removal instrument according to Equation 1.1 using only the
sample of substantiated investigations, I find that standard balance tests are sensitive to the
inclusion of baseline standardized test scores.43 This offers evidence that data constraints
can create a violation of the exclusion restriction.
Table 1.7 shows that the true effects using the complete data (Panel A) are larger than
those found when restricted to substantiated investigations (Panel B).44 45 The replication
exercise produces a substantively small and statistically insignificant impact on the index
of child wellbeing. The effect on daily attendance rate is moderately smaller than the true
effect yet still statistically significant, while the point estimate on math test scores is over
0.28 standard deviations smaller and is imprecise. The findings in Panel B of Table 1.7 are
somewhat similar to those in Bald et al. (2019), which finds noisy estimates for school-age
children, and to Roberts (2019) which reports imprecise estimates on test scores but positive
effects for on-time grade progression. While institutional differences between the child welfare
systems in Michigan, Rhode Island, and South Carolina surely contribute to the different
findings, this exercise documents that bias in the other studies may also play a role. Overall,
this exercise cautions against applying the examiner assignment design with censored data.46
43Specifically, Table A.14 shows that the censored instrument is unrelated to many observable child
characteristics, yet does not pass a standard balance test when prior test scores are included as covariates.
In comparison, Roberts (2019) passes a balance test that includes baseline test scores, while Bald et al. (2019)
rejects statistical significance at the one percent level in a joint balance test for school-age girls, but passes
the balance test for school-age boys. Balance tests in other studies may be underpowered, however—even
the sample of substantiated investigations in Michigan with available baseline test scores in Michigan is 1.6
times larger than the sample in South Carolina and 2.3 times larger than the school-age sample in Rhode
Island.
44Table A.15 shows that there exists a strong first stage relationship with the censored instrument.
In addition, it is possible that Panel B in Table 1.7, which compares placement to substantiated cases,
represents a different LATE than Panel A. To address this potential concern, I use investigator tendencies over
substantiation and removal to instrument for both foster placement and substantiation. Table A.16 shows
that the estimates in Panel B are also smaller than the causal effects of placement relative to substantiation
from the complete data.
45Table A.17 shows that the OLS estimates are very similar from both the complete data and when
restricted to substantiated investigations, however.
46In addition, while Arteaga (2019) proposes a reasonable approach to use the examiner assignment design
to recover unbiased estimates with censored data, the study cannot empirically assess how well the approach
performs in practice because it only accesses censored data itself. Appendix A.1.1 shows that the proposed
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1.7 Conclusion
This paper offers some of the only causal estimates of foster care on crucial indicators
of child wellbeing: safety, education, and crime. To do so, I leverage the quasi-random
assignment of child welfare investigators who vary in their propensity to recommend placement.
Using detailed administrative data from Michigan to study over 200,000 child welfare investigations
between 2008 and 2016, I find that placement improved a variety of children’s outcomes.
Foster children were 50% less likely to be abused or neglected in the future, relative to
a baseline mean of 25.5%. Placement also increased daily school attendance by 6%, or
about ten additional days of school every year, and improved standardized math test scores
by one-third of a standard deviation, the equivalent of moving from the 33rd to the 46th
percentile in the state. I also estimate a substantively large, yet statistically insignificant,
reduction in juvenile delinquency.
1.7.1 External Validity
As child welfare systems in the United States vary across states, it is important to consider
the generalizability of these results. Overall, foster care in Michigan is similar to others in
terms of how long children remain in the system and the stability of their placements (AECF,
2017). Among all children in foster care in the US in 2015, the average child had spent
nineteen months in the system, ranging from just twelve months in Idaho to 35 months in
Illinois. At seventeen months, Michigan, along with eight other states, ranked eighteenth in
this measure. Similarly, 35% of foster children in the US had lived in at least three different
foster homes, ranging from 24% in Wyoming to 54% in Illinois. Michigan ranked seventeenth
in this measure at 31%. Furthermore, among all children in the US who exited the system
in 2015, 51% reunified with their birth parents compared to 47% of children in Michigan.
In addition, it is also unlikely that the services for families with maltreated children who
were not removed in Michigan were notably different than those in other states. Though
there is no publicly available data on the quality of prevention services across states, there
is little rigorous evidence of effective services from any state.47 Overall, the child welfare
system in Michigan during the sample period was fairly typical of those in other states.48
method does little to resolve bias in the current context.
47Specifically, there are only 32 programs, spanning infant and toddler mental health to adult substance
abuse treatment, that received the highest evaluation rating on the California Evidence-Based Clearinghouse
for Child Welfare (CEBC) as of October 2019. For comparison, the What Works Clearinghouse includes 76
studies of pre-kindergarten alone that met its highest standards of rigor and almost 500 of K-12 education
(IES, 2017).
48Michigan did make substantive changes to its child welfare system following a July 2008 settlement in
Dwayne B. v. Snyder, yet this does not considerably inhibit the external validity of my analysis for several
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A second important consideration for the generalizability of the results is that this paper
focuses exclusively on the effects of foster care for school-age children.49 Bald et al. (2019)
and Roberts (2019) make critical advances in this regard, finding that placement can have
benefits for young children, yet as previously shown in Section 1.6, data constraints in these
papers may preclude a causal interpretation. Since they make up nearly half of the foster
care population, more evidence is needed on how placement influences young children.
1.7.2 Implications for Public Policy
The new research findings from this paper have important implications for public policy,
especially in light of the Family First Prevention Services Act which took effect in October
2019. The legislation introduced massive changes to the child welfare system. Most relevant
for this study, it made reducing the use of foster care a federal priority by allocating up
to eight billion dollars of federal Title IV-E funds for states to spend on alternatives to
placement. Previously reserved for foster care and adoption budgets, except for waivers
permitted in special cases, states can now use this funding stream on services to prevent
foster care entry among children at-risk of placement. Therefore, the effectiveness of this
policy hinges on both the population of children that states deem as candidates for foster
care and the prevention services that states choose to fund. My analysis from Michigan helps
to shed light on both of these issues.
First, by showing that placement improved outcomes in Michigan, which uses foster care
less often than other states, this paper highlights states where the new federal policy may be
most and least effective. Specifically, Michigan ranked 12th in the rate of foster care entry in
2017; just 3.1 of every 1000 children in Michigan entered foster care relative to the national
median of 4.1 (USDHHS, 2017b).50 The Children’s Bureau’s annual report to Congress notes
in 2016 that, “it is unlikely that these variations can be attributed to differences in the rates
of child victims” (USDHHS, 2016a).51 Therefore, my analysis suggests that foster care can
reasons. First, my sample period begins in 2008. Second, lawsuits against child welfare systems are common;
sixteen other states and many cities have faced similar lawsuits between 1999 and 2018 (ChildrensRights,
nd). Lastly, changes required by the settlement, such as increasing the education requirements for caseworker
hiring, implementing pre-service training, and reducing worker caseload, made Michigan’s system more
similar to others across the country.
49Though I observe the child welfare investigations of younger children, it is challenging to follow them
across administrative data systems over time because they are disproportionately likely to be adopted and
legally change their last names.
50Figure A.1b shows the variation in foster care entry across states in 2017, ranging from 1.5 per 1000
children in Virginia to 13.3 in West Virginia.
51It is difficult to measure the actual rate of foster care entry among child victims of abuse and neglect
because both the definition of substantiation and the use of alternatives to formal maltreatment investigations
vary dramatically across states.
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be beneficial for children’s wellbeing when reserved for relatively high-risk cases.52 Though
this paper does not study all of the outcomes that should be considered—e.g., mental health
or the trauma associated with family separation—the findings suggest that, all else equal,
the Family First Prevention Services Act may be helpful for children in some states, but
potentially harmful for children in others.
Second, this paper underscores that states must invest in high-quality prevention services
for the new federal policy to be most effective. Since this study finds that foster placement
had benefits for at-risk children relative to offering services in the home, a focus on the
efficacy of prevention services is critical. In particular, the evidence indicates that birth
parents improve their parenting as a result of their children being placed in foster care,
which suggests that states should invest in prevention programs that better engage with
birth parents as they work toward transformational life changes like overcoming addiction,
securing housing, or gaining employment. Learning what works to keep vulnerable children
safe and thriving when they remain in their homes and understanding how to scale these
interventions is a crucial next frontier for future research.
52Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that the estimate of placement on the index of child wellbeing
is twice as large in Michigan counties that remove at a rate below the state median than in counties that
remove at a rate above it (0.26 compared to 0.13).
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Figure 1.1: Comparison of State Foster Care Systems
(a) 1998 Statistics
(b) 2015 Statistics
Notes. These figures show statistics about state foster care systems from 1998, the first year of publicly
available data, reported in USDHHS (2003) and from 2015 reported in USDHHS (2017a). Due to a change
in reporting, the horizontal axis shows the median number of months spent in foster care for each state in
1998 and the average number of months in 2015. The vertical axis shows the share of foster children who
lived in at least three different foster homes in both periods. In 1998, ten states did not report either of
these statistics.
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Notes. This figure describes the child maltreatment investigation process in Michigan. Substantiated
means that investigators found enough evidence to support the abuse or neglect allegation. Conditional on
substantiation, low-risk families received either a referral to community-based services like a local food pantry
or drug rehabilitation group while high-risk families additionally receive targeted services like substance abuse
treatment or parenting classes. In cases with the most intensive risk, the child is also removed from the home
and placed in foster care.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Investigator Removal Stringency Instrument
Notes. This figure shows the distribution of the removal stringency instrument residualized by the level
of rotational assignment. That is, the instrument is shown net of child zipcode by investigation year fixed
effects in order to show that there is variation in propensity to remove within local offices. The instrument is
calculated as the fraction of all other investigations—both past and future—assigned to the same investigator
that resulted in foster placement.
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Figure 1.4: Effects of Foster Care on Likelihood of Being in Foster System Over Time
Notes. This figure reports the results from 2SLS regressions of the likelihood of being in the foster system
on an indicator for foster placement using removal stringency to instrument for placement. It plots both
the point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals. All specifications include the covariates as listed in
the text, as well as zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by investigator.
Children are defined as being in the foster system during a given month if they were ever in foster care
during that month. The figure shows the results from an unbalanced panel where children who turn eighteen
years old exit from the analysis. The point estimate can be negative in the rare case that control compliers
eventually entered foster care.
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Figure 1.5: Effects of Foster Care Over Time
(a) Index of Child Wellbeing
(b) Child is Confirmed Victim of
Maltreatment (Cumulative)
(c) Daily Attendance Rate (d) Std Math Score
(e) Original Perpetrator Alleged for Child
Maltreatment Again (Cumulative)
Notes. These figures report the results from 2SLS regressions of the outcome variable on foster care using removal stringency to instrument for
foster care. They plot both the point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals. All specifications include the covariates as listed in the text,
as well as zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. Follow-up years after the investigation are
defined by school years even for non-schooling outcomes. Figure 1.5e represents the effect of child removal on the cumulative number of future
allegations of child maltreatment against the original perpetrator. Since multiple perpetrators can be involved in the original case, this represents
the mean effect across all perpetrators. For reference, 56% of investigations involved a single perpetrator, 97% involved one or two, and 99.4%
involved three or fewer.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Analysis Sample
(1) (2) (3)
All Michigan All Foster
Students Care
Child Socio-Demographics
Female 0.49 0.49 0.47
White 0.67 0.62 0.52
Black 0.21 0.29 0.39
Hispanic 0.08 0.07 0.07
Other Race 0.05 0.03 0.02
Age 11.70 10.34 10.59
Grade in School 6.15 4.76 4.93
Low Income 0.49 0.83 0.87
Prior Schooling Characteristics
Attendance Rate 0.95 0.81 0.74
Special Education 0.14 0.22 0.23
Ever Retained in Grade 0.20 0.36 0.39
Std Math Score 0.00 -0.27 -0.36
Std Reading Score 0.00 -0.25 -0.34
Investigation Characteristics




Foster Care 0.02 1.00
Observations 1,262,665 242,233 4,809
Notes. This table reports summary statistics for three groups of students,
and the unit of analysis changes across columns. Column one consists of the
cross-section of Michigan public school students during the 2016-2017 academic
year enrolled in grades one through eleven. All variables listed in column one are
measured during the 2016-2017 school year, and age is defined as of September 1,
2016. Column two contains all investigations in the analysis sample while column
three contains the subset of investigations that resulted in foster placement. The
socio-demographic variables in columns two and three are measured in the school
year of the investigation. Low income is measured by free or reduced-price lunch
eligibility. The prior schooling characteristics are measured in the school year
prior to the investigation. Math and reading test scores are normalized for the
entire state to have mean zero and standard deviation of one within every subject
by grade by year cell. The abuse and neglect categories are coded to be mutually
exclusive indicators such that abuse is equal to one for any investigation that
involved physical abuse while neglect is equal to one for all investigations that
did not involve physical abuse.
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Table 1.2: First Stage Effect of Removal Stringency on Foster Placement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foster Foster Foster Foster
Care Care Care Care
Removal Stringency 0.480∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 242,233 242,233 242,233 242,233
F-Statistic 658.980 441.260 440.570 438.750
Zipcode by Year FE X X X
Socio-Demographic Controls X X
Academic Controls X
Notes. This table reports the results from regressions of foster placement on the
leave-out measure of removal stringency. Each column includes a different set of
covariates. Socio-demographic controls include gender, race/ethnicity, indicators
for grade in school, an indicator for whether the child was the subject of a prior
investigation, and the number of prior investigations. Academic controls include
an indicator for free or reduced-price lunch eligibility, an indicator for receipt
of special education services, an indicator for ever retained in grade, and daily
attendance rate—measured in the school year prior to the investigation—as well
as the most recent pre-investigation score from standardized math and reading test
scores. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, ***
p< 0.01.
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Table 1.3: Balance Tests for the Conditional Random Assignment of Investigators
Full Sample 4th Grade and Above
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foster Removal Foster Removal
Care Stringency Care Stringency
F-Statistic from Joint Test 18.119 0.953 12.505 1.001
P-Value from Joint Test 0.000 0.530 0.000 0.463
Observations 242,233 242,233 144,032 144,032
Notes. This table reports the results from regressions of the dependent variable on a variety
of socio-demographic and academic covariates as well as zipcode by investigation year fixed
effects. Columns 1 and 2 include the full sample of investigations and exclude standardized
test scores in the vector of covariates. As students in Michigan begin taking statewide
standardized tests in grade three, columns 3 and 4 report results for students enrolled in at
least grade four during the maltreatment investigation and include standardized test scores.
Table A.2 reports the full set of results. Standard errors are clustered by investigator.
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Table 1.4: Effects of Foster Care on Child Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Index of Alleged Confirmed Daily Retained Std Math Std Reading Juvenile
Child Victim of Victim of Attendance in Grade Score Score Delinquency
Wellbeing Maltreatment Maltreatment Rate
Panel A: OLS
Foster Care -0.005 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.015) (0.004)
{0.000} {0.177} {0.046} {0.912} {0.051} {-0.501} {-0.479} {0.025}
Panel B: 2SLS
Foster Care 0.164∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.053∗ 0.054∗∗ -0.019 0.339∗ 0.162 -0.028
(0.075) (0.066) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.203) (0.216) (0.038)
{-0.063} {0.255} {0.094} {0.893} {0.063} {-0.429} {-0.234} {0.051}
Observations 242,233 242,233 242,233 224,925 242,204 177,118 177,084 134,076
Notes. Panel A reports the results from OLS regressions of the outcome variable on foster care while Panel B reports the results from 2SLS regressions
using removal stringency to instrument for foster care. The curly brackets below the standard error represent the control mean in Panel A and the
control complier mean in Panel B. All regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by investigator. The education and crime outcomes do not include all of the observations in the sample. Specifically, some grade
level and attendance records are missing and students may not have taken a standardized math or reading test if they were too young or old to be in
grades 3-8, were absent from school on a test day, or were exempt. Furthermore, juvenile delinquency data is missing for eight counties, is available
only through 2015, and is relevant only for children younger than Michigan’s age of majority of sixteen. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Effects of Foster Care Over Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index of Index of Confirmed Daily Std Math Received
Neighborhood Child Victim of Attendance Score Special
& School Wellbeing Maltreatment Rate Education
Characteristics Services
Panel A: One Year After Investigation
Foster Care 0.257∗∗ 0.067 -0.024 0.039 -0.218 -0.012
(0.117) (0.095) (0.060) (0.036) (0.211) (0.065)
{-0.147} {0.028} {0.068} {0.912} {0.062} {0.099}
Panel B: Two+ Years After Investigation
Foster Care 0.066 0.194∗∗ -0.065∗ 0.060∗ 0.558∗∗ 0.016
(0.141) (0.089) (0.035) (0.032) (0.239) (0.107)
{-0.011} {-0.092} {0.102} {0.885} {-0.624} {0.035}
Observations 242,233 242,233 242,233 224,925 177,118 242,233
Notes. This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of the outcome variable on foster care using removal
stringency to instrument for foster care. Panel A reports results for outcomes measured during the first school year
after the investigation and Panel B reports results across all school years after the first. The curly brackets below
the standard error represents the control complier mean. The index of neighborhood and school characteristics is
made up of neighborhood median income, educational attainment, and employment rate, as well as school average
test scores and income level. The effects on each component of the index of neighborhood and school characteristics
is shown in Table A.8. The p-value reports whether the subgroup estimates are statistically different from each other.
All regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
37
Table 1.6: Effects of Adult Interventions on Child Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index of Confirmed Daily Std Math
Child Victim of Attendance Score
Wellbeing Maltreatment Rate
Child Removal, 0.123 -0.038 0.060∗ 0.310
Targeted Services, and (0.098) (0.041) (0.037) (0.266)
Community Services
Targeted Services and 0.049 -0.018 0.002 0.105
Community Services (0.037) (0.016) (0.012) (0.096)
Community Services -0.032 0.012 -0.005 -0.095
(0.024) (0.010) (0.008) (0.064)
Observations 242,233 242,233 224,925 177,118
Notes. This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of the outcome variable on three
treatment conditions: community services, targeted and community services, and foster care
plus targeted and community services. It uses investigator stringency in evidence and risk
levels to simultaneously instrument for the independent variables respectively. All regressions
include the covariates as listed in the text and zipcode by investigation year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Effects of Foster Care on Child Outcomes Using Censored Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index of Confirmed Daily Std Math
Child Victim of Attendance Score
Wellbeing Maltreatment Rate
Panel A: Complete Data, Unsubstantiated and Substantiated
Foster Care 0.164∗∗ -0.053∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.339∗
(0.075) (0.031) (0.027) (0.203)
Observations 242,233 242,233 224,925 177,118
Panel B: Censored Data, Only Substantiated
Foster Care 0.026 -0.009 0.039∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.040) (0.018) (0.014) (0.107)
Size of Bias 0.138 0.044 0.015 0.277
Observations 47,469 47,469 43,839 35,322
Notes. Panel A reports the 2SLS results from Table 1.4 while Panel B reports
the results from 2SLS regressions of the outcome variable on foster care using
censored removal stringency to instrument for foster care. The sample in Panel B
is restricted to only substantiated investigations. The size of the bias represents
the absolute value of the difference between the point estimate in Panel A (the
true effect) and Panel B (the biased effect). All regressions include the covariates
as listed in the text and zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by investigator. ∗p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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CHAPTER II
The Effect of Course Shutouts on Community College
Students: Evidence from Waitlist Cutoffs
2.1 Introduction
State funding for higher education in the United States has dramatically declined over the
past decade. Budget cuts following the Great Recession have persisted even ten years later-
funding for public two and four-year colleges in 2017 was $9 billion less than its pre-recession
level in 2008 (Mitchell et al., 2016). Despite some evidence that money matters for college
students, the mechanisms through which such resource effects operate are decidedly less clear.
Anecdotally, overburdened college budgets are often associated with course overcrowding.
When a college faces budgetary pressure, it may reduce course offerings or the number of
sections per course. More students may find themselves unable to enroll in the courses they
need to complete a degree. This hypothesis appears in the academic literature as well. Both
Bound and Turner (2007) and Deming and Walters (2017) cite oversubscribed courses as a
likely mechanism to explain the relationship between funding and college student outcomes,
yet do not test it directly.
Credibly identifying the impact of limited course availability is challenging. Doing so
requires detailed course registration data as a means to determine what classes students
wish to take. It also requires exogenous variation in who is rationed out of a course. Using
newly available data, this paper provides some of the only causal evidence on the impact of
being shut out of a college course and the first estimates of its impacts among community
college students. Community colleges enroll 47% of all U.S. undergraduate students in public
colleges and 55% of underrepresented minority students (Snyder et al., 2018). Their open
enrollment policies, binding class size constraints, lower tuition rates, and heavy reliance on
state funding may make course scarcity especially salient relative to four-year colleges.
We use novel administrative course registration data from a large community college in
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California to construct waitlist queues for each course. We link these to transcript data
containing student course schedules, grades and degrees, as well as to the National Student
Clearinghouse (NSC). The analysis measures the discontinuous impact of being stuck on
a waitlist and unable to enroll in one’s desired course on a student’s current and future
course-taking and degree completion, including transfers to other postsecondary institutions.
Our study is the first to use waitlist queues and admissions cutoffs as discontinuous breaks
to determine who is able to or unable to enroll in a course. To understand the intuition behind
this design, consider a section for an introductory English composition course. Suppose the
section had a waitlist with two people on it, and before the end of the registration period,
just one formerly enrolled student decided to drop out. This would give the first person on
the waitlist the opportunity to enroll in her desired section, but not the second person. The
admissions cutoff- the waitlist number below which a student does not get an opportunity to
enroll- is very difficult to manipulate because waitlisted students can not reliably predict how
many seats will open up. This introduces exogenous variation in who is able to take their
desired courses. Our new approach leveraging waitlists for causal inference can be applied
broadly in many other contexts.
The analysis primarily takes a local randomization approach to regression discontinuity
analysis in order to compare students who signed up for a course-section waitlist and
just missed or made the admission cutoff. Unlike a continuity-based framework, the local
randomization approach explicitly treats observations in a narrow window around the cutoff
like a randomized experiment. Cattaneo et al. (2018) argue that in settings with a very
discrete running variable- those where there are only a few mass points around the cutoff-
local randomization is the preferred estimation strategy.
Comparing students who just miss the waitlist cutoff to those who just make it, we find
that students who were not able to enroll in their preferred section due to oversubscription
were more likely to sit out the term altogether. Specifically, the reduced form results show
that being stuck on a waitlist increased the probability of enrolling in zero courses by 1.6
percentage points, a phenomenon we call same-term drop-out. This represents a 16% increase
relative to the 10.1% same-term drop-out rate among students who just got off of the waitlist.
Using the the waitlist cutoff as an instrument for being rationed out of a section, the
2SLS estimates show that being shut out of a course led to a 2.6 percentage point increase
in same-term dropout. This is a 25% increase relative to the 10.4% same-term dropout
rate among control compliers, those who enrolled in their desired section by the end of the
registration period precisely because they got off of the waitlist. The estimated effects are
robust to alternative sample definitions and different design decisions, including a continuity-based
regression discontinuity analysis.
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The rise in same-term dropout was driven by students waitlisted for especially popular
courses, which serve as prerequisites for a variety of other courses and can be easily transferred
for credit at any public four-year college in California. While students were no more or less
likely to transfer to another two or four-year school within one year of being stuck on a
waitlist, they were 34% more likely to transfer to other two-year schools within two years of
missing the waitlist cutoff, in some cases enrolling in both two-year schools simultaneously.
In particular, students tend to substitute to nearby two-year schools within 30 minutes of
driving distance. These nearby schools have lower degree completion rates and their students
have lower average salaries, both of which indicate a reduction in college quality.
Though we find no average effect of shutouts on completion rates for associate degrees,
certificates, or bachelor’s degrees within five years, there are divergent impacts by student
ethnicity. Shutouts caused underrepresented minority students to transfer to another two-year
school while Asian students, the largest ethnicity group at the college, responded to rationing
by transferring to four-year colleges sooner than they would have otherwise. This led
to a corresponding increase in bachelor’s degree completion rates within five years of the
waitlist for Asian students. Ethnicity is most likely a proxy for other unobservable skills
and advantages- or lack thereof- in navigating the higher education system and illustrates
the potential for heterogeneity in how the community college system is used. That is, the
two-year system may be a direct substitute for the early years at a four-year school among
students who have access to both options, a stepping-stone to eventually gain access to the
four-year system, or a terminal setting itself.
Taken together, the impacts from a relatively small friction demonstrates that oversubscribed
courses can meaningfully alter a student’s path. These results document that limited course
availability, an often cited mechanism through which funding matters for college students,
can interrupt and distort student’s educational trajectories
2.1.1 Related Literature
Broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on the impacts of resources in higher
education. Most of the work in this space has used aggregate data, and in some cases even
use variation in the incoming class sizes- which could induce course scarcity- as instruments
for variation in dollars spent per student. For example, Bound and Turner (2007) uses
variation in the size of graduating high school cohorts to estimate the effect of decreases in
per capita funding, finding a commensurate drop in bachelor’s degree attainment. Fortin
(2006) uses variation in cohort sizes, state appropriations, and tuition to estimate impacts
on college enrollment and ultimately the college wage premium. More recently, Deming
and Walters (2017) estimates the effect of large changes in state budgets on enrollment and
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degree attainment. The paper finds that budget cuts reduce the number of bachelor’s degrees,
driven by a decrease in persistence among students who were already enrolled rather than
decreases in matriculation rates. The authors write that, “our results are consistent with the
much broader trend of informal capacity constraints in public institutions, including reduced
course offerings [and] long waitlists,” yet they do not have data to test this mechanism
directly (Deming and Walters, 2017).
Notwithstanding the work using aggregate data, there is limited causal evidence on
micro-level pathways through which college budgets could affect degree attainment. Some
studies have implied how resources could matter by evaluating resource-intensive interventions
such as financial incentives (Barrow et al., 2014), tutoring, mentoring (Bettinger and Baker,
2014), or full-service wrap-around programs such as the CUNY ASAP experiment (Scrivener
et al., 2015).1 These studies generally have found positive effects.
To the best of our knowledge, there are two other papers that estimate the effects of
course scarcity (Kurlaender et al., 2014; Neering, 2018). Both use administrative data from
public, four-year universities in California and instrument for course shutouts using variation
in the timing when students are first allowed access to the course registration systems. In
Kurlaender et al. (2014), students at U.C. Davis (a moderately selective school) were put into
registration priority blocks where all students in a higher priority block gained access before
those in lower priority blocks, but within each block the day on which any given student
could first register was randomly assigned. In Neering (2018), students in an anonymous
public university were assigned to a priority sequence based on the first three letters of a
student’s last name, such that students randomly assigned an earlier time in one term are
intentionally assigned a later time the next term. Kurlaender et al. (2014) instruments for
the average number of shutouts a student experiences over their first four years to estimate
the impact of a shutout on bachelor’s degree completion and time to degree. The paper
does not detect any effects of course shutouts. Neering (2018) instruments for the number of
shutouts a student experiences in a given term and finds that shutouts reduce the number
of credit units students attempt in that term, which seems to be offset by a rise in the rate
at which students enroll over the summer. Consistent with Kurlaender et al. (2014), the
author finds no downstream effects on graduation rates or time to graduation.
This paper extends the literature on course shutouts in two ways. First, we offer a new
identification strategy, which directly compares students just able to get off of waitlists and
into their desired courses to those who are stuck on the waitlist. Second, the granularity
of the registration attempt data allow the analysis to examine heterogeneity by course
1ASAP provided community college students with a comprehensive package of interventions, one of which
was a higher course registration priority.
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characteristics (such as the subject of the course, or how popular the course is). Third,
this is the first paper to document the impacts of course shutouts in a community college,
where there are at least four reasons why course scarcity may be more salient. On the
demand side, community colleges have open enrollment policies, unlike selective four-year
schools that can reject applicants in order to manage course demand. Second, tuition is much
lower at community colleges, which reduces the barrier to entry and also fuels demand.
On the supply side, community colleges are particularly reliant on funding from state
governments, which are affected by budgetary pressures. These first three factors make
community colleges susceptible to large, unexpected swings in enrollment and funding. For
example, enrollment in community colleges increased by over 8% between 2008 and 2009
during the Great Recession while enrollment in four year colleges increased by less than
1% (Dunbar et al., 2011). California’s two year public schools in particular saw a sharp,
per-student funding decrease of about 11% in 2009 due to the defeat of several budget
proposals (IHE, 2009). Finally, section enrollment at many community colleges in California
is capped at 40 students due to classroom size, while class sizes at four-year schools may be
allowed to expand more readily. The potential for sectoral heterogeneity leave a gap in the
current understanding of the effect of course capacity constraints.
This paper also contributes to a small literature on course registration behavior. Registration
attempt data has rarely been used for descriptive analysis, let alone causal inference. Gurantz
(2015) presents a review of other papers using registration attempt data and finds that they
are few and far between. The paper also shows that it is not uncommon for community
college students to register for classes well after their designated time, perhaps as a result of
a weaker commitment to their education or a consequence of the difficulty of navigating the
registration process. Understanding the reasons why students delay registration is especially
important if course scarcity impacts student outcomes, as delays affect the degree to which
students experience scarcity. This paper presents an innovative method for circumventing
the selection bias in registration time which may prove useful in future work with similar
data. Unlike other studies of course scarcity, the approach in this paper can be applied in
settings where registration priority is not randomly assigned.
Finally, findings from this study can speak to documented longterm trends in the U.S.,
including the downward trend in bachelor’s degree completion rates conditional on enrolling
in college, and the upward trend in time to degree, even as there has been an overall
increase in the number of students attending post-secondary institutions (Bound and Turner,
2007; Bound et al., 2010, 2012). These phenomena have been concentrated among students
enrolling in non-selective two-year and four-year schools, and the literature has suggested




The study uses administrative data from De Anza Community College, a large two year
college located in the Bay Area which is part of the California Community College system,
the largest higher education system in the United States. The college has an average total
enrollment of approximately 23,000 students per year and costs about $3000 per year for
a full time student. Yearly tuition is higher than the average two year school in the US
($1,269), yet is much lower than public four year colleges ($9,230) (Deming et al., 2012,
Table 2, page 156). The college operates on a quarter system, yet enrollment is much lower
during the summer term.2
De Anza offers a particularly useful setting for examining the impact of course shutouts.
For one, community colleges are an important sector of the higher education landscape in
California and nationally. In California, nearly half of all students attending a four year
college previously attended a community college.3 Furthermore, transfers from California
community colleges to the California State University (CSU) system were projected to
increase by 25% from 2010 to 2020 (Wilson et al., 2010). Thus, two year schools are an
increasingly vital step in the accumulation of human capital and production of labor market
skills.
Most pertinent to this study, De Anza is a likely setting for observing course scarcity
due to non-selective admissions, low tuition, small and capped class sizes, and the budgetary
pressures of the recession. The data includes the years during the Great Recession, when
California community colleges decreased the size of their staff by 8% due to budget shortfalls
(Bohn et al., 2013). According to the Public Policy Institute of California, 88% of senior
community college administrators surveyed in 2012 agreed that funding reductions were
harmful for maintaining course offerings (Bohn et al., 2013).
Meanwhile, like all community colleges in California, De Anza has an open enrollment
policy; anyone with a high school diploma or equivalent is automatically admitted. Not
all open enrollment settings will automatically lead to scarcity. A college could respond to
scarcity in realtime by creating additional sections if they observe excess demand during the
registration period. However, both empirical evidence and anecdotal evidence from De Anza
administrators offer little support for this type of dynamic course creation. There were no
sections in the data where the first student enrolled a few days after a different section of
2Curious readers can see Fairlie et al. (2014) for more details about De Anza Community College.
3See U.S. Department of Education (2017); CCCCO (2012); and Sengupta and Jepsen (2006).
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the same course filled up. In addition, the marginal cost of adding a section is non-trivial.
According to De Anza’s salary schedule, most instructors are paid between $7,500 and $9,000
to teach an additional section. This figure does not factor in any costs or constraints from
classroom space or equipment, any increase in fringe benefit costs, or the difficulty of hiring
in a part of the state with consistently lower-than-average unemployment rates. The actual
marginal cost is likely more expensive.4 Furthermore, De Anza can not simply increase
the number of students permitted into a section. Class sizes are set around the 40 student
mark. Changes in class sizes are limited by available classroom configurations and need to
be approved by the faculty labor union.
2.2.1 Data Sources
This study benefits from access to community college institutional records and data
from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). Data from the college includes registration
attempt logs, student demographic characteristics, and student-level transcript records.
Students in the sample enrolled at the school between the fall quarter of 2002 and the
spring quarter of 2010. Students are linked to their transcripts which record grades and
credits for every course offered by the college during the sample period. In addition, internal
data on associate degrees and certificates are available through the summer of 2010.
Especially important for the analysis, detailed logs document each registration attempt
during a term’s registration period. An enrollment attempt is identified by a student
identifier, time- with precision to the second- and course section. For each attempt, the
logs report an outcome that can take one of four values: enrolled in the section, placed on
a waitlist, dropped from the section, or no change. The difficulty of obtaining data of this
nature has prohibited most analyses of course scarcity on a micro level.
Students are also matched to the NSC, which records enrollment at most postsecondary
institutions in the United States, through the summer of 2016. The NSC also provides data
on degrees earned from these institutions, supplementing administrative records on degree
completion from De Anza. This allows us to examine effects on certificate and associate
degree completion from two-year colleges as well as bachelor degree completion from four-year
schools many years after a students’ registration attempt at De Anza.
2.2.2 Section Enrollment
The online registration process takes place one to two months before the term begins.
It is governed by an automated system and students are given one of seven enrollment
4Larger classes also count as double or even triple teaching credit for instructors.
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priority designation dates, upon which they are granted access to the registration system.
Registration priority is primarily determined by credit accumulation, although some students
are assigned special priority if they are an athlete, a veteran, or are involved with the
Extended Opportunities Programs and Services- a service for at-risk students. The registration
priority assignment rules should generate discontinuous changes in the time that students
sign up for courses, independently of any waitlist effects. Therefore, we conduct all analysis
within registration priority and special student categories.
When a given student searches for a desired section (eg. MWF 9-10AM) of a desired
course (eg. ECON 101 Principles of Microeconomics), she is informed of the location,
instructor and the available number of seats for that particular section. Students can sign up
for a maximum of 21.5 credits at one time, about 7 courses. If there are no seats available,
the system displays the number of other students on the waitlist.
There are a few rules governing the waitlist process. Students on a waitlist for one section
of a course are not allowed to register for the waitlist of other sections of the same course
and cannot register for sections of other courses that meet at the same time. According
to current policies, if a seat opens up in a section during the registration period, waitlisted
students are automatically enrolled in the section. While archived records of the waitlist
policy are available going back to 2008, anecdotes about the policy before 2008 suggest
that when students on the waitlist were notified of an opening, they were given 24 hours
to enroll. If they did not enroll in 24 hours, then the next student on the waitlist could
claim the spot. We check for robustness to the policy by restricting the analysis to attempts
between 2008-2010 in Table B.11.
The analysis focuses on registration attempts before the term begins. After the term
begins, instructors have more discretion over enrollment and often make enrollment conditional
on attendance. The first stage estimates the impact of missing a waitlist cutoff on being
enrolled in the waitlisted section at the end of the registration period, prior to the start of
classes. Many of the outcomes concern enrollment patterns as well. For these, enrollment is
defined as being enrolled after the add/drop period a few weeks into the term.
2.2.3 Sample Characteristics
Students are part of the sample if they registered for a course waitlist during the registration
period between fall 2002 and spring 2010. Community colleges serve a wide variety of people,
including students hoping to transfer to four year schools, those completing a vocational
degree, and those taking a recreational course. Therefore, the analysis focuses on students
attempting to get a two year associate degree or transfer to a four year institution, and
for whom enrolling in a bachelor’s program in a four-year institution could be considered a
47
reasonable substitute. This allows for ease of interpretation and makes a cleaner comparison
to previous studies on course shutouts at four-year schools. Upon enrolling, students are
asked to declare their educational goal or intention. Table B.1 lists all of the categories a
student can choose from in declaring their intention. The sample includes all students who
declare an intention to transfer to a four-year school, earn an associate degree, or who are
undecided. The analysis is robust to including all students though. In addition, we exclude
registration attempts in the optional summer term from the analysis sample.5
We focus on the first waitlist a student ever signed up for in order to avoid dynamic RD
issues. While students may sign up for waitlists in subsequent terms, the analysis is explicitly
testing the hypothesis that missing a waitlist cutoff influences whether a student appears in
a subsequent semester. In addition, students may sign up for another waitlist in the same
term. To the extent that the first waitlist a student signs up for represents the course that
they most desire to enroll in, the analysis can be thought of as the effect of scarcity in the
courses students most care about. Ultimately, the results are robust to including all waitlists
and clustering standard errors at the student level.
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics at the section and student levels. Column (1) of
Panel A shows that just under half of all sections were ever oversubscribed. This statistic
masks differences across subject areas. 68% of all sections in science, technology, engineering,
and math (STEM) courses are oversubscribed during the registration period, compared with
50% of arts & humanities sections, 60% of social science courses, and only 30% of sections
for other courses. For classes that were oversubscribed, the average waitlist had about nine
students still on it at the end of the registration period. Column (2) of Panel A shows
the subject breakdown for all course sections included in the analysis. By definition, these
sections all had waitlists. 34% of sections included in the analysis were in STEM fields,
28% where in arts and humanities, 12% were social science courses, and 26% fell into other
subject areas. Average waitlist lengths at the end of the registration period for sections in
the analysis were slightly lower, at 8.01 students.
Panel B shows descriptive statistics for students in the analysis compared to the California
average. Column (1) reports demographics for all two-year colleges in California from the
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). Column (2) contains information
for all students who ever enrolled or attempted to enroll for a course at De Anza Community
College during the sample period, as measured by the administrative registration records,
and Column (3) reports the characteristics for students included in the analysis sample. De
Anza serves slightly more women than men, though the ratio is not higher than the California
5The summer term lasts between 6 and 8 weeks depending on the course. The other terms are about 3
months long. Far fewer students enroll during the summer term.
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average. The ethnic breakdown reflects the demographics of the Bay Area: in Column (2),
40% of students are Asian and 26% are White, while Black and Hispanic students make up
only 19% of the student body. Relative to the state average, De Anza students are much
less likely to be underrepresented minorities and less likely to receive financial aid.
As show in Column (3), the analysis sample contains registration attempts from 4,258
unique students. These students are more likely to receive financial aid and is younger
than the De Anza student population. Students in Column (3) take an average of 1.81
courses in their first observed term relative to the population average of 1.70. Finally,
in-sample students appear on 1.01 waitlists during the registration period in their first term,
on average. Among all De Anza students who attempt to register during the advanced
registration period, the average number of waitlists in the first observed term is just 0.42.
De Anza students as a whole are thus less likely to sign up for waitlists and take fewer
courses. Like the differences in age, this is consistent with the restrictions on students’
educational goals, which select students with an intention to transfer or earn a two-year
degree. Students who did not declare this interest are probably less attached students or
students taking recreational courses.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The analysis employs a fuzzy regression discontinuity design using waitlist queues to form
a running variable. To illustrate the intuition behind the design, suppose a course section
has a waitlist with two people on it. By the end of the registration period, if one formerly
enrolled student decided to drop out, then the first person on the waitlist would have the
opportunity to enroll in her desired section while the second person on the list would not.
While the decision to sign up for a waitlist is clearly endogenous, it is difficult to anticipate
how many spots will open for any given section, and therefore how deep into the queue
admission offers will be extended. This makes the cutoff very difficult, if not impossible, to
manipulate.
2.3.1 Construction of the Running Variable
Conceptually, the running variable represents the number of spots that would have needed
to open up in order for a student to have the opportunity to enroll during the registration
period, assuming she never dropped out of the queue. Figure 2.1 shows a hypothetical
enrollment log to illustrate the running variable construction. The first column Pi is a
student identifier that represents the chronological order in which students initially sign up
for any section or section waitlist. A student who enrolls in a section without ever having
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been on a waitlist also has a position Pi. However, Xi, the initial waitlist position, is only
defined for students who enter a waitlist queue. In Figure 2.1, X42 = 1, as student 42 is first
on the waitlist when she signs up and similarly, X43 = 2 and X44 = 3.
Importantly, the initial waitlist position is not the same as the running variable. Rather,
the running variable for student i also involves Di, the number of students who registered
before student i and dropped out during the registration period after student i registered.
In Figure 2.1, both student 7 and student 22 enrolled before students 42, 43, and 44, and
dropped after these students entered the waitlist. Therefore, D42, D43 and D44 all equal two.
Although student 38 also dropped out of the queue, this occurred before students 42, 43,
and 44 signed up for the waitlist and therefore student 38 has no effect on D42, D43 or D44.
Essentially, Di counts the types of drops that would move a student up on the waitlist or
create a spot for her in the section.
The running variable RVi is defined as the difference between one’s initial waitlist position
and the number of drops Di,
RVi = Xi −Di. (2.1)
Students with a strictly positive running variable would not have had the opportunity
to enroll in the section during the registration period. Students with running variables less
than or equal to zero would have had an opportunity to enroll, conditional on staying in
the queue. A student can only influence her own running variable by signing up, not by
dropping out. For example, although student 44 eventually dropped off of the waitlist, she
still received a running variable. This paper compares the outcomes of students who just
made the waitlist cutoff- those with RVi = 0- to those who just missed it- students with
RVi = 1.
This running variable construction is preferred to other possible definitions because it
preserves the order in which students sign up for the waitlist. For example, suppose student
A signs up to a waitlist that already has two people on it, and student B signs up the next
day, but in the interim two people have dropped out of the class. Student B would be in the
second position, but student B’s running variable as defined above could not be smaller than
student A’s. A running variable based on the time that students sign up would also have
this order preserving feature, however, the construction of a cutoff time is not obvious.6
Of course, students continue to enroll and drop after the registration period ends. The
analysis does not include these attempts because there is a larger role for instructor discretion
6In fact, the construction of a cutoff time fully depends on the construction of the current running
variable. That is, without a cutoff waitlist position, there can be no cutoff time. Appendix B.3 tests the
robustness of the results to a time-based running variable; the findings remain similar.
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once the quarter begins. There is imperfect compliance since students can drop out of the
queue.That is, students with RV ≤ 0 might not actually be enrolled in the section at the
end of the registration period.7 Thus, estimates use a fuzzy RD design as opposed to a sharp
RD.
2.3.2 Estimation
Consider a student who placed herself on a waitlist. NotEnrollist is a measure of rationing
and indicates the treatment. It is one if the student does not enroll in her desired section s
in term t during the registration period, and zero otherwise. Let Yi(NotEnrollist = 1) be her
educational outcome if she does not enroll in her preferred section and Yi(NotEnrollist = 0)
be her educational outcome if she does. The analysis estimates E[Yi(NotEnrollist = 1) −
Yi(NotEnrollist = 0) | RVist = 1]. This is interpreted as the local average treatment effect
(LATE) for compliers, students who are rationed out of a section if they miss the cutoff and
are induced to enroll if they make the cutoff. It is important to consider the type of student
represented by a complier in this scenario. Students discouraged by a waitlist cutoff could
be less motivated, less organized, or both. Furthermore, they may be less savvy navigators
of institutions for reasons that reflect social inequality.
To estimate the LATE, we use a two stage least squares regression for students within one
position of the waitlist cutoff. That is, for student i in section s and term t with RVist ∈ [0, 1]:
NotEnrollist = α0 + α1MissWList + Xist
′Γ + δt + ζist (2.2)
Yist = β0 + β1 ˆNotEnrollist + Xist
′Π + δt + εist (2.3)
where ˆNotEnrollist represents the student’s predicted probability of not enrolling in the
section according to equation 2.2. Enrollment for the first-stage equation is measured on the
last day of the advanced registration period, prior to the start of classes. RVist is the running
variable, and MissWList is an indicator equal to one if RVist = 1 and equal to zero otherwise.
Xist is a vector of covariates including gender, race, ethnicity, US citizenship status, age,
financial aid receipt, registration priority fixed effects, special admit status, special program
status, as well as indicators for missing variables. The δt represent a vector of term by year
fixed effects and ζist and εist are error terms.
The estimates rely on local randomization assumptions to identify the causal effect of not
enrolling in a desired section due to oversubscription for compliers (for a detailed description
7By definition, students with RV > 0 could not have enrolled during the registration period though. In
this sense, we observe only one-sided noncompliance.
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of local randomization see Cattaneo et al., 2017b, 2018). Essentially, local randomization
assumes that within one position on either side of the waitlist cutoff, the running variable
is unrelated to potential outcomes. That is, assignment of the running variable is “as-if
random,” and there is no selection into treatment.
Local randomization is appropriate for settings with extremely discrete running variables,
as opposed to the more commonly used RD assumptions involving continuity of the regression
function, which require a continuous running variable.8 In fact, Cattaneo et al. (2018) argue
that in settings with a very discrete running variable, local randomization is “possibly the
only valid method for estimation and inference.” The full set of assumptions include
1. Fixed Potential Outcomes. Potential outcomes are non-random and fixed for students
within one position the cutoff.
2. Known randomization mechanism. The distribution of the treatment assignment vector
is known for those within one position of the cutoff.
3. Unconfoundedness. Whether students end up directly on the right or left of the cutoff
does not depend on potential outcomes.
4. Exclusion Restriction. Within one position of the cutoff, the running variable influences
outcomes only through treatment, not directly.
5. SUTVA. Locally, within one position of the cutoff, each student’s potential outcomes
only depend on his or her own treatment assignment, and not anybody else’s.
6. Monotonicity. Within one position of the cutoff, missing the cutoff does not cause any
students to be more likely to enroll than they otherwise would have been, and making
the cutoff does not cause any students to be less likely to enroll.
Assumption one and two define what is meant by random. Assumption one means that
a student’s potential outcomes are fixed and inherent to her.9 Assumption three is the key
to local randomization and has some testable implications. Any manipulation of a student’s
own running variable would violate this assumption. However, a student’s running variable is
dependent on the number of other students who drop the section, and is out of her control.10
8The results are robust to using a larger bandwidth and treating the running variable as if it were
continuous, however.
9There is a formulation of the local randomization assumptions for potential outcomes that are random
variables as well, but it would not change anything in the mechanics of estimating the LATE parameter
(Cattaneo et al., 2017b).
10In some sections, no students drop. In others, as many as twenty students drop. Among sections in the
analysis, the 10th percentile number of drops is zero and the 90th percentile is five.
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An example of a violation of the assumption is if a student is more likely to sign up for the
waitlist because she knows that a friend is planning to drop. This seems unlikely, particularly
for our sample which is mostly incoming students who may not know many people. Section
2.3.3 formally tests for manipulation around the cutoff.
Assumption four, the exclusion restriction, is generally not needed in RD studies that rely
on continuity of the conditional regression function, and indeed, it would be unreasonable to
assume that there is no direct relationship between the running variable and the potential
outcomes for all values of the running variable. Clearly, somebody who signed up for a
section very early in the registration period is different from somebody who signed up very
late. However, it is more plausible that there is no difference, on average, between people
within one waitlist position of each other.
The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) is standard in estimating LATE
using an instrumental variable, though of course it’s possible that there are spillovers from
other students. Again, one mitigating factor for these possible spillovers is that most students
are first-time enrollees and likely do not know each other well. The monotonicity assumption
is also standard. Since signing up for a waitlist has a cost- students are barred from signing
up for any other section at the same time or for the same course- it is implausible that being
high enough on the waitlist to gain admission would cause a student to be less likely to sign
up for a course than they otherwise would have been. Being more likely to sign up for a
course because one missed the waitlist cutoff is also intuitively unlikely, though not testable.
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) are estimated using a two-stage least squares regression. Although
Lee and Card (2008) suggest clustering standard errors by the value of the running variable
when the running variable is discrete, Kolesar and Rothe (2016) point out that confidence
intervals constructed in this way have poor coverage when the number of clusters is small,
which is the case in this analysis. Therefore, only the usual heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are used, unless otherwise noted.
2.3.3 Validity Checks
One can test for manipulation of the running variable by checking for smoothness in the
density of the running variable at the cutoff. Figure 2.2 shows the density of the running
variable. Table 2.2 reports p-values from formal tests for smoothness using a McCrary-like
test specifically designed for discrete running variables, introduced in Frandsen (2017). An
important assumption of the Frandsen (2017) test is that the second order finite difference of
the running variable’s probability mass function (pmf) is bounded at zero, with the bound
represented by k. Intuitively, k represents the amount of curvature or nonlinearity in the
pmf of the running variable that would still be compatible with no manipulation. The choice
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of k is left to the researcher, but the author notes that a natural maximum is the amount
of curvature in a discretized normal distribution that is roughly as discrete as the observed
distribution of the running variable- call this the “rule of thumb” maximum. If there are
about twenty support points within one standard deviation of the cutoff, then the rule of
thumb maximum is 0.005, whereas if there are only six support points, it is 0.047. We test
for manipulation using many values of k but note that in our context there are about eight
support points within one standard deviation. The density test fails to reject the null of no
manipulation at the five percent level for all values of k and fails to reject it at the ten percent
level at values that are much smaller than the rule of thumb maximum in our context.
Another testable implication of the FRD assumptions is that predetermined characteristics
should be balanced across the waitlist cutoff. Table 3.3 reports the results of linear regressions
testing for imbalance across the waitlist cutoff in student characteristics.11 The regressions
condition on term by year fixed effects, registration priority fixed effects, and special student
categories that affect registration priority. None of the student characteristics are statistically
significant at the five percent level, although age is significantly different across the threshold
at the ten percent level. The difference is small in magnitude however, equal to about four
months. Furthermore, the covariates are not jointly significant, with a joint F-test yielding a
p-value of 0.242. In addition, although the analysis relies only on variation between students
with a running variable of zero or one, Figures B.1 through B.1 show that these baseline
characteristics are similar across the cutoff when looking at a wider bandwidth.
The analysis also examines two other student characteristics that should be very similar
across the threshold if there is no selection into treatment. First, students across the cutoff
sign up for a similar number of other waitlists during the registration period- 1.07 on average
for those with running variable of zero and 1.09 for those with running variable of one.
Since this behavior occurs after students sign up to the initial waitlist, the student had
some information about their likely schedule, even if it wasn’t full information. Therefore,
while this variable can’t be tested for balance formally, the similarity in waitlist enrollment
behavior is consistent with “as-if” random assignment. In addition, there was less than a
day between the registration attempts of students in the same section with running variable
zero or one. Specifically, the average amount of time between registration for these students
was 19 hours, just 13% of a standard deviation between any two registration attempts in a
waitlisted section.
11The balance tests do not include registration time because it will mechanically be earlier for those with
a running variable of zero.
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2.4 Course Scarcity and Student Outcomes
2.4.1 First Stage Estimates
The first stage estimates can be easily seen in discontinuities at the cutoff. Figure 2.3a
shows a discontinuity at the waitlist cutoff for enrollment in the waitlisted section at the end
of the registration period. 64% of students just to the left of the cutoff- the last to have the
opportunity to enroll in the section during the registration period- ended up enrolled in the
waitlist section. In accordance with the definition of the running variable, students who miss
the waitlist cutoff are not able to enroll during the registration period. Figure 2.3b shows
the enrollment rates for courses in which a student has been waitlisted for one section. Due
to the rules about only being able to enroll in one waitlist per course, the first stage looks
almost identical. In theory, somebody on the left of the cutoff could have switched sections
within the same course. This does not appear to happen often, as 65% of students who do
not miss the cutoff ultimately enroll in the waitlisted course, relative to 64% who enroll in
the waitlisted section.
It is important to verify that the first stage effect of missing a waitlist cutoff is large
enough to avoid a weak instruments problem. Table 2.4 examines sensitivity of the first
stage to the inclusion of covariates for both enrollment in the desired section and the desired
course, and reports F-statistics. The F-statistics are all greater than 3500 regardless of
whether covariates are included and whether examining enrollment in the waitlisted section
or course. As reported in Panel A, students who miss the waitlist are between 64.1 and 64.4
percentage points less likely to enroll in their desired section than those who just make it.
The barrier to entry for a section translates into a barrier at the course level. In Panel B,
students are between 64.5 and 64.8 percentage points less likely to enroll in their desired
course after missing the waitlist cutoff.
Although estimates of the first stage for section enrollment and course enrollment are
qualitatively similar, all further analysis uses the section enrollment as the endogenous
variable of interest, as it is most directly influenced by the waitlist cutoff. The results
are nearly identical regardless of whether the analysis defines treatment at the section or
course level though.
2.4.2 Reduced Form and IV Estimates
The main outcomes of interest are enrollment in the concurrent term and enrollment
in other two and four-year schools within one through five years of the waitlisted term.
Although the estimates identify effects by comparing students immediately on either side
of the cutoff, Figures B.2 through B.4 visually depict the reduced form effects using a
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larger window. They plot the residuals of the main outcome variables, conditioned on the
observable, pre-determined characteristics, and binned by values of the running variable.
Figure B.2 is the visual representation of the reduced form effects of missing a waitlist cutoff
on whether students enroll in zero, one to two, or three or more courses in the waitlisted
term and whether they enrolled in any course in the following non-summer term. Enrolling
in zero courses can be thought of as same-term drop-out, though the student may appear
again in a later term. Enrollment in one or two courses would be like enrolling part-time,
while three or more courses is roughly full-time enrollment. There is a 0.016 percentage
point jump up in percentage point jump in same-term dropout, and smaller, less prominent
jumps in the other enrollment outcomes.
Figure B.3 shows the reduced form impact on whether the student transfers to another
two-year school. There is no noticeable rise in the share who transfer within one year, but
a large 2.3 percentage point increase in the share of students who transfer within two years
to another two-year school for those who missed the waitlist cutoff. Since the data only
include enrollment in other two-year schools and not transcript records from those schools,
the analysis cannot disentangle whether students transfer only to take their waitlisted course
or for their entire course load. The difference in transfers to other two-year schools on either
side of the cutoff gets smaller in later years. While reduced form effects of two percentage
points may seem small, these translate to meaningfully large effects relative to the control
means. For example, only 10.7% of students transfer to another two year within two years.
Finally, Figure B.4 shows that there is no noticeable change in transfers to four year schools
across the cutoff at any time point.
Table 2.5 presents formal estimates of the LATE of being shut out of a course on
enrollment patterns in the concurrent semester. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the effect
of begin shut out on whether a student enrolls in zero, one to two, or three or more courses
respectively. All results control for the full vector of covariates and use a bandwidth of
one. The main results show students are 2.6 percentage points more likely to “drop out” in
the waitlisted term; that is, to take no course at all that term. The estimated increase
in same-term dropout is an increase of 25% relative to the same-term dropout rate of
the control compliers, which is 10.4%. There are also negative, though not statistically
significant, effects on course-taking for students who do take a course. The rise in same-term
drop-out is accompanied by a 1.7 percentage point decrease in the probability of enrolling
in three or more classes- a full course load- relative to a control complier mean of 55.9%.
We also estimate a 0.8 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of enrolling in one to
two courses that term relative to a control complier mean of 33.7%. These results cannot
distinguish between a cascading effect- somebody who would otherwise have taken three
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courses dropping down to two and somebody who would have taken two, dropping down to
one, and so on- and a more dramatic shift from a plan to take a full course load to taking
no courses, or some combination of these two options.
Table 2.6 shows the effect of course shutouts on transfer rates and degree completion for
associate degrees, certificates, and bachelor’s degrees. Students were no more or less likely
to transfer to another two or four-year school within one year of being stuck on a waitlist.
Taken together with the increase in same-term dropout at De Anza, this suggests that course
scarcity increases the likelihood of dropout from college altogether for that term.
This dropout effect does not persist, however. There is a large positive effect of 3.6
percentage points on the transfer rate to other two-years within two years of missing the
waitlist cutoff. This is relative to a control complier mean of 10.5%, which means the transfer
rate increases by 34%. The point estimates for transfers to other two-year schools within
three, four, and five years are also meaningfully large, 2.6, 2.6, and 2.7 percentage points
respectively, but not statistically significant. It suggests the effect attenuates but might not
entirely dissipate over time. There are no detectable effects on transfers to four-year schools
or on the share who earn associate degrees or certificates from De Anza or any other school,
or bachelor’s degrees up to five years out.
In general, the three most frequent recipients of De Anza’s transfer students are: Foothill
College, Evergreen Valley College, and San Jose City College. These are roughly 15 minutes,
30 minutes, and 18 minutes from De Anza by car, respectively. Foothill college in particular
is almost seamlessly integrated, with cross-registration between De Anza and Foothill being
common and easy to do because it uses the same registration system.12 However, as shown
in Table B.2, when estimating the treatment effect on attending each of these alternative
schools separately, there is a statistically significant increase in enrollment at Evergreen, San
Jose City College, and all other two-year schools, but not at Foothill. It’s likely that students
consider classes at Foothill as part of the initial choice set when they are registering, and not
as a back-up option after the fact. According to the U.S. Department of Education’s College
Scorecard website, De Anza Community College costs less, has a higher graduation rate, and
students who attend De Anza earn higher average salaries after attending than attendees
at the other two colleges. In addition, both by revealed preference and by online ranking
services such as NICHE and Wallethub, which consistently rank De Anza above Evergreen
and San Jose City, it is likely that students are worse off from having to substitute for the
courses they need at these common alternatives.
12To be clear, although students often take some classes at De Anza and others at Foothill in the same
term, the data consists only of course registration attempts at De Anza.
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2.4.3 Subgroup Analysis
This section reports results by subgroup categories, including differential impacts by
gender, ethnicity, popularity of the course, and course subject. The demographic breakdowns
are proxies for student vulnerability or disadvantage. The ethnic categories in particular are
not taken to have theoretical meaning in their own right, but are rather meant to serve as
rough correlates of unobservable characteristics such as the human capital of a student’s
social network or other barriers to human capital accumulation. Course popularity and
subject are meant to test the idea that not all courses are equally important to a student’s
educational and labor market goals.
Tables B.3 to B.6 show the differential effects on course enrollment in the concurrent
term for all subgroups. There are no detectable differential impacts on enrollment patterns
by demographic subgroups, either gender or ethnicity.
There is more evidence that the type of course may be important for enrollment patterns.
To gauge the popularity of the course, we tallied enrollment requests for all courses across the
sample period and picked the top five most requested with the rationale that more popular
courses are likely to be important pre-requisites for common majors or for transfer. The top
five include three introductory writing courses, a government course, and a psychology course.
Indeed, course catalogs confirm that these five classes were all prerequistes for a variety of
other courses at the college. Furthermore, they were part of the Intersegmental General
Education Transfer Curriculum (IGETC), which allows them to be easily transferred toward
a bachelor degree in the UC system. As shown in Table B.5, the point estimates for same
semester drop-out are more than twice as large for the top five most popular classes, although
they are not statistically different from each other. In addition, being rationed out of a top
five class seems to lead students to either drop out or increase their enrollment to full time,
with a significantly larger drop in part-time enrollment. Waitlists for less popular classes
cause relatively larger, though not statistically significant, decreases in full-time enrollment
instead. This suggests that students enrolled in the most popular classes are relatively less
attached to college. Finally, as shown in Table B.6, differences in impact by subject matter
such as STEM, arts and humanities, social studies, and other subjects, however, are minimal.
Interesting dynamics emerge in transfer and degree completion by ethnicity categories.
Tables B.7 and B.8 report results on transfer rates to other colleges by ethnicity, where
students are partitioned into three groups: Asian, White, and underrepresented minority
(URM). The URM category consists of Black, Hispanic, Native American, multi-racial
students, and students who do not fit into any other category. The point estimates are
plotted in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
There is a divergence in transfer responses by ethnicity. As seen in Figure 2.4, although all
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students show a positive uptick in transfer rates to other two-year schools within two years of
the waitlist, the point estimates are highest for URM students. For these students, transfers
to two-year schools continue to increase every year through five years out. Meanwhile, other
students do not transfer to two-year schools at an appreciably high rate, including near zero
point estimates for Asian students and negative point estimates for white students.
In contrast, Asian students are more likely to transfer to a four-year school in response
to being rationed out of a course, as shown in Figure 2.5, while URM students become
increasingly less likely to transfer to a four year school as time goes on. With Asian students
accelerating their transfer to a four-year school, there should be a corresponding uptick in
bachelor’s degree completion for Asian students. Indeed, Figure 2.6 shows a positive effect of
rationing on bachelor’s degree completion among Asian students, especially at the five year
mark. There is no impact on bachelor’s degree completion for URM students, although the
control complier mean for this group is near zero for the first three years after the waitlist
and still quite low at 5.8% in the fifth year out. Finally, there is evidence that bachelor’s
degree attainment among White students is hampered by course rationing. Being rationed
out of a course reduces bachelor’s degree completion within five years by 56% for White
students, relative to a control complier mean of 13.4%. The estimates plotted in Figure 2.6
can be found in Table B.9.
This analysis suggests that students use the community college system differently in
California. Perhaps students better prepared to navigate the college landscape, as proxied
by ethnicity, strategically enroll in community college after high school because it is easier
to get into a UC school as a community college transfer. For example, Berkeley and UCLA
acceptance rates are almost twice as high for transfer students than for freshman admits.
Anecdotally, these statistics seem well known on college discussion forums. The results
highlight the many potential responses to course scarcity in a community college setting-
some transfer to four-year schools thus accelerating their time to a bachelor’s degree, while
others transfer to lower-quality two year schools.
2.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The results of this paper are robust to several design decisions. First, as is standard in a
regression discontinuity analysis, the analysis checks whether there are treatment effects at
placebo thresholds.13 Figure 2.7 plots the reduced form coefficients the two main outcomes
13An FRD that relied on continuity assumptions might also check for sensitivity to bandwidth choices
and controlling for different polynomials of the running variable. The local randomization assumptions are
only valid within one position of the cutoff, however. In particular, conditional independence does not hold
as the bandwidth is increased. This is not surprising because increasing the bandwidth creates a comparison
between students who signed up to the waitlist at increasingly far apart in time. Given that the identification
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affected by course shutouts, estimated for ten different waitlist thresholds.14 The outcomes
are: took zero courses in the waitlisted term and transferred to another two-year school
within two years. Table B.10 reports the corresponding point estimates and standard errors
represented in the figure. The true cutoff represents the last student on the waitlist who
received an offer of admission to the section. For each placebo cutoff j, students with
RVist = j behave as the control group and are compared to students directly to the right,
with RVist = j+1. The difference in outcomes at any cutoff j 6= 0 should not be significantly
different from zero, which is the case.
Table B.11 shows the LATE of a course shutout on selected outcomes using different
samples of students. Results are robust to alternative sample restrictions. Column (1)
includes all students, regardless of which initial intention they declared, and all waitlists.
This examines whether estimates are sensitive to conditioning on students’ initial declared
intentions listed in Table B.1 or to using student’s first waitlist. Column (2) restricts the
sample to students who declared an intention to transfer to a four year. Column (3) includes
only terms after 2007, when documentation on enrollment rules is available (see section
2.2.2 for a discussion of the issue). Column (4) uses the waitlist cutoff to instrument for
course enrollment, rather than course section enrollment. Finally, Column (5) uses the
main analysis sample but treats the running variable as if it were continuous, performing a
traditional regression discontinuity analysis using a bandwidth of ten and a linear function
form.
The estimates on taking zero courses in the waitlisted term are similar in magnitude
to the main results and all are statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition, the
analysis is nearly identical both when instrumenting for course enrollment rather than section
enrollment and when treating the running variable as if it were continuous.
2.4.5 Complier Densities
This section estimates outcome densities for treated and untreated compliers in order to
better understand how enrollment patterns change. Up to this point, the analysis has looked
at discrete changes in course load, examining whether students respond to course shutouts
by dropping out, taking one or two courses, or three or more. This analysis may mask greater
heterogeneity at different points in the course load distribution. Following Abdulkadiroglu
is only valid within one position around the cutoff, testing sensitivity to bandwidth and functions of the
running variable are not relevant.
14We perform this placebo threshold exercise using the reduced form rather than the two-stage least
squares estimates because the first stage is zero at placebo cutoffs by constuction. That is, all students
to the right of the true cutoff, where the running variable is equal to zero, were not able to enroll in the
waitlisted section at the end of the registration period.
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×NotEnrollist = τyNotEnrollist + X′iλy + viy (2.4)
where Yi(0) and Yi(1) are potential outcomes, and failing to enroll in the desired course
section is the treatment. We use a Gaussian kernel for K(u), and Silverman’s rule of thumb
for h, the bandwidth (Silverman, 1986). The instrument for treatment is missing the waitlist
cutoff. The 2SLS estimate of τy is a consistent estimate of the density of Yist(1), evaluated
at y. Likewise, by substituting Enrollist = 1−NotEnrollist in equation (2.4), the equivalent
of the 2SLS coefficient, τy, is a consistent estimate of the density of Yist(0) evaluated at y.
Densities are evaluated on a grid of 100 points.15
Figure 2.8a shows the complier densities for the number of courses a student is enrolled
in after the add/drop date. Figure 2.8b shows the densities for the time it takes students to
earn an associate degree, certificate, or bachelor’s degree. For ease of interpretation, students
who do not earn a degree within five years are coded as receiving a degree in six.
The orange dashed line represents the density for compliers who missed the cutoff; these
students are shut out of their desired section. The blue solid line shows the estimated density
for compliers who do not miss a cutoff; these students represent the counterfactual, business
as usual for students who are not rationed out of the section they want. They are enrolled
during the advanced registration period. There is a shift to the left in the distribution of
the number of courses a student takes for students who get shut out of a course, though a
small minority does seem to respond by taking even more courses, perhaps to compensate. A
heterogeneous response would make it more difficult to detect an average impact on the share
of students taking a full course-load, which is demonstrated by the vertical lines representing
average number of courses. These are basically superimposed.
The plot for time to degree reveals that very few compliers earn any type of degree.
While the average differences are too small to detect, the potential outcome densities do
reveal more more nuance. There is slightly less mass at four years, and slightly more mass
at five and six for students shut out of a course, which means a small share of compliers may
take longer to earn a degree or not earn a degree after being shut out of a course. While
the magnitudes are small and not statistically detectable, this is suggestive that further
investigation is necessary on long-term outcomes.




This paper studies the effect of course scarcity in a setting with open access, high
enrollment and budget shortfalls. The analysis measures course scarcity by using cutoffs
in waitlist queues which discontinuously change the probability of enrolling in a desired
section. Comparing students who just miss the waitlist cutoff to those who just make it,
the study finds that students who are not able to enroll in their preferred section due to
oversubscription are 2.6 percentage points less likely to take any courses that term. At the
same time, missing a waitlist cutoff causes a corresponding 3.6 percentage point increase in
the share of students who transfer to other two-year schools within two years, in some cases
enrolling in both schools simultaneously. This could signal substitution behavior to try to
earn the credits associated with the waitlisted course. These effects are large relative to the
control complier means. 10.4% of control compliers dropped out in the waitlisted semester
and 10.5% transferred to another two year within two years. Therefore, the results represent
a 25% increase in same-term dropout and a 34% increase in transfers to other two-year
colleges.
The results of our study contrast with earlier work that suggests course scarcity in college
does not have downstream effects on student outcomes (Kurlaender et al., 2014; Neering,
2018). One likely reason for this contrast is that there are important institutional differences
between community colleges and public four-year universities, the settings studied in earlier
work. For example, community colleges have open enrollment policies, binding class size
constraints, lower tuition rates, and heavy reliance on state funding. Moreover, underfunded
community colleges are not unique to California; 46 states spent less per-student in 2016 than
they did before the 2008 recession (Mitchell et al., 2016). In light of sustained decreases in
per-student funding for public colleges, future work should continue to explore the effects of
course scarcity at the institution level.
In addition, we estimate the effect of missing a waitlist cutoff holding availability in all
other sections fixed. This could be considered a small friction; the response to a scenario in
which a large fraction of sections are eliminated at once may be very different and presumably
more severe. Likewise, students often face more than one waitlist during their college careers.
For example, 81% of students in our sample sign up for more than one waitlist. In this
sense, we present a lower bound on the cumulative impact of missing multiple waitlists.
The evidence of short-term behavior change is at least consistent with Bound et al. (2010)
and Deming and Walters (2017), which find aggregate impacts of decreases in funding per
student.
While we find no average impacts of course rationing on transfers to four-year schools or
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bachelor’s degree attainment, there is evidence of diverging impacts by ethnicity. For Asian
students, facing rationing leads to an accelerated rate of transfer to a four-year college.
Underrepresented minority students are more likely to continue in other two-year schools
and if anything, become less likely to transfer to a four-year as time goes on. White students
seem to delay their transfer to a four year. These patterns show up again in bachelor’s
degree completion, with Asian students reacting to rationing by earning a bachelor’s degree
sooner than they otherwise would have, and White students earning their degree later. URM
students are earning bachelor’s degrees at such a low rate within five years of the waitlist
that they exhibit a floor-effect- they can’t do any worse. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
there are potentially two streams of students using the community college as a vehicle to
access four-year schools.
The first type of student can not access a four-year initially, and uses the community
college to build their skills in a stepping-stone fashion. This represents the traditional
picture of how community colleges are thought to function. However, there could be a
group of very positively selected students who actually could have enrolled in a four-year
school initially, but instead choose to start in a two-year setting. This could be because
they can complete their core courses at a lower tuition rate or because it may be less
competitive to access a selective University of California campus by transferring from a
two-year rather than applying directly out of high school. Whatever the case, a positively
selected student who faces rationing may become frustrated with the resource constraints of
a two-year setting and abandon their initial plans to start in a community college, leading
them to transfer to a four-year sooner. One hypothesis is that ethnicity serves as a rough
proxy for student resources and ability to navigate the higher education system. Finding
differential responses is consistent with prior literature that worries about diverting students
from selective four-year schools to two-year schools or less selective four-year schools by
heavily subsidizing these options (Cohodes and Goodman, 2014).
In summary, this paper provides evidence of the impact of course shutouts on educational
attainment, a mechanism that was previously untestable due to data limitations. It also
introduces a new method for leveraging waitlist registration logs, a data resource that
has been underused to perform causal inference. Finally, this study continues the work of
documenting and quantifying the effects of higher education funding and specifically funding
for community colleges, which disproportionately serve low-income students and students of
color. In the face of unequal access to educational resources, it is extremely important to
understand the exact processes through which money influences student outcomes in order
to create effective solutions.
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Figure 2.1: A Hypothetical Registration Log
Notes. Pi is a student identifier, Xi is the initial waitlist position, Di counts the number
of students who signed up before student i signed up for the waitlist, and dropped after
student i (as long as it was during the registration period). RVi = Xi −Di is student
i’s running variable.
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Figure 2.2: Density of the Running Variable
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Figure 2.3: First Stage Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Enrollment in Waitlisted
Section and Course
(a) Enrolled in Waitlisted Section
(b) Enrolled in Waitlisted Course
Notes. Each dot represents enrollment binned by the value of the running variable,
where is enrollment is equal to one if the student was enrolled in the section or course
at the end of the advanced registration period. Both section and course enrollment are
equal to zero for students with a running variable greater than zero by construction.
The size of the dot reflects the number of observations in each bin.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Transfers to Other Two-Year Schools,
by Ethnicity
Notes. This figure shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects
are estimated separately by ethnicity. The outcomes are indicators for transfers to
other two-year schools at different time horizons: within one through five years of the
waitlisted term. All specifications include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. The exact
point estimates and standard errors are reported in Table B.7.
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Figure 2.5: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Transfers to Four-Year Schools, by
Ethnicity
Notes. This figure shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects
are estimated separately by ethnicity. The outcomes are indicators for transfers to
four-year schools at different time horizons: within one through five years of the
waitlisted term. All specifications include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. The exact
point estimates and standard errors are reported in Table B.8.
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Figure 2.6: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Bachelors Degree Completion, by
Ethnicity
Notes. This figure shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects
are estimated separately by ethnicity. The outcomes are indicators for bachelors degree
completion at different time horizons: within one through five years of the waitlisted
term. All specifications include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. The exact point
estimates and standard errors are reported in Table B.9.
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Figure 2.7: Reduced Form Effect of Missing a Placebo Cutoff
(a) Enrolled in Zero Courses
(b) Transferred to Another Two-Year School within Two Years
Notes. This figure plots point estimates and confidence intervals for the reduced form
effect of missing a placebo cutoff using a bandwidth of one. For example, at the placebo
cutoff of three, we show the effect of having a running variable of three relative to a
running variable of four. The actual reduced form effect- where the cutoff is equal to
zero- is shown in blue, whereas the other values on the x-axis represent the effects of
the other placebo cutoffs.
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Figure 2.8: Density of Potential Outcomes for Treated and Untreated Compliers
(a) Number of Courses
(b) Time to Degree
Notes. This figure plots estimates of the potential outcome densities for treated and
untreated compliers. Treated compliers missed the waitlist cutoff and did not enroll
in their desired section, and untreated compliers did not miss the cutoff and therefore
enrolled in their desired section. The vertical lines represent the average outcomes
for each group. Number of courses is defined as the number of courses a student was
enrolled in after the add/drop date. Time to degree measures the number of years
from the waitlisted term until a student earned any higher education degree, including
associates, certificates, or bachelors degrees. Time to degree is equal to six for students
who either take six years to complete a degree, or do not complete a degree within six
years of the waitlisted term.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics




% with a WL 0.49 1.00
% STEM with WL 0.68 0.34
% Arts/Humanities with WL 0.50 0.28
% Social Sciences with WL 0.60 0.12
% Other with WL 0.30 0.26
WL Length 8.98 8.01
WL Length (SD) 9.15 7.07
Observations 29,614 3,499
Panel B: Student-level statistics
CA 2-year All Analysis
Public Colleges De Anza Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.53 0.52 0.51
Asian 0.13 0.40 0.44
White 0.27 0.26 0.24
Hispanic 0.45 0.14 0.16
Black 0.07 0.05 0.05
Ever Receives Aid 0.59 0.17 0.32
Age Under 25 0.63 0.59 0.80
Age 25 and Over 0.37 0.41 0.20
# Courses, first term 1.70 1.81
# Waitlists, first term 0.42 1.01
Observations 1,234,509 179,596 4,258
Notes: Panel A presents section-level statistics for De Anza Community College between Fall
2002 and Summer 2010. Column (1) reports the average share of sections with waitlists, by
subject and before sample restrictions. For all sections in the analysis, column (2) reports
the share in each subject. By definition, all sections in the analysis have a waitlist. The
STEM definition follows the National Science Foundation. Waitlist length measures how
many students remain on the waitlist at the end of the registration period for oversubscribed
sections. In Panel B, column (1) describes student characteristics at all two-year colleges
in the California, column (2) shows characteristics for De Anza students, and column (3)
reports statistics for the students in the analysis (sample restrictions are detailed in Section
2.2.3). Data for all two-year public colleges in CA comes from IPEDS for Fall 2014, except
for financial aid receipt which is from the 2014-2015 school year. In column (1), financial aid
receipt and age represent a cross section of all undergraduates at public 2-year schools in CA.
In columns (2) and (3), a student is counted as receiving aid if they received it at any time in
the sample period and age represents their age in their first term in the sample period. The
number of courses is the number a student was enrolled in after the drop date in the first
observed term. The number of waitlists is the total that a student signed up for during the
advanced registration period in the student’s first observed term.
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Notes: This table presents results
from the manipulation test proposed
in (Frandsen, 2017). The parameter
k, which is chosen by the researcher,
represents the “maximal degree of
nonlinearity in the probability mass
function that is still considered to
be compatible with no manipulation”
(Frandsen, 2017). Column (1) reports
tested values of k and Column (2)
reports the p-value of a test of the
null hypothesis that no manipulation
occurred.
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Table 2.3: Test for Balance of Pre-determined Student Characteristics Across the Waitlist
Cutoff
Coefficient Standard Error P-Value
(1) (2) (3)
White -0.019 0.013 0.142
Asian 0.004 0.015 0.807
Hispanic 0.018 0.011 0.103
Black 0.001 0.007 0.883
Other Race 0.007 0.007 0.290
Missing Race -0.011 0.008 0.184
Female -0.017 0.015 0.257
Missing Gender 0.002 0.001 0.165
Age 0.351 0.199 0.078
Missing Age -0.001 0.001 0.315
International Student 0.004 0.014 0.792
Received Financial Aid -0.012 0.014 0.396
Missing Financial Aid Receipt 0.001 0.002 0.775
First Time Student 0.001 0.003 0.751
Joint p-value 0.242
Observations (Nl/Nr) 1,977 2,281
Notes: Each row reports results from a linear regression of the covariate on an indicator
for missing a waitlist cutoff, term by year fixed effects, registration priority fixed effects,
and indicators for special student categories. The sample includes students within one
position of the waitlist cutoff. The first column shows coefficients, the second column
shows the robust standard error, and the third column shows the p-value. The p-value
in the last row is from an F test of whether the differences in each characteristic




Table 2.4: First Stage Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Enrollment in Waitlisted
Section and Course
(1) (2)
Panel A: Section Enrollment





Control Mean 0.641 0.641
Panel B: Course Enrollment





Control Mean 0.655 0.655
Observations (Nl/Nr) 1,977/2,281
Notes: Results are from a linear regression where the dependent
variable is enrollment in the waitlisted section in Panel A and
enrollment in the waitlisted course in Panel B, where enrollment
is equal to one if the student was enrolled at the end of the
advanced registration period. All students are within one running
variable position from the cutoff. The first column does not include
controls while the second controls for race/ethnicity, gender, age,
citizenship, financial aid receipt, first time students, special student
status, special program status, registration priority fixed effects,
term by year fixed effects, and indicators for missing variables. The
control mean is the mean of the dependent variable for students
with a running variable of zero. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 2.5: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Course Load and Persistence
# Courses Enrolled in Concurrent Term Enrolled
Zero One or Two Three or More Next Term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 0.026* -0.008 -0.017 -0.019
(0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Reduced Form 0.016* -0.005 -0.011 -0.012
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
CCM 0.104 0.337 0.559 0.688
Observations (Nl/Nr) 1,977 2,281
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3. The outcome is an
indicator for whether the student took no courses in the concurrent term in Column (1), took one
or two courses in Column (2), or took three or more courses in Column (3). A course is counted
if the student is enrolled after the add/drop date. The outcome in column (4) is an indicator for
whether the student enrolls in any classes the following major term. The standard errors are in
parentheses, with the control complier means (CCM) and the reduced form displayed below. All
columns include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
(* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
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Table 2.6: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Transfers and Degree Completion
Within Within Within Within Within
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transfer Other Two-Year 0.009 0.036** 0.026 0.026 0.027
(0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
CCM [ 0.056] [0.105] [0.152] [0.189] [0.222]
Reduced Form 0.006 0.023** 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Transfer Four-Year 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.013 0.019
(0.008) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
CCM [0.030] [0.062] [0.141] [0.190] [0.219]
Reduced Form 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.013
(0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Certificate/ Associate 0.003 -0.002 -0.010 -0.016 -0.011
(0.005) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
CCM [0.008] [0.033] [0.077] [0.106] [0.117]
Reduced Form 0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.011 -0.007
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Bachelors 0.004 0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014)
CCM [0.002] [0.006] [0.014] [0.043] [0.094]
Reduced Form 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations (Nl/Nr) 1,977 2,281
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3. The outcomes
are indicators for transferring and degree completion at different time horizones: within
one through five years of the waitlisted term. Associate and certificate completion data
comes from both De Anza administrative records and the National Student Clearinghouse.
The standard errors are in parentheses, with the control complier means (CCM) and the
reduced form displayed below. All columns include the covariates listed in Table 2.4.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
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CHAPTER III
The Effect of Summer Employment on the Educational
Attainment of Under-Resourced Youth
3.1 Introduction
Even though the U.S. economy has climbed out of the Great Recession, the labor market
opportunities for many people remain a concern. The labor force participation rate among
all civilians age 16 or older was 5% lower in 2016 than its pre-recession level of 66.2% in 2006,
according to data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The recovery for young adults
age 16 to 24, particularly for young men, has been slower than for the population overall;
the labor force participation rate for these groups declined by 9% and 11% respectively over
the same timeframe. As policymakers seek to improve work opportunities for youth, there
has been a growing interest in alternative pathways for them to obtain career skills.
Summer youth employment programs are a popular way for municipalities to provide
adolescents with skills and experiences thought to improve labor market outcomes. The first
such program began in the United States over 50 years ago in 1964, and as of 2016, at least
42 cities across the country offered summer jobs to over 115,000 youths.1 New York City
and Chicago operate the largest programs, providing jobs to about 50,000 and 24,000 youths
respectively, though many smaller cities operate them as well, including Tuscaloosa, AL,
Charlottesville, VA and Madison, WI (Dollarwise, 2016).
These programs are arguably more important in today’s economy than ever before, as
recent work has highlighted the increasing returns to non-cognitive skills in the labor force
(Deming, 2017). Working during the summer offers youth the opportunity to interact with
professionals who can teach them valuable interpersonal skills. Also, many summer youth
employment programs include an explicit curriculum designed to teach a variety of work
1There is no exact count of how many local governments organize summer youth employment programs
as these programs are decentralized (Belotti et al., 2010).
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readiness and life skills, ranging from how to prepare a resume to the benefits of establishing
a bank account. Finally, some have a particular focus on career and technical education
(CTE), which is receiving increased attention from many cities and states (Alfeld, 2016;
Jacob, 2017). In this sense, summer youth employment programs are similar in spirit to
school-based CTE programs, in which schools offer students internships or connections to
employers, in that both are part of the education for career readiness.
There are three main purposes of summer youth employment programs. First, they
intend to give young adults the opportunity to earn an income during the summer. Second,
they aim to reduce crime during the summer by keeping youth ‘off the streets.’ Finally, they
serve to improve labor market outcomes beyond the summer.
While research evidence on such programs has grown in recent years, it is still limited. In
particular, it is not clear how, if at all, participation influences key educational outcomes such
as high school graduation. This is a critical gap as education is one of the strongest predictors
of labor market success. Participation might increase educational attainment by increasing
the opportunity cost of dropping out of high school or by increasing academic engagement as
a result of improved soft skills. On the other hand, it may decrease educational attainment
if youth have an unsatisfying work experience. Using detailed administrative data, this
paper analyzes a more extensive set of educational outcomes than previous studies, including
continued enrollment in school, attendance rates, test scores, high school graduation, and
college enrollment.
In this paper, we study how participation in a summer youth employment program
is associated with educational outcomes. Specifically, we study the program in Detroit,
Michigan using a selection on observables identification strategy, comparing youth who
participated in the program to those who applied but did not participate. The main threat
to our identification is that participants differ from applicants who did not participate along
unobservable dimensions that are related to educational outcomes. To address this, we first
match participants to applicants who did not participate that were of the same race and
gender and were in the same grade in the same school in the same year. Participants look
quite similar to their matched peers along a variety of other observable dimensions.
We also control for information related to the selection process in our analysis. While
details vary across job placements, program administrators select participants using information
from the application, from brief conversations at a career fair, or, if applicable, from an
existing relationship with the applicant. In our analysis, we control for all of the information
from the application, including gender, race and a second-order polynomial of age. We
also control for some things that administrators may be able to infer from the application,
such as characteristics of the neighborhood where the applicant lives. Lastly, we control for
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information that was unobservable to program staff, such as prior attendance records and
test scores. Specifically, we control for prior school attendance, special education status,
limited English proficiency, eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch, ever retained in grade
as well as prior standardized math and reading test scores, and the interaction of the two.
We perform falsification exercises and do not find that participation predicts pre-program
characteristics. For the 99.9% of youth who completed 6th grade before applying, we test
whether participation predicted educational performance in 6th grade. These measures could
not have been caused by participation in the summer program. We condition on all of the
covariates listed above, including baseline attendance and test scores, and do not find that
participation predicts sixth-grade attendance or test scores.
We find that participation is associated with a modest increase in educational attainment.
Specifically, it increased the likelihood of enrolling in public school after the program by 1.5%
and of graduating from high school by 4%. We perform the robustness checks proposed
in Oster (2016) and find that, consistent with the falsification exercises, these results are
not driven by selection bias from unobservable characteristics that are correlated with
observables. Specifically, we can bound the effect on public school enrollment between 0.8%
and 1.5% and on high school graduation between 3.4% and 4%, assuming that selection on
unobservables was not larger than selection on observables.
Youth with the weakest academic skills benefited the most, as participation increased
school enrollment and high school graduation by 2.2% and 5.5% respectively for this group.
Our findings suggest that summer youth employment is an important complement to in-school
work-based learning programs, such as career technical education and school-employer partnerships.
A youth’s first experience in the labor force may have a significant impact on future education
and career aspirations.
3.2 Prior Literature
Until recently, research on summer youth employment programs was limited to descriptive
analyses of program implementation or short-run participant outcomes. To the best of
our knowledge, there are only seven studies which credibly estimate causal effects of these
programs — four that study the same New York City program (Leos-Urbel, 2014; Schwartz
et al., 2015; Gelber et al., 2016; Valentine et al., 2017), two that study the same Chicago
program (Heller, 2014; Davis and Heller, 2017) and one that focuses on the program in
Boston (Modestino, 2017). The NYC and Boston studies utilize a quasi-experimental lottery
design that compares youth who were provided an opportunity to participate via a random
admissions lottery to those who applied but did not receive an offer to participate. The
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Chicago study analyzes two randomized controlled trials, comparing young adults who were
randomly assigned to participate in the program to those who were assigned to a control
group.
Several consistent findings stand out. First, participation in summer employment programs
seems to be associated with a reduction in crime. In New York City, Gelber et al. (2016) find
that participation reduced the likelihood of incarceration up to 9 years after the program by
10% relative to a comparison mean of 1%. In Chicago, the program reduced violent-crime
arrests by 35% during the summer and the following school year (Heller, 2014; Davis and
Heller, 2017). In Boston, participation reduced the number of arraignments for violent and
property crime in the following year by 35% and 57% respectively, with the largest impacts
for African-American and Hispanic males (Modestino, 2017).
Second, participation in the programs does not seem to have a meaningful impact on
employment or earnings. Researchers followed NYC participants for up to 7 years and do
not find that participation had a long-run effect on labor market outcomes. They do find a
small increase in the likelihood of having a job in the first two follow-up years, accompanied
by a small decline in wages, which they associate with a greater likelihood of working in the
public sector (Gelber et al., 2016; Valentine et al., 2017). However, the studies of the Boston
and Chicago programs follow youth for one and two years respectively and did not find an
effect on employment or earnings over this timeframe. (Davis and Heller, 2017; Modestino,
2017).
It is decidedly less clear how, if at all, participation in a summer youth employment
program influences educational outcomes. An early study in NYC of the 2007 cohort found
that participation increased attendance in the following school year by 1.7%, driven by youth
age 16 and older who had low baseline attendance rates (Leos-Urbel, 2014). However, a study
that included a broader sample of five cohorts of the program from 2006 to 2010 found a
precise zero effect on attendance (Valentine et al., 2017). Moreover, studies following NYC
participants over a longer time period find precise null effects on high school graduation,
college enrollment or degree completion (Gelber et al., 2016; Valentine et al., 2017).2
Modestino (2017) finds that participation in Boston’s summer youth employment program
increased attendance rates in the following school year by 3% relative to a baseline of 87%.
This was driven by larger increases for Hispanic youths, males and those older than 16.
Studying the Chicago program, however, Davis and Heller (2017) find that participation
did not affect daily attendance or grade point average the following school year. It also did
2Schwartz et al. (2015) studies the test-taking and performance of four cohorts of applicants between
2005 and 2008 and find that participation did not increase either the number of Regents exams or the
number of exams passed among first-time applicants. Youth who participated in the program for more than
one summer do benefit, though.
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not affect persistence in school, defined as continued enrollment or high school graduation,
within 3 years. However, the authors do find that relatively more advantaged youth, those
with the highest pre-program school attendance and grades, do benefit from participation.
Specifically, participation increased school persistence by 13% for those in the top quartile
of predicted employment impact relative to a baseline mean of 60%, which was statistically
significant at the 10% level.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we use more detailed
education data than previously available, allowing us to look at a broader set of educational
outcomes altogether than any other single study. Second, in an effort to understand contradictory
findings in the prior literature, we provide some additional evidence as to which subgroups
benefit the most from summer employment programs. Finally, our study is the first to
evaluate the summer youth employment program in Detroit, Michigan. While it is similar
to those in NYC and Boston in terms of implementation, the program in Detroit serves
a less-resourced population than these other cities.3 For example, according to the 2016
American Community Survey, 51% of children in Detroit live in poverty, compared to 27%
in NYC, 31% in Boston and 28% in Chicago. Furthermore, 6th graders in Detroit score 2.3
grade levels below the national average on standardized tests, relative to 0.3 grade levels in
NYC and Boston and one grade level in Chicago (Reardon et al., 2017). Therefore, youth
in Detroit may benefit from having a summer job more than those in other cities.
3.3 Institutional Background
The current iteration of Detroit’s summer youth employment program began in 2009
with federal stimulus funding provided at the onset of the Great Recession. It has provided
summer jobs to over 15,000 youths between 2015 and 2017. The program, commonly known
as Grow Detroit’s Young Talent or GDYT, employs young adults for 20 hours per week for
six weeks from July through August, at between $8 and $9.50 per hour depending on age
and job type. Youth selected for the program receive 24 hours of work readiness training
before and during their employment.
All Detroit residents between the ages of 14 to 24 are eligible to apply for the program.
The application period begins in February and is open for five weeks. It is widely advertised in
the city as the Mayor’s office holds a kickoff event and works with schools, religious leaders
and community organizations to recruit a pool of applicants. About 10% of the eligible
3The program in Chicago has more of an emphasis on a social-emotional learning curriculum than
programs in other cities. Participants in Chicago spent up to 40% of their hours engaged with the curriculum.
In contrast, participants in NYC, Boston and Detroit spent about 10-20% of their hours in programming
about work readiness.
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population applies for the program.4 The application is very simple; in it, youth provide
basic demographic information, indicate whether they have any past work experience and
specify their interest in different industries. The application does not include a resume or
personal statement and does not ask for details about past job responsibilities or school
achievement.
GDYT consists of four sub-programs, each of which has a distinct selection process and
involves a different summer experience.5 Although there may be meaningful differences in
how each influences educational outcomes, we can not explore heterogeneity across sub-programs
in our analysis. Except for the Junior Police and Fire Cadets program, we do not have data
on which particular sub-program youth participated in.
3.3.1 Junior Police and Fire Cadets
The Junior Police and Fire Cadets program (JPC) is reserved for 14 to 15-year-olds and
is structured to provide a first work experience for youth. Working with JPC includes a
variety of community service activities, including providing support and companionship to
seniors and cleaning parks and other neighborhood commons. College students serve as
day-to-day supervisors for the young adults, and police officers interact with the youth in
various capacities throughout the summer. JPC employees make up 20 percent of GDYT
participants.
According to our conversations with program staff, youth are not purposely chosen for
this program. Instead, staff pick a (somewhat) random set of 14- and 15-year-old applicants
to GDYT and invite them to participate. When we compare pre-program characteristics of
JPC participants to age-eligible youth who applied but did not participate in GDYT, we
find they are quite similar, though not identical. As reported in Table C.1, there were no
statistically significant differences in academic performance, including attendance and test
scores, between these groups, yet JPC participants lived in lower-income neighborhoods.
3.3.2 Community-Based Organizations (CBOs)
The largest group of GDYT youth — roughly 60 percent — work for one of many
non-profit community-based organizations (CBO) in Detroit, similar to the employment
models in NYC and Chicago. The work covers a wide range of activities, from camp
counselor for younger children to clerical office support to community beautification. These
organizations recruit applicants on their own, frequently selecting youth with whom they
4According to authors’ calculations from the 2015 ACS population estimates.
5Youth apply to participate in GDYT broadly, and not to a specific sub-program.
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have a long-term relationship (e.g., those who participated in programming during the
academic year with the CBO, or were known to staff in the neighborhood).6 CBO participants
typically range in age from 15-18 years old.
3.3.3 Industry Led Training and Career Pathways Programs
The final two opportunities for employment are through Industry Led Training (ILT) and
Career Pathways internships. The ILT program is a new and relatively smaller component
for applicants at least 16 years old, with about 10% of GDYT youths participating each
summer. It consists of work-based training programs in high-growth sectors (e.g., hospitality,
child care, IT, advanced manufacturing, healthcare), which are typically run by non-profit
organizations in Detroit. The Career Pathways program provides an internship for older
applicants, usually at least 19 years of age, at a variety of major private sector employers in
the city, including Detroit Manufacturing Systems, Touchpoint Support Services, and Wayne
State University. To be eligible for an ILT program or Career Pathways internship, applicants
must have had some prior work experience, and be referred by some other organization.
Eligible youths are invited to attend a career fair to meet the employers, and then employers
select who they want to hire.7 Given this selection process, we assume that applicants who
participate in the ILT and Career Pathways programs are likely to be quite different than
those who do not.
3.4 Data and Sample
This study uses administrative records from both GDYT, the Michigan Department of
Education (MDE) and the Center for Educational Performance and Information (CEPI).
From GDYT, we have application and participation data from the program for the summer
of 2015. The application data consists of all applications which were started during the
submission window between February and March of 2015, regardless of whether they were
completed.8 We define applicants as those who completed the entire application during the
submission window or, in some rare cases, as those who did not complete an application
during the window yet still participated in the program.9 In total, there were 12,255
6Youth who are recruited to participate in a CBO summer program must still submit a GDYT
application. Therefore, we have complete data on these applicants.
7GDYT staff assigns any remaining spots to other eligible youths.
8Only 2.44% of applications were incomplete. 97% of these stalled after the first step of the application,
which only asked for first name, last name, and email address. These incomplete applications do not contain
sufficient information to match youth to the education data, so we drop them from our analysis.
9Youth who are recruited to participate in a CBO summer program can apply after the submission
window ends and still work with GDYT in the summer. In total, 0.79% of completed applications were
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applicants in 2015.10
We matched the application data to payroll data using exact matches on first and last
name. The payroll data was maintained by multiple organizations that managed records
for the youth who worked during the summer. Some of the payroll systems were unreliable
and crashed repeatedly over the course of the summer. Therefore, we are missing important
information about job placement, hours worked and earnings. We consider any youth who
appeared in a payroll system to have participated with GDYT.11 In total, 2,807 youths
worked in 2015.12
We matched the GDYT data to administrative records from MDE and CEPI consisting
of the universe of K-12 public school students in the state from 2003 to 2017. We used a
quasi-probabilistic matching algorithm based on first name, middle initial, last name, suffix,
date of birth and gender. We successfully matched 94% of applicants to the education data,
and exclude youth who did not match from our main analysis.13 The education records
contain information on school enrollment, attendance, test scores, and graduation. They
are linked to data from the National Student Clearinghouse, which provides information
on college enrollment. We analyze the effect of participation in GDYT on a variety of
educational outcomes, including K-12 enrollment, attendance, expulsions, taking the SAT,
SAT score, high school graduation and college enrollment.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for four groups. Column 1 shows characteristics for
all Detroit residents in 8th to 12th grade who were enrolled in a public school during the
2014-2015 school year, while column 2 focuses only on the youth who applied for GDYT.
Comparing column 1 to column 2 provides insight about who applied for the summer
program.14 Applicants were disproportionately black, as 95% of those who applied for
submitted after the submission window.
10While we do not have information on whether applicants in 2015 applied or participated in prior
summers, data from a different summer indicates that about 30% of all applicants, and 42% of participants,
participated in the program during the previous summer.
11Although we do not have information on hours worked for the 2015 cohort, data from a different summer
indicates that 12% of youth in the payroll system did not ever show up to work. If youth appeared in the
payroll data but did not actually work, then this would attenuate our estimates of the effects of program
participation toward zero.
12The number of participants reported in official GDYT reports is greater than what we report here
because the GDYT counts include youth who are employed by affiliate organizations, a separate employment
model that isn’t captured in the available application or payroll records.
13Applicants may not have matched to the education data because (1) they only attended private K-12
schools in Michigan, (2) they moved to Michigan after high school, or (3) the combination of their name,
birthdate and gender did not provide enough information to identify a match. Of the 6% of applicants who
did not match to the education data, about 80% were 18 years old or younger when they applied, suggesting
that the non-matches were not driven by (2). We cannot disentangle explanations (1) and (3) with our data.
14The distribution of age and educational status between these groups differs by construction, as column
1 is restricted to middle and high school students while column 2 includes all applicants, regardless of their
age or school enrollment status.
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the program were black compared to 86% of Detroit youths. Females were also more
likely to apply. To draw comparisons between student needs in school as well as the
neighborhoods where they live, we measure applicant characteristics in the most recent
pre-program year that they were enrolled in a public K-12 school. Although applicants
and Detroit residents overall were similar in terms of eligibility for free or reduced-price
lunch, there are notable differences in terms of where they live and how they performed
on standardized tests. Applicants lived in relatively more advantaged neighborhoods; 13%
of adults had a Bachelors’s degree and 33% of households earned below the poverty line,
compared to 12% and 35% respectively for all Detroit youths. Similarly, applicants were
more likely to take standardized tests in 8th grade, and those who took them scored higher.
Overall, this comparison shows that applicants were a somewhat positively selected group
of Detroit youths.
Since youth who applied for the program were different than those who did not along a
variety of observable dimensions, our empirical strategy compares youth who participated in
GDYT to those who applied but did not participate. Comparing columns 3 and 4 of Table
3.1 shows that these two groups look nearly identical in terms of age and academic enrollment
during the 2014-2015 school year, and quite similar in terms of race/ethnicity, gender and
needs in school. Participants and non-participants lived in very similar neighborhoods, where
about one-third of households live below the poverty line. While participants were slightly
less likely to take standardized tests in 8th grade, those who took the tests were more likely
to be proficient, suggesting that they were similar in terms of academic performance overall.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
The key empirical challenge in our analysis is to control for pre-program differences
between participants and other applicants that directly influence educational outcomes, and
would bias our impact estimates. We use a combination of exact matching and regression
adjustment to control for such differences.
We create match groups consisting of all applicants who were the same race and gender
and also were in the same grade in the same school in the most recent pre-program year that
they attended a public K-12 school in Michigan.15 For example, if a student was in 11th
15The most recent pre-program year an applicant attended a public K-12 school in Michigan (match year)
was almost always (1) the 2014-2015 school year, or (2) the year that they graduated or dropped out of high
school. 81% of applicants have match years of 2014-2015, 11% have match years of 2012-2013 or 2013-2014
and 8% have match years before the 2012-2013 school year. In some rare cases, though, the match year
represents when an applicant moved out of state or began attending private school. As a result, 1% of
applicants have match groups that consist of their classmates when they were in 6th grade or below, even
though they applied for GDYT when they were much older. In addition, ten applicants first enrolled in a
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grade during the 2014-2015 school year, then his or her match group consists of all of the
other 11th grade applicants from their school who were of the same race and gender. Using
this example, we define the match year as the 2014-2015 school year and the match school
as the school they attended during the match year. Similarly, if a student was in 12th grade
in 2012-2013 and graduated high school that year, then their match group consists of all of
the other applicants who were also in 12th grade in their school in 2012-2013 of the same
race and gender.
Of all participants, 81% are in match groups with at least one participant and one
non-participating applicant, and thus provide variation with which we can identify effects
of the program. As shown in Table 3.2, these youth differ in several ways from other
applicants, which influences the generalizability, or external validity, of our analysis. Relative
to the participants in a degenerate match group, those in a match group with at least one
participant and non-participant were substantially younger, more likely to be black and lived
in a somewhat higher poverty neighborhood.16
Because our identification is driven by within match group differences between participants
and other applicants, it is useful to compare these two groups in terms of pre-program
characteristics. To do so, we estimate the following model
Xij = α0 + α1Participatedij + γj + νij (3.1)
whereXij represents a baseline characteristic of youth i in match group j, and Participatedij
is a binary indicator for participation. Lastly, γj is the full set of match group fixed effects.
We give participants a weight of one and other applicants a weight equal to the ratio of
participants to non-participants in their match group.17 This weighting scheme accounts for
the fact that match groups vary in terms of the proportion of participants to non-participants.
We cluster standard errors by match school.18
Table 3.3 shows the results of the balance tests estimated using equation 3.1. Column
1 shows the comparison means, the weighted average of the baseline characteristic for
Michigan public school after the 2014-2015 school year. We exclude them from the analysis since we cannot
construct match groups for them without pre-program information.
16For example, 10% of youths in a non-degenerate match group were older than 18, 98% were black and
34% of households in their neighborhoods lived below the poverty line, compared with 30%, 89%, and 30%
respectively for youth in a match group with only participants or non-participants.
17That is, if a match group contains two participants and six non-participants then we give each participant
a weight of one and each non-participant a weight of 13 . Similarly, if a match group contains three participants
and two non-participants then we give each participant a weight of one and each non-participant a weight
of 32 .
18All of our results are robust to using an unweighted regression model as well as to clustering standard
errors by the zip code where youth resided in the match year or by the school they attended during the
2015-2016 school year.
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non-participants, and column 2 shows α1, the coefficient on the indicator for participation.
Participants look quite similar to non-participants along most observable dimensions.19 For
example, 14.5% of participants and 13.2% of non-participants received special education
services in the match year and 82.9% of participants were eligible for free or reduced-price
lunch compared to 82.7% of non-participants. The differences in these baseline characteristics,
as well as in neighborhood poverty rate and those related to 8th-grade standardized tests, are
not statistically significant. However, there are meaningful differences between participants
and non-participants in terms of baseline attendance. Participants had higher attendance
rates by 1.5 percentage points and were 4.4 percentage points less likely to be chronically
absent.20 To address these differences, we control for a rich set of baseline controls, including
baseline attendance and chronic absenteeism, in our main analysis.
In our context, testing for mean differences in baseline characteristics may not be very
informative as to how similar participants and non-participants were before the program.
Some CBO’s employ youth who are particularly ‘at risk’ while others target those who are
especially high-achieving. Therefore, it is possible that participants and non-participants
look similar on average, even though they are actually quite different. To address this
concern, Figure 3.1 shows kernel density plots of the entire distribution of four baseline
characteristics, separately for participants and non-participants.21 They are residualized by
match group and are restricted to the sample of youth who are in a match group with at
least one participant and one non-participant. The figures show that there exists a common
support between participants and non-participants; participants are not drawn from the two
extremes of the distribution.
Having established that participants and non-participants within match group are quite
similar on most observable dimensions, we estimate the impact of participation in the
program with the following regression model
Yij = β0 + β1Participatedij + β2Xij + γj + εij (3.2)
where outcome Y for youth i in match group j is a function of a binary indicator for
participation (i.e., worked in the GDYT program during the 2015 summer), and other
covariates. We include a vector of match group fixed effects, γj, which ensures we are
comparing outcomes within race ∗ gender ∗ school ∗ grade cells. In addition, we control for
a rich set of covariates, Xij, consisting of all of the information from the application, some
19We do not test for differences along race/ethnicity, gender or age because the match group fixed effect
ensures that participants and non-participants are comparable along these dimensions.
20We define chronic absenteeism as having an attendance rate less than 90%.
21The kernel density plots for the binary characteristics in Table 3.3 look similar to those in Figure 1 but
are much less smooth. They are available upon request.
88
information not from the application but likely observable to program administrators, as
well as information that was not available to program staff during the selection process. The
information from the application that we control for includes an indicator of whether the
applicant graduated from high school before the program as well as linear and quadratic terms
of age as of July 1, 2015. Program administrators could infer neighborhood characteristics
from the application, so we use controls, measured at the census block group level, for
the fraction of adults with at least a Bachelor’s degree, the fraction of households living
in poverty, the fraction of households that are owner-occupied and the employment rate.22
Finally, program staff did not have access to past academic records, yet we use academic
controls, including attendance rate, binary indicators for chronic absenteeism, special education
status, limited English proficiency, eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch, ever retained
in grade, as well as standardized math and reading test scores and an interaction of math
and reading scores.23 We include indicators for missing control variables. As before, we give
participants a weight of one and other applicants a weight equal to the ratio of participants
to non-participants in their match group. We cluster standard errors by match school.
The coefficient of interest, β1, represents the difference in average outcomes between
participants and those who applied but did not participate. β1 represents the true causal
effect of program participation if the conditional independence assumption holds. There
cannot be any unobservable differences between participants and non-participants that directly
influence educational outcomes. While we cannot explicitly test this assumption, we can
probe it. There are two ways in which we examine the robustness of our results to omitted
variable bias. First, we implement the tests proposed in Oster (2016) to determine the extent
to which selection on unobservables explains our results. We discuss these tests in detail in
section 3.6.1.
Second, if participants differ from non-participants along unobservable dimensions, even
after controlling for match group fixed effects and the rich set of covariates listed above, we
might expect participation to predict youth outcomes prior to the program. Therefore, we
estimate variants of equation 3.2 where the dependent variable is a pre-program educational
outcome. We focus on 6th-grade outcomes, as 99.9% of youths applied after completing the
sixth grade. Weighting and standard errors are handled as before.
Table 3.4 shows the results of these falsification tests. Column 1 reports the weighted
average of the 6th-grade outcome for non-participants and column 2 shows the coefficient
on the indicator for participation. Participation does not predict prior student outcomes,
22Unless otherwise specified, all of the pre-program characteristics are measured in the match year.
23We use 8th-grade test scores whenever possible. If the applicant did not reach 8th grade before they
applied or did not take the tests in 8th grade, we use 7th-grade scores. If neither 7th nor 8th-grade scores
are available, we use 6th-grade scores.
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including attendance and performance on standardized tests. This exercise suggests that it
is unlikely that there are important omitted variables that confound our impact estimates.
3.6 Effects of Participation in GDYT
We assess the effect of participation in GDYT on a variety of short-run educational
outcomes. We observe outcomes during two follow-up school years, 2015-2016 and 2016-2017.
Overall, we find consistently positive effects of program participation on enrollment, test-taking
rates, and high school graduation, with no evidence of subsequent decreases in attendance
or test scores.
Table 3.5 reports the effect of participating in GDYT on educational outcomes, showing
the estimates from equation 3.2. Since applicants range in age from 14-24, each outcome
is defined only for a certain set of youth.24 We describe the sample who were eligible for
each outcome in column 1 and the number of youths in the sample in column 2.25 Column 3
shows the weighted average of the outcome for non-participants and column 4 displays the
cumulative effect of participation in GDYT in the two years following the program. While
we focus our discussion on the effects after two years, we show estimates of the effect of
participation after each follow-up year separately in Table C.3.
Participation in GDYT increased the likelihood of being enrolled in a Michigan public
school by 1.4 percentage points. In the two years after the program, 95.9% of participants
remained enrolled compared to 94.5% of non-participants, a difference which is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Although we cannot directly test it, this is likely driven by a
reduction in dropping out of school. It is unlikely that this is a result of differential mobility
out of state or enrollment in private school given that we find even larger positive effects
on high school graduation from a Michigan public school, which will be discussed in further
detail below.
We interpret our results as the effect of working with GDYT compared to a ‘business as
usual’ control group. We do not observe the employment status of non-participants during
the 2015 summer, so we do not know whether they worked outside of GDYT or did not
have a job at all.26 However, all of the prior studies of summer youth employment programs
24For example, we do not analyze the effect of participation on subsequent enrollment in K-12 for a
19-year-old participant who already graduated high school.
25Table C.2 further describes the sample of eligible youths for the outcomes in each of the first two
follow-up years and clarifies the formula used to calculate the cumulative measure of the outcomes after the
first two follow-up years.
26Some non-participants were offered a summer job with GDYT but declined, although we also do not
observe offers to participate with GDYT. There are a few reasons why someone who received an offer would
not participate: 1) they did not complete registration paperwork, 2) they were selected for the ILT or Career
Pathways Internship programs but did not show up to the career fairs, 3) they needed to attend summer
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suggest that participation increases the likelihood of having any job during the summer and
we have little reason to suspect that this result would not generalize to Detroit (Gelber et al.,
2016; Davis and Heller, 2017; Modestino, 2017).
Participation in GDYT did not influence daily attendance rates or chronic absenteeism;
we find precise zero point estimates for these outcomes. Students who remained in public
school were no more or less likely to show up throughout the school year. If the marginal
student were any less qualified, prepared or resourced to remain in school, then they might
have had lower attendance rates or higher chronic absenteeism, conditional on enrollment.
This is not what we find, however. In addition, we do not find evidence that participation
influenced the likelihood of expulsion.
Michigan offers the SAT for free and during school hours, as part of its 11th grade
standardized tests. Some students still do not take the test, though, due to exemptions as
a result of special education plans or absences on test days. GDYT participants were 3.4
percentage points more likely to take the SAT than non-participants, representing a 4.7%
increase from a comparison mean of 72.9%. This estimate is significant at the 10% level.
Some, but not all, of the increase in test-taking is driven by increased enrollment in school,
yet the magnitude of the effect on enrollment is less than half the size of the effect on taking
the SAT. Importantly, there was no statistically significant effect on SAT scores among those
who took the SAT.
Participation in GDYT had a large and positive effect on high school graduation. Youth
who participated were 3.4 percentage points more likely to graduate than non-participants,
representing a 4% increase relative to a comparison mean of 85%. This finding stands in
contrast to Valentine et al. (2017) which finds that summer youth employment did not
influence high school graduation in NYC. As shown in Table C.3, this is mostly driven
by an increase in the second follow-up year.27 Finally, we find meaningfully large, yet
statistically insignificant, estimates of participation on college enrollment for applicants who
had graduated high school before applying. They suggest that participation increased the
likelihood of enrolling in college by 8%. This is driven by an increase in four-year college
enrollment.
school, or 4) they did not wish to participate.
27This is probably because 11th grade applicants were likely to graduate regardless of participation in the
program, whereas the program had a greater influence for 10th-grade applicants. However, an alternative
explanation could be that there is a cumulative effect of participation, whereby working with GDYT for
more than one summer has a larger effect on graduation than working for a single summer. This would
be consistent with findings from the NYC program in Schwartz et al. (2015). We do find that 10th grade
participants in 2015 were more likely to work with GDYT during the 2016 summer. Descriptively, though,
there was not a larger increase in high school graduation among youth who participated in both the 2015
and 2016 summers. Results are available upon request.
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3.6.1 Robustness to Omitted Variable Bias
Although we use both matching and regression adjustment to control for many observable
differences between participants and other applicants, our estimates may still suffer from
omitted variable bias. Unobservable differences between these groups could come both from
the labor supply side, if the most motivated or committed youth who were offered jobs chose
to participate, and from the labor demand side, if employers chose to hire the best applicants
based on unobservable features like personality. We expect either to lead us to overstate the
positive effects of the program.
In order to test the extent to which omitted variable bias may be driving our results,
we perform two exercises proposed by Oster (2016). Building on earlier work by Altonji
et al. (2005), Oster proposes that, under some reasonable assumptions, one can identify a
consistent estimator of the bias. In particular, Oster suggests two complementary methods
to assess the robustness of results to omitted variable bias. The first is to generate a
bias-adjusted treatment effect, which represents the value of the treatment effect assuming
a given degree of selection on unobservables. Researchers can bound the true treatment
effect using the bias-adjusted treatment effects. The second is to examine the amount of
selection on unobservables, relative to selection on observables, that would need to exist for
the true treatment effect to be equal to zero. If a large amount of selection on unobservables
is needed, then the treatment effect can be considered robust to omitted variables bias.
Both of these exercises require a proportional selection assumption, whereby selection
on unobservables is proportional to selection on unobservables. The former exercise also
assumes that the omitted variable bias does not change the direction of the covariance
between the observables and the treatment. This holds as long as the bias not too large. An
important caveat with these exercises is that they only address omitted variable bias created
by unobservables that are related to observable characteristics. In the context of this study,
it seems unlikely that there are unobservables that are orthogonal to prior academic records
or socio-demographic characteristics.
Table 3.6 reports the results of these two exercises.28 Column 1 shows our estimate of the
effect of program participation, as previously reported in Table 3.5. This is equivalent to the
estimate of the treatment effect if there were no omitted variable bias. Column 2 shows the
bias-adjusted treatment effect, assuming that the amount of selection on unobservables is
equal to the amount of selection on observables.29 Both Oster (2016) and Altonji et al. (2005)
28We used the STATA package psacalc for these calculations.
29We also assume that the maximum R2 from a regression of the outcome on the observable characteristics
and all unobservables would be equal to one. Assuming a smaller R2, perhaps due to measurement error in
the outcome variable, would only move the bias-adjusted treatment effect away from zero, suggesting this
may be a conservative approach.
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suggest this as an upper bound on the amount of omitted variable bias. Together, columns
1 and column 2 report bounds for the true treatment effect. Finally, column 3 shows the
amount of proportional selection needed such that the treatment effect equals zero. Values
smaller in magnitude than one mean that selection on unobservables would not need to be
as large as selection on observables, whereas values larger than one mean that selection on
unobservables would need to be larger than the amount of selection on observables.30
Our impact estimates do not appear to be driven by omitted variable bias. We can bound
the effect on public school enrollment between 0.8 and 1.4 percentage points. Selection on
unobservables would need to be almost twice as large as the selection on unobservables in
order for the true effect to equal zero. Consistent with earlier results, the amount of bias
needed to generate an effect of zero is much smaller for attendance and expulsion outcomes.
In addition, the estimates for taking the SAT and graduating high school are robust.
Selection on unobservables would need to be over twenty times as large as selection on
observables for the effect on test-taking to equal zero, and almost four times as large for
the effect on graduating high school. We can bound our estimate for graduating from high
school between 2.9 and 3.4 percentage points, which still represents a large increase of at
least 3.4% relative to the comparison mean of 85%. Although estimates for the effect of
participation on college enrollment were not statistically significant, these exercises suggest
that the substantively large estimate on college enrollment for applicants who graduated
high school was unlikely to be driven by omitted variable bias.
3.6.2 Subgroup Analysis
While we find positive effects of the summer youth employment program overall, we also
seek to identify for whom the program was most beneficial. We explore heterogeneity along
four dimensions: grade in school, gender, prior academic achievement, and prior chronic
absenteeism. First, we compare the effect of participation for those in 9th grade or below
when they applied to those who were in 10th or 11th grade because previous studies find
differential effects by age.31 Second, we compare males to females because of growing gender
gaps in non-cognitive skills and educational attainment (Jacob, 2002; Goldin et al., 2006).
Finally, we examine differences based on both prior academic achievement and prior chronic
30Negative values indicate that selection on unobservables must operate in the opposite direction as
selection on observables for the treatment effect to equal zero.
31Leos-Urbel (2014) finds that, conditional on low baseline attendance, youth age 16 and older benefited
more from the program than younger participants. Modestino (2017) finds that youth older than 16 benefited
more from participation as well. Davis and Heller (2017) also find that those who benefited most from the
program were 16-17 year olds, although their analysis primarily compares this group to participants age
18 and older. In Detroit, 16-17 year olds tend to be in grades 10-12, so our analysis is closer in spirit to
Leos-Urbel (2014) and Modestino (2017), in that we compare these youths to younger participants.
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absenteeism because of past findings of heterogeneity by levels of school engagement.32 Since
test scores and attendance offer different, albeit correlated, measures of engagement, we study
these two groups separately.
We tested for balance in pre-program characteristics for each subgroup and show the
results in Table C.4. Consistent with our main analysis, participants and other applicants
look quite similar along most observable dimensions, yet participants had higher attendance
rates and were less likely to be chronically absent. As before, we control for a rich set
of covariates, including baseline attendance rate and chronic absenteeism, to address these
differences. We also conduct the same falsification tests as in our main analysis to check
whether participation predicts past academic outcomes. We report the results in Table
C.5. While we expect to find some statistically significant differences as we are testing
many hypotheses, participation is generally not predictive of prior outcomes. Therefore,
it is unlikely that there are important unobserved factors that bias our subgroup impact
estimates.
Table 3.7 shows the effect of participation in GDYT on a handful of key educational
outcomes for each subgroup in the two years after the program.33 The program was beneficial
for students who were in 9th grade and below when they applied (column 1) as well as for
those who were in 10th and 11th grade (column 2). The magnitude of the effect on subsequent
enrollment was similar for both groups, although the estimate for younger participants is not
statistically significant. Younger participants were 1.0 percentage point more likely to remain
enrolled in school, compared to a 1.7 percentage point increase for their older counterparts.
Older students who enrolled were more likely to be chronically absent than their younger
peers, however. This was likely driven by the enrollment of older students who otherwise
would have dropped out; although they remained in school, they were less likely to show
up. Despite higher rates of chronic absenteeism, we find that participation still increased
the educational attainment of older youths. They were 3.4 percentage points more likely
to graduate high school. We conclude that having a summer job with GDYT improved the
educational outcomes for middle and high school students.
Male and female participants benefited from the program in different ways. While both
males (column 3) and females (column 4) enrolled in school at similar rates, participation
increased chronic absenteeism for males and reduced it for females. Although neither is
32While Leos-Urbel (2014) finds that students with low baseline attendance benefit most, Davis and
Heller (2017) conclude that the program was most beneficial for youth with higher GPAs and attendance.
These studies use very different definitions of attendance, though. Leos-Urbel (2014) focuses on youth with
attendance rates less than 95% while Davis and Heller (2017) find that youth who had average pre-program
attendance rates of 77% (attended 139 days of school out of 180) benefited more than those who had average
attendance rates of 63% (attended 114 days).
33Table C.6 reports similar results for the full set of outcomes.
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statistically different from zero, they are close to being statistically different from each other,
with a p-value of 0.119. Surprisingly, participation may have increased the gender gap in
high school graduation by a modest amount, yet reduced the gap in college enrollment by
even more.34 The main effect of GDYT on high school graduation was driven by an increase
for females, who were already more likely to graduate. Although our estimates on college
enrollment are not statistically significant, they are consequential. If taken literally, they
suggest that participation reduced the gender gap in college enrollment by 60%, from 11.5
to 4.6 percentage points.
To examine differences based on prior academic achievement, we compare youth who
scored above the median on their 8th-grade math test (column 5) to those who scored below
it (column 6).35 The benefits of participation were largest for those who entered high school
with the weakest academic skills. Participation increased school enrollment by 2.1 percentage
points and high school graduation by 4.4 percentage points among lower-achieving youths.
In contrast, it did not have a meaningful effect on educational outcomes for higher-achieving
participants. The differences between these groups in terms of school enrollment and high
school graduation are statistically significant at the 10% level. Consistent with these results,
we also find that those who were not chronically absent before the program (column 7)
benefited less from participation than those who were (column 8). Our estimates of the
effects on school enrollment and high school graduation were larger for youth who were
chronically absent. Similar to our previous findings, though, despite positive effects on other
outcomes, participation did increase chronic absenteeism among youth who were chronically
absent before the program. Overall, we conclude that the program was particularly beneficial
for those with the weakest academic achievement and lowest attendance.
3.7 Conclusion
The labor market continues to present challenges for young, low-income, and less-educated
workers. This has spurred a growing interest in finding new ways for young adults to
obtain career skills, both inside and outside of school. Summer youth employment programs
34This appears to be because these outcomes are defined for different samples. That is, the high school
graduation outcome is defined for 10th and 11th-grade applicants while college enrollment is defined for 11th
and 12th-grade applicants. When we limit the analysis to 11th-grade applicants in order to hold the sample
constant, we find that the point estimate for high school graduation is slightly larger in magnitude for males
than females, while the estimates for college enrollment for each group are similar to those reported in Table
3.7.
35This analysis only includes youth who reached 8th grade by the 2014-2015 school year. We define the
median here as the median among all 8th-grade math scores in our sample. Test scores were normalized
within each year so they are comparable across years. Our results are robust to using reading scores instead
of math scores.
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represent one such intervention. In Detroit, the Grow Detroit’s Young Talent program has
provided over 15,000 summer work opportunities to youth between 2015 and 2017.
This study is complementary to prior evaluations of similar programs. Despite the
prevalence of summer youth employment programs across the United States, there is surprisingly
limited evidence of their effectiveness, particularly in terms of whether participation influences
educational outcomes. Despite findings from New York City, Chicago, and Boston which
suggest that there were small, if any, impacts on education, we find that the program in
Detroit increased education attainment. While the implementation of GDYT is similar
to the programs in NYC and Boston, the cities themselves are very different. Detroit is
a less-resourced city than these other sites. The poverty rate is higher, the schools are
of lower quality in terms of standardized test scores and the city has uniquely struggled
with population decline over the past several decades (Infoplease, 2017). Our analysis
suggests that in this context, providing jobs during the summer can change the educational
trajectories of young adults.
We find that youth who participate in GDYT experience consistently better educational
outcomes than their classmates who applied but did not participate. GDYT increased
subsequent enrollment in a Michigan public school by 1.5%, likely driven by a reduction
in dropping out. Even with increased enrollment, participants were no more or less likely
to be chronically absent. Most importantly, participation increased high school graduation
by 4% relative to a comparison mean of 85%. Following two exercises proposed in Oster
(2016), these estimates are not driven by selection bias from unobservables characteristics
that are related to observables. In addition, those who entered high school with the weakest
academic skills benefited the most, as participation increased school enrollment and high
school graduation by 2.2% and 5.5% respectively for this group. Overall, the benefits of
participation in GDYT continued long after youth received their last paycheck.
Our study has several limitations. First, we focus on only a single cohort of applicants
and follow them for only two years after the program. As we continue our partnership with
GDYT, we plan to study more cohorts for a longer follow-up period in future work. Second,
our study relies on a selection on observables identification strategy, which is considered
a less credible design than those used in evaluations of other summer youth employment
programs. We are currently working with GDYT to randomly assign a subset of summer
jobs to applicants, which will allow for a more refined evaluation in the future. However,
after controlling for a rich set of covariates and using matching methods, our analysis shows
that it is unlikely that there are important omitted variables that bias our estimates. Finally,
we do not address whether participation influenced outcomes other than education. In order
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the program, it will be important to examine its effect
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on employment, crime, and health in future work. We are working to establish partnerships
to bring in data about these other indicators of wellbeing for future work.
As policymakers from all levels of governance look for ways to improve the job prospects
for many people, and particularly for young people, it is important to understand whether
summer youth employment programs offer a pathway to success in the labor market.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Baseline Characteristics for Participants and Non-Participants
(a) Below Poverty Line in Neighborhood (b) Attendance Rate
(c) Standardized 8th Grade Math Score (d) Standardized 8th Grade Reading Score
Notes. Each figure shows a kernel density plot of the distribution of a baseline characteristic for participants
and non-participants, residualized by match group. The sample is restricted to youth in match groups with
at least one participant and non-participant. All baseline characteristics are measured in the match year,
except for 8th grade test scores. Youth who did not reach 8th grade before the program are not included in
the analysis of 8th grade test scores.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Detroit All Did Not
Grades 8-12 Applicants Participated Participate
Total 44394 12255 2807 9448
Matched to Education Data 1.00 0.94 0.90 0.95
Age as of July 1, 2015
15 and Younger 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.37
16-18 0.52 0.46 0.45 0.46
19 and Older 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.16
Educational Status
Grade 9 and Below 0.43 0.34 0.33 0.34
Grades 10-11 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.35
Grade 12 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.12
Enrolled In College 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.08
Not in School 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.11
Demographics
Black 0.86 0.95 0.90 0.96
Hispanic 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.02
White 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Female 0.51 0.58 0.55 0.60
Needs in School
Limited English Proficient 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.02
Special Education 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12
Free or Reduced Priced Lunch 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.81
Neighborhood Characteristics
BA Degree or Higher 11.94 13.30 12.69 13.47
Below Poverty Line 35.15 32.82 33.02 32.77
Owner Occupied Housing 40.05 41.31 40.84 41.45
Employed (16 and over) 75.10 75.10 75.15 75.09
8th Grade Test Scores
Took Math Test 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.89
Proficient Math 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.09
Math Score -0.67 -0.62 -0.60 -0.62
Took Reading Test 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.88
Proficient Reading 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.41
Reading Score -0.55 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46
Notes. Column 1 shows summary statistics for all 8th to 12th graders who lived in Detroit and
attended a Michigan public school during the 2014-2015 school year, regardless of whether they
applied to GDYT. Column 2 describes GDYT applicants for the 2015 summer while columns 3
and 4 describes GDYT participants and GDYT applicants who did not participate, respectively.
We report educational status in the 2014-2015 school, where not enrolled indicates that the
youth was neither enrolled in public school in Michigan nor in college. Needs in school and
neighborhood characteristics are measured in the most recent pre-program that a youth was
enrolled in a public K-12 school in Michigan. Youth who did not reach 8th grade before the
program are not included in the 8th grade test scores summary statistics.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics, by Match Group Characteristics
(1) (2)
Match Group with Match Group with
at Least 1 Participant Only Participants or
and 1 Non-Participant Non-Participants
Total 7960 3587
Age as of July 1, 2015
15 and Younger 0.40 0.33
16-18 0.50 0.37
19 and Older 0.10 0.30
Educational Status
Grade 9 and Below 0.36 0.29
Grades 10-11 0.41 0.21
Grade 12 0.13 0.09
Enrolled In College 0.06 0.15





Asian American 0.00 0.02
Female 0.59 0.56
Needs in School
Limited English Proficient 0.02 0.04
Special Education 0.12 0.13
Free or Reduced Price Lunch 0.82 0.80
Neighborhood Characteristics
BA Degree or Higher 12.69 14.65
Below Poverty Line 34.00 30.21
Owner Occupied Housing 39.98 44.28
Employed (16 and over) 74.39 76.67
8th Grade Test Scores
Non-missing math score 0.89 0.86
Proficient Math 0.10 0.09
Math Score -0.61 -0.63
Non-missing reading score 0.89 0.84
Proficient Reading 0.43 0.35
Reading Score -0.45 -0.49
Notes. Column 1 shows summary statistics for youth who are in match groups with at least one
participant and one non-participating applicant while column 2 describes youth in match groups with
only participants or non-participating applicants. The sample is restricted to applicants who matched
to the education data. We report educational status in the 2014-2015 school, where not enrolled
indicates that the youth was neither enrolled in public school in Michigan nor in college. Needs in
school and neighborhood characteristics are measured in the most recent pre-program that a youth
was enrolled in a public K-12 school in Michigan. We define a neighborhood as a census block group.
Youth who did not reach 8th grade before the program are not included in the 8th grade test scores
summary statistics.
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Special Education 0.132 0.013
(0.011)
Low Income 0.827 0.002
(0.010)
% Below Poverty Line in Neighborhood 34.258 -0.053
(0.556)
Attendance Rate 0.895 0.015***
(0.004)
Chronically Absent 0.351 -0.044***
(0.017)
Took 8th Grade Math Test 0.873 -0.006
(0.010)
Proficient on 8th Grade Math Test 0.091 0.013
(0.011)
Standardized 8th Grade Math Score -0.631 0.019
(0.025)
Took 8th Grade Reading Test 0.875 -0.007
(0.009)
Proficient on 8th Grade Reading Test 0.406 0.016
(0.017)
Standardized 8th Grade Reading Score -0.476 -0.010
(0.034)
N 11,547
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of a
baseline characteristic on an indicator for participated and match group fixed
effects, where participants have a weight of one and non-participants have a
weight equal to the ratio of participants to non-participants in their match
group. Column 1 shows the weighted mean of the baseline characteristic
for non-participants and column 2 shows the coefficient on the indicator for
participation. All baseline characteristics are measured in the match year,
except for 8th grade test scores. Youth who did not reach 8th grade before
the program are not included in the analysis of 8th grade test scores. Standard
errors are clustered by match school. Stars indicate: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 3.4: Falsification Tests of the Effect of






Attendance Rate 0.909 0.005
(0.003)
Chronically Absent 0.337 -0.013
(0.013)
Took Math Exam 0.937 0.003
(0.006)
Proficient on Math 0.144 -0.011
(0.011)
Std Math Score -0.543 -0.039
(0.024)
Took Reading Exam 0.941 -0.002
(0.006)
Proficient on Reading 0.405 -0.002
(0.014)
Std Reading Score -0.525 -0.013
(0.027)
N 11,531
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted
regression of a 6th grade educational outcome on an indicator
for participated, a vector of control variables as listed in the
text and match group fixed effects, where participants have a
weight of one and non-participants have a weight equal to the
ratio of participants to non-participants in their match group.
Column 1 shows the weighted mean of the baseline characteristic
for non-participants and column 2 shows the coefficient on the
indicator for participation. The sample is restricted to the 99.9%
of youths who reached 7th grade before the program so that the
control variables, most of which are measured in the match year,
are not measured in 6th grade. Standard errors are clustered by
match school. Stars indicate: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Participation in GDYT on Educational Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Description of Sample N Comparison Mean Participated
Enrolled in K12 11th grade or below in 2015 6,340 0.945 0.014***
(0.006)
Attendance Rate Enrolled in K-12 in 2016 or 2017 5,637 0.876 0.002
(0.004)
Chronically Absent Enrolled in K-12 in 2016 or 2017 5,637 0.409 -0.000
(0.013)
Expelled Enrolled in K-12 in 2016 or 2017 6,173 0.002 -0.001
(0.001)
Took SAT 9th or 10th graders in 2015 4,080 0.729 0.034*
(0.018)
SAT Composite Score Took the SAT in 2016 or 2017 3,012 860.307 -0.164
(3.791)
Graduated HS 10th or 11th grade in 2015 3,131 0.850 0.034**
(0.014)
College from HS 11th or 12th grade in 2015 2,484 0.435 0.006
(0.027)
2 Year College from HS 11th or 12th grade in 2015 2,484 0.210 0.012
(0.026)
4 Year College from HS 11th or 12th grade in 2015 2,484 0.230 -0.008
(0.018)
College as a HS Grad Graduated HS before 2015 1,701 0.449 0.038
(0.040)
2 Year College as a HS Grad Graduated HS before 2015 1,701 0.216 0.015
(0.032)
4 Year College as a HS Grad Graduated HS before 2015 1,701 0.244 0.024
(0.029)
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of an educational outcome on an indicator for
participated, a vector of control variables as listed in the text and match group fixed effects, where participants
have a weight of one and non-participants have a weight equal to the ratio of participants to non-participants
in their match group. Column 1 describes the sample for whom the outcome is defined, column 2 shows the
number of observations in the sample, column 3 shows the weighted mean of the baseline characteristic for
non-participants and column 4 shows the coefficient on the indicator for participation. Standard errors are
clustered by match school. Stars indicate: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
103
Table 3.6: Robustness of the Effects of Participation in GDYT




Observed Bias-Adjusted Selection for
Effect Effect Effect of Zero
Enrolled in K12 0.014 0.008 1.892
Attendance Rate 0.002 -0.006 0.265
Chronically Absent -0.000 0.028 0.012
Expelled -0.001 0.002 0.536
Took SAT 0.034 0.036 22.633
SAT Composite Score -0.164 0.754 0.183
Graduated HS 0.034 0.029 3.809
College from HS 0.006 -0.038 0.152
2 Year College from HS 0.012 0.059 -0.495
4 Year College from HS -0.008 -0.053 -0.200
College as a HS Grad 0.038 0.15 1.404
2 Year College as a HS Grad 0.015 0.088 -0.490
4 Year College as a HS Grad 0.024 -0.012 0.720
Notes. This table reports the results of robustness checks proposed in Oster
(2016). Column 1 reports the observed estimate of the effect of program
participation on the outcome, without accounting for omitted variable bias.
Column 2 reports the bias-adjusted treatment effect, assuming that selection
on unobservables is as large as selection on observables. Column 3 shows the
amount of the selection on unobservables, relative to selection on observables,
necessary for the treatment effect to equal zero. Columns 2 and 3 were
estimated using the STATA package psacalc. Stars indicate: *p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
104
Table 3.7: The Effect of Participation in GDYT on Educational Outcomes, by Subgroup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
9th Grade 10th and Above Median Below Median Not Chronically Chronically
and Below 11 Grade Male Female Math Score Math Score Absent Absent
Enrolled in K12 0.010 0.017** 0.016* 0.011* 0.004 0.021** 0.006 0.024
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.016)
[0.957] [0.934] [0.939] [0.949] [0.965] [0.940] [0.975] [0.907]
{0.438} {0.634} {0.077} {0.172}
Chronically Absent -0.030 0.027* 0.026 -0.023 0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.051*
(0.021) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.029)
[0.387] [0.428] [0.377] [0.435] [0.333] [0.455] [0.243] [0.743]
{0.016} {0.119} {0.876} {0.103}
Graduated HS 0.034** 0.008 0.051** -0.006 0.044* 0.018 0.035
(0.014) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.014) (0.047)
[0.850] [0.833] [0.862] [0.928] [0.791] [0.933] [0.787]
{0.210} {0.082} {0.693}
College from HS 0.004 0.046 -0.023 0.016 0.006 -0.031 0.008
(0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.041) (0.054) (0.041) (0.053)
[0.453] [0.372] [0.487] [0.547] [0.347] [0.547] [0.329]
{0.114} {0.861} {0.422}
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of an educational outcome on an indicator for participated, a vector
of control variables as listed in the text and match group fixed effects, separately for each subgroup. Participants have a weight of one
and non-participants have a weight equal to the ratio of participants to non-participants in their match group. Standard errors, which
are clustered by match school, are reported in parenthese and the weighted mean of the baseline characteristic for non-participants is
shown in brackets. In the even columns, we report the p-value from a test of whether the point estimates are equal across subgroups
in curly braces. Columns 5 and 6 are restricted to youth who reached 8th grade before the program since we define prior achievement





Appendix to Temporary Stays and Persistent Gains:
The Causal Effects of Foster Care
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A.1 Supplemental Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: Foster Care Entry Per 1000 Children
(a) 1998 Statistics
(b) 2017 Statistics
Notes. These figures show the rate of foster care entry per 1000 children for each state in the first and last
year of available data as of March 2019. There are five different shades of blue which represent the quantile
of the foster care entry rate for each state, with darker shading indicating higher rates of entry. Eight states
do not report the number of children who entered foster care in 1998 and are shaded in gray in Figure A.1a.
The 1998 information comes from USDHHS (2003) and the 2017 information comes from USDHHS (2017b).
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Table A.1: Effects of Foster Care on Michigan Public School Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever Enrolled Enrolled Enrolled Enrolled Enrolled
Enrolled One Year Two Years Three Years Four Years Five Years
After After After After After After




Panel B- Analysis Sample, Enrolled in Grades One to Eleven During Investigation
Foster Care -0.033 -0.018 0.001 -0.126 -0.001 0.039
(0.039) (0.049) (0.070) (0.090) (0.110) (0.130)
Observations 248,730 248,730 212,718 168,711 133,268 99,014
Notes. This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of the outcome variable on foster care using
removal stringency to instrument for foster care. Panel A consists of children age six years old and younger
at the time of their investigation while Panel B consists of children in the analysis sample—those enrolled
in public school in grades one through eleven during the investigation. Only children eligible for school
enrollment in a given year are included in the analysis. For example, a three year old who is investigated in
2016 is not included in Panel A because they were not eligible to enroll in a public school by 2017, the last
year of available education data. Similarly, students in 11th grade during the investigation are not included
in the analysis of enrollment three years later in Panel B. This explains why the sample size decreases with
every follow-up year in Panel B. All regressions include zipcode by investigation year fixed effects, Panel
A also includes non-academic socio-demographic covariates, and Panel B further includes the full set of
covariates as listed in the text. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table A.2: Full Balance Tests of the Conditional Independence of the Removal Stringency Instrument
Full Sample 4th Grade and Above
Dependent Variable: Foster Care Removal Stringency Foster Care Removal Stringency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error
Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Female -0.002∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
White -0.001 (0.002) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.000)
Black 0.006∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) 0.009∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.000 (0.000)
Hispanic 0.003 (0.003) -0.000 (0.000) 0.004 (0.002) -0.000 (0.000)
Low Income 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
Grade 2 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
Grade 3 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
Grade 4 -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
Grade 5 0.001 (0.016) -0.000 (0.005) 0.028∗ (0.001) -0.004 (0.000)
Grade 6 0.001 (0.016) 0.000 (0.005) 0.028∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.004 (0.000)
Grade 7 0.003∗∗ (0.016) -0.000 (0.005) 0.030∗ (0.002) -0.004 (0.000)
Grade 8 0.006∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.000 (0.005) 0.032∗ (0.002) -0.004 (0.000)
Grade 9 0.007∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.000 (0.005) 0.034∗∗ (0.002) -0.004 (0.000)
Grade 10 0.007∗∗∗ (0.017) -0.000 (0.005) 0.033∗∗ (0.002) -0.004 (0.000)
Grade 11 0.001 (0.017) -0.000 (0.005) 0.028∗ (0.002) -0.004 (0.000)
Had a Prior Investigation 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
# Prior Investigations 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Prior Academic Characteristics
Attendance Rate -0.033∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.001∗ (0.001) -0.035∗∗∗ (0.005) -0.001 (0.001)
Special Education -0.000 (0.001) 0.000∗ (0.000) 0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
Ever Repeated Grade 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
Std Math Score -0.001∗∗ (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
Std Reading Score 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
Observations 242,233 242,233 144,032 144,032
F Stat from Joint Test 18.119 0.953 12.505 1.001
P-Value from Joint Test 0.000 0.530 0.000 0.463
Notes. This table reports the results from a regression of the dependent variable on a variety of socio-demographic and baseline academic characteristics as
well as zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Students in Michigan begin taking statewide standardized tests in third grade so I include prior standardized
tests scores only for the sample of students enrolled in at least fourth grade. Not shown here to save space, but included in the joint test, the regressions
also include indicators for the following variables which contain some missing information: female, low income, and each of the prior schooling characteristics.
Standard errors are clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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Table A.3: Testable Implications of the Exclusion of Removal Stringency Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investigator’s Days in # Foster First Placed First Placed First Placed
Number of Foster Care Homes with Relatives with Unrelated in Group
Investigations Family Home
Removal Stringency 179.734 25.797 0.241 0.166 -0.021 -0.145
(197.998) (647.431) (3.534) (0.541) (0.495) (0.300)
Observations 242,233 4,809 4,809 4,809 4,809 4,809
Notes. This table reports the results from a regression of the dependent variable on the removal stringency instrument. The
dependent variable in Columns 2 through 6 are conditional on foster placement. Standard errors are clustered by investigator.
*p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table A.4: Testable Implications of Monotonicity of the Removal Stringency Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female Male White Student Age Age Had Prior No Prior
of Color ≤ 10 > 10 Inv Inv
Panel A: Main Leave-One-Out Instrument
Removal Stringency 0.481∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027)
Panel B: Leave-Subgroup-Out Instrument
Removal Stringency 0.365∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.023) (0.018) (0.029) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020)
Observations 118,436 123,715 149,527 92,706 133,476 108,757 142,034 100,199
Notes. Panel A reports the first stage effect of removal stringency on foster placement separately by student subgroup. Panel
B reports the first stage effect using the leave-subgroup-out instrument. The leave-subgroup-out instrument is the fraction of
an investigator’s cases other than those in the same subgroup that resulted in foster placement. Standard errors are clustered
by investigator. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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Table A.5: Effects of Foster Care on Taking Standardized Tests
(1) (2)
Took Std Took Std
Math Test Reading Test
Panel A: OLS
Foster Care 0.007 0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Panel B: 2SLS
Foster Care 0.019 -0.029
(0.063) (0.065)
Observations 189,084 189,084
Notes. Panel A reports the results from OLS
regressions of the outcome variable on foster care
while Panel B reports the results from 2SLS
regressions using removal stringency to instrument
for foster care. All regressions include the covariates
as listed in the text and zipcode by investigation
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by
investigator. Students may not take standardized
tests if they are absent from school during the
testing dates or took an alternative state assessment
for students who require special accommodations.
Children who were too young or too old to have
been in grades 3-8 after their investigation are also
excluded from this analysis.*p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05,
*** p< 0.01.
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Table A.6: Effects of Foster Care on High School Graduation and College Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Graduated Ever Enrolled Ever Enrolled Ever Enrolled
High School in College in a Two-Year in a Four-Year
College College
Panel A: OLS
Foster Care -0.024∗ 0.001 -0.008 0.013
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012)
Panel B: 2SLS
Foster Care 0.085 0.192 -0.001 0.029
(0.274) (0.368) (0.343) (0.286)
Observations 60,776 36,661 36,661 36,661
Notes. Panel A reports the results from OLS regressions of the outcome variable on foster
care while Panel B reports the results from 2SLS regressions using removal stringency to
instrument for foster care. All regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and
zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. Only
students expected to be in 12th grade by 2017 based on an on-time grade progression from the
school year of their investigation are included in the analysis of high school graduation. The
analysis of college enrollment is similarly restricted to students expected to be in 12th grade
by 2016. Some colleges are missing information on their type, so the two and four-year college
enrollment estimates need not add up to the overall college enrollment estimate. *p< 0.10, **
p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table A.7: Effects of Foster Care on Type of Foster Placement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days in Days in Days with Days in
Foster Kinship Unrelated Group
Care Care Family Home
Foster Care 581∗∗∗ 345∗∗∗ 185∗∗∗ 50∗∗∗
(44) (28) (24) (16)
Observations 242,233 242,233 242,233 242,233
Notes. This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of
the outcome variable on foster care, using removal stringency to
instrument for foster care. All regressions include the covariates
as listed in the text and zipcode by investigation year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05,
*** p< 0.01.
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Table A.8: Effects of Foster Care on Neighborhood and School Environment Over Time
Neighborhood School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index of Median BA Degree Employment Test Low
Neighborhood Income or Higher Rate Scores Income
& School ($100,000)
Characteristics
Panel A: One Year After Investigation
Foster Care 0.257∗∗ 0.071 0.084∗∗∗ 0.021 -0.003 -0.100∗∗
(0.117) (0.044) (0.028) (0.027) (0.096) (0.044)
{-0.147} {0.406} {0.121} {0.848} {-0.119} {0.649}
Panel B: Two+ Years After Investigation
Foster Care 0.066 0.055 0.034 -0.011 0.086 -0.021
(0.141) (0.054) (0.038) (0.033) (0.109) (0.051)
{-0.011} {0.411} {0.157} {0.875} {-0.239} {0.538}
Obserservations 242,233 209,446 209,446 209,446 217,956 241,267
Notes. This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of the outcome variable on foster care using removal
stringency to instrument for foster care. Panel A reports results for outcomes measured during the first school year
after the investigation and Panel B reports results across all school years after the first. The curly brackets below the
standard error represent the control complier mean. All regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and
zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. Neighborhoods are defined
by census block groups. A child’s school in each follow-up year is defined as the school where they spent the most time
during the school year and their neighborhood is defined as where they lived while enrolled in that school. School
test scores represent the average of standardized math and reading scores and low income represents the fraction of
students in the school who qualify for free or reduced-price lunch. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table A.9: Effects of Foster Care on Permanency Placements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reunified Adopted Guardianship Emancipated Still in FC
in Sep 2017
Foster Care 0.703∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.020)
% Conditional on Exiting 85.3% 7.8% 4.9% 2.1%
Observations 242,233 242,233 242,233 242,233 242,233
Notes. This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of the outcome variable on foster care, using removal
stringency to instrument for foster care. All regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and zipcode
by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. Each permanency outcome is
mutually exclusive. Some students were still in the foster system at the end of the sample period in September
2017, so these students are coded as such for their permanency outcome. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table A.10: Characteristics of Compliers at the Margin of Foster Placement
(1) (2) (3)
All Foster Care Compliers
Female 0.49 0.47 0.52
White 0.62 0.52 0.52
Student of Color 0.38 0.48 0.47
10 Years Old & Younger 0.55 0.51 0.61
11 Years Old & Older 0.45 0.49 0.39
Urban/Suburban County 0.64 0.63 0.63
Rural County 0.36 0.37 0.37
Low Income 0.83 0.87 0.89
Ever Retained in Grade 0.36 0.39 0.38
Above Median Math Score 0.50 0.41 0.39
Above Median Reading Score 0.50 0.42 0.38
Share of Sample 1.00 0.02 0.05
Notes. I follow Dahl et al. (2014) to calculate the share and characteristics
of compliers. Specifically, I compute the share of compliers as the difference
in the first stage effect between children assigned to an investigator with
removal stringency at the 99th and the 1st percentiles. Then, I calculate
the characteristics of compliers as the fraction of compliers across each
characteristic subgroup. Above median math and reading scores are
indicators for scoring higher than the median child in the sample on baseline
standardized math and reading tests.
118





With Relatives 0.582 0.572
With Unrelated Family 0.320 0.344
In Group Home 0.098 0.085
Placement Stability
Number of Different Placements 3.121 3.085
One or Two Different Placements 0.441 0.512
Three or More Different Placements 0.559 0.488






Still in Foster Care in Sep 2017 0.188 0.176
Observations 242,233 242,233
Notes. This table compares the experiences of the average foster
placement and the marginal foster placement while in the foster system.
Column one reports the mean outcome among all foster placements while
column two reports the results from 2SLS regressions of the outcome
variable on foster care, using removal stringency to instrument for foster
care. All regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and
zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by investigator. For initial placement details, group homes include
institutions. Some students were still in the foster system at the end
of the sample period in September 2017, so these students are coded as
such for their permanency outcome.
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Table A.12: Effects of Foster Care on Index of Child Wellbeing, by Age and Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Young Old Male Female Young Young Old Old
Male Female Male Female
Foster Care 0.196∗∗ 0.108 0.191∗∗ 0.145∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.135 -0.028 0.157
(0.085) (0.115) (0.099) (0.086) (0.119) (0.102) (0.164) (0.143)
P-value 0.483 0.669 0.147 0.316
Observations 133,476 108,757 123,715 118,518 70,438 63,038 53,277 55,480
Notes. This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of the index of child wellbeing on foster care for
a variety of subgroups, using removal stringency to instrument for foster care. The young subgroup includes
children ages ten and younger at the start of the child welfare investigation while the old subgroup includes
children age eleven and older. The p-value reports whether the subgroup estimates are statistically different
from each other. All regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and zipcode by investigation year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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Panel A: Alternative Samples
Child’s First Investigation 0.163∗
(N=180,859) (0.086)
Investigator Assigned ≥ 25 Investigations 0.137∗
(N=249,228) (0.072)




Panel B: Alternative Removal Stringency Instruments
REALLY LONG TEXT AND A LITTLE TRICK SO ALL TABLE NOTES TO FIT
Split Sample 0.141
(N=242,233) (0.089)
Leave-out Other Years 0.078∗
(N=242,233) (0.046)
Leave-out Same Year 0.318∗
(N=242,233) (0.166)
Empirical Bayes Shrinkage 0.266
(N=242,233) (0.239)
Panel C: Alternative Level of Rotational Assignment
County by Year 0.204∗∗∗
(N=242,233) (0.079)
Notes. Panel A reports the results from 2SLS regressions using alternative sample definitions, Panel B uses alternative
measures of removal stringency to instrument for foster care, and Panel C reports the results using the main stringency
instrument yet replaces zipcode by investigation year fixed effects with county by investigation year fixed effects. All
regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and, except for Panel C, zipcode by investigation year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by investigator. In Panel A, the balanced panel sample is restricted to the first five follow-up
years for children investigated in seventh grade or below in 2012 or earlier. In Panel B, the split sample measure is the
removal rate of the assigned investigator from a random half of the sample. The leave-out other years measure is the
leave-out removal rate of the assigned investigator from other children who had investigations in the same calendar year.
The leave-out same year measure is the leave-out removal rate of the assigned investigator from other children who had
investigations in different calendar years. The empirical bayes shrinkage measure allows stringency to vary across years
and shrinks the main removal stringency instrument toward its mean. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table A.14: Balance Tests Using Censored Data
All Substantiated 4th Grade and Above
Investigations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foster Censored Foster Censored
Care Removal Care Removal
Stringency Stringency
F-Statistic from Joint Test 16.826 0.932 10.385 1.770
P-Value from Joint Test 0.000 0.557 0.000 0.008
Observations 47,469 47,469 27,036 27,036
Notes. This table reports the results from regressions of the dependent variable on a
variety of socio-demographic and academic covariates as well as zipcode by investigation
year fixed effects. The censored removal stringency instrument is explained in detail in
Section 1.6. Columns one and two include the all substantiated investigations and exclude
standardized test scores in the vector of covariates. As students in Michigan begin taking
statewide standardized tests in grade three, columns 3 and 4 report results for students
with a substantiated investigation who were enrolled in at least grade four during the
maltreatment investigation and include standardized test scores. Full regression results are
available upon request. Standard errors are clustered by investigator.
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Table A.15: First Stage Effect of Censored Removal Stringency on Foster Placement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foster Foster Foster Foster
Care Care Care Care
Censored Removal Stringency 0.592∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Observations 47,469 47,469 47,469 47,469
F-Statistic 699.783 388.389 389.063 387.127
Zipcode by Year FE X X X
Socio-Demographic Controls X X
Academic Controls X
Notes. This table reports the results from regressions of foster placement on the
censored measure of removal stringency. The censored removal stringency instrument
is explained in detail in Section 1.6. Each column includes a different set of
covariates. Socio-demographic controls include gender, race/ethnicity, indicators for
grade in school, an indicator for had a prior investigation, and the number of prior
investigations. Academic controls include an indicator for free or reduced-price lunch
eligibility, an inicator for receipt of special education services, an indicator for ever
retained in grade, and daily attendance rate, measured in the school year prior to
the investigation, as well as the most recent pre-investigation score from standardized
math and reading test scores. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10,
** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table A.16: Effects of Foster Care Relative to Substantiation Without Removal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index of Confirmed Daily Std Math
Child Victim of Attendance Score
Wellbeing Maltreatment Rate
Foster Care and 0.181** -0.060* 0.063** 0.435*
Substantiated (0.085) (0.035) (0.032) (0.229)
Substantiated -0.007 0.003 -0.004 -0.041
(0.014) (0.006) (0.005) (0.036)
Observations 242,233 242,233 224,925 177,118
Notes. This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of the outcome variable
on two treatment conditions: substantiation and foster care plus substantiation. It
uses investigator stringency in evidence and risk levels to simultaneously instrument
for the independent variables respectively. All regressions include the covariates as
listed in the text and zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05,
*** p< 0.01.
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Table A.17: OLS Effects of Foster Care on Child Outcomes Using Censored Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index of Confirmed Daily Std Math
Child Victim of Attendance Score
Wellbeing Maltreatment Rate
Panel A: Complete Data, Unsubstantiated and Substantiated
Foster Care -0.005 -0.007∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.046) (0.002) (0.013)
Observations 242,233 242,233 224,925 177,118
Panel B: Censored Data, Only Substantiated
Foster Care -0.006 -0.014∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015)
Observations 47,469 47,469 43,839 35,322
Notes. Panel A reports the OLS results from Table 1.4 while Panel B reports the
results from OLS regressions of the outcome variable on foster care using only the
sample of substantiated investigations. All regressions include the covariates as
listed in the text and zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by investigator. ∗p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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A.1.1 Assessing Arteaga (2019) Approaches to Using Examiner Assignment
Design with Censored Data
Section 1.6 documents that censored data can create bias in the examiner assignment
research design. What can researchers do when limited to using censored data? Arteaga
(2019) proposes a reasonable solution in a study of the effects of parental incarceration
on child outcomes. The study uses data from SISBEN, Colombia’s census of its low-income
population, to link children to parents and parents to both criminal convictions and incarceration.
SISBEN does not include information on parents who appeared before a court but were
not convicted, however. Fortunately, anonymized records containing the universe of both
conviction and incarceration decisions are publicly available for every judge in Colombia,
which the study uses to create the judge instrument. Importantly though, these anonymized
records can only be matched to SISBEN along the judge field and not to individual parents.
Therefore, though the study accesses complete information about judge tendencies, it does
not observe the full population of criminal defendants.
Arteaga (2019) shows how the standard examiner assignment design can not be applied
in this context and derives an estimator of the causal effects of incarceration relative to
conviction that can be identified using censored data.1 The key insight is that there is
exogenous variation in incarceration among judges with identical conviction thresholds but
different incarceration thresholds. In the context of this study, the variation in removal is as
good as random for a given evidence threshold. More formally, the study proposes that the
causal effects of removal relative to substantiation can be identified from censored data as:∫ 1
0
δE[Y · 1(Tε{tS, tR})|PS(Z) = pS, P ∗R(Z) = p∗R]
δp∗R
dp∗R (A.1)
where Y is a child outcome and T denotes treatment assignment: substantiated but
not removed (tS) or substantiated and removed (tR).
2 PS(Z) = pS represents that the




R means that the
removal threshold conditional on substantiation is equal to p∗R. Integrating over the inside
term averages the effect across all investigators.
In practice, the study derives PS and P
∗
R from the data as the leave-out measure of
evidence stringency and the leave-out measure of removal conditional on substantiation
respectively. Therefore, identification hinges fixing the conviction threshold. While Arteaga
(2019) proposes three complementary strategies to do so, the study itself only has access to
1This is a somewhat special context of the censoring issue given that the study has access to the universe
of court records, even though they cannot be linked to parents in the SISBEN.
2This is equivalent to Equation 13 in Arteaga (2019).
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censored data and thus can not empirically assess whether these strategies actually produce
unbiased estimates. Using the universe of maltreatment investigations, I compare estimates
from each approach with those from the full, uncensored data.
The first, called the pooled approach, uses P ∗R to instrument for foster care while additionally
controlling for linear and quadratic terms of PS and all interactions. The second, called the
tercile approach, instruments for placement with P ∗R separately for each tercile of the evidence
stringency distribution. The idea is that, in addition to controlling for evidence stringency,
splitting the data into terciles approximates fixing the evidence threshold. Lastly, the third
approach, called the rolling window approach, mirrors the tercile approach yet estimates
impacts more flexibly along the distribution of evidence stringency. Specifically, it sorts
the sample by the evidence stringency of the assigned investigator and estimates impacts of
placement for the lowest 18,000 observations of the distribution. Then it repeats this process
for the lowest 500 to 18,500, and so on.
Table A.18 shows the results of the first two approaches and Figure A.2 shows the
results from the third. As a benchmark, both the table and figure also include estimates of
foster care relative to substantiation identified from the full, uncensored data. To identify
this parameter, I use measures of investigator removal and substantiation stringency to
simultaneously instrument for both foster placement and substantiation. The table and
figure show the effects on the index of child wellbeing.
The approaches with censored data do not approximate the estimates from the full data
especially well. With censored data, the pooled approach finds a small and statistically
insignificant effect of foster care relative to substantiation yet the true effect with full data
reveals a large and statistically significant increase. Similarly, the point estimates using the
full data are larger with the tercile approach, though they vary in precision. Furthermore,
when using the rolling window approach, the censored data reveals a positive relationship
between evidence stringency and the index of child outcomes while the full data points
toward the true relationship being somewhat U-shaped.
Overall, estimates using these approaches are biased in the same direction as shown
when using the standard examiner assignment design with censored data in Section 1.6—they
understate the benefits of foster care. While beyond the scope of this paper, these approaches
may create bias because the estimator is only valid at a given evidence threshold, yet each of
these approaches uses a large window around an evidence threshold for identification. Future
work may consider applying insights from recent advances in optimal bandwidth selection in
the regression discontinuity context to better address the tradeoff between bias and variance
when fixing the evidence threshold.
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Table A.18: Assessing Arteaga (2019) Approaches to Examiner Assignment Design with
Censored Data
Tercile Approach
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Lenient Middle Strict
Approach in Evidence in Evidence in Evidence
Panel A: Censored Data
Foster Care 0.028 -0.101 0.039 0.112
(0.040) (0.091) (0.077) (0.086)
Observations 47,470 15,823 15,823 15,824
Panel B: Full Data
Foster Care 0.181∗∗∗ 0.311 0.087 0.346∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.327) (0.173) (0.128)
Observations 242,233 80,744 80,744 80,745
Notes. This table compares the estimates of foster care relative to substantiation
on the index of child wellbeing using approaches proposed in Arteaga (2019). All
regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and zipcode by investigation
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. Panel A applies
the approaches to censored data, restricted to only children with substantiated
maltreatment reports. In Panel A, investigators who were lenient in evidence
substantiated between 0-21% of reports, while those in the middle and strict
substantiated between 21-28% and 28-67% respectively. Panel B applies the
approaches to the full, uncensored data. I use removal stringency to instrument for
foster care and evidence stringency to instrument for substantiation. In Panel B,
investigators who were lenient in evidence substantiated between 0-18% of reports,
while those in the middle and strict substantiated between 18-25% and 25-69%
respectively. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Figure A.2: Assessing Arteaga (2019) Rolling Window Approach to Examiner
Assignment Design with Censored Data
(a) Censored Data
(b) Full Data
Notes. This figure compares the estimates of foster care relative to substantiation on the index of child
wellbeing using the rolling window approach proposed in Arteaga (2019) with both the censored and full
data. They plot both the point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals. All specifications include the
covariates as listed in the text as well as zipcode by investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by investigator. Figure A.2a sorts the censored data based on evidence stringency and estimates
separate regressions of the index of child outcomes on foster care using removal stringency conditional on
substantiation to instrument for foster care and including evidence stringency as a covariate. Since the
sample size is similar to my study, I follow Arteaga (2019) in using a rolling window of 18,000 observations
and adjust the window by 500 observations each time along the evidence threshold. Figure A.2b applies
the same approach to the full, uncensored data. I use removal stringency to instrument for foster care
and evidence stringency to instrument for substantiation to estimate the effect of foster care relative to
substantiation. Since the sample size is about five times larger with the full data, I use a rolling window of
90,000 observations and adjust the window by 2,500 observations each time.
129
A.1.2 OLS Effects of Foster Care Placement Types
In recent years, states have prioritized placing foster children with relatives, known as
kinship care, whenever possible. Kinship care is thought to be less disruptive to children’s
lives because it allows them to live with someone that they know and who shares their
culture. These placements also exhaust fewer state resources as it is difficult to recruit
unrelated families to take in foster children. Despite this trend toward kinship care, there
is mixed research evidence on the effectiveness of kinship care relative to other placement
types.
Lovett and Xue (2018) exploit changes in monthly compensation rates and note that while
low compensation rates to unrelated foster families are predictive of increased placements
in kinship care, previous studies have found that they are not associated with children’s
outcomes. The study finds that children who were placed in kinship care were more likely
to be employed or in school, less likely to be incarcerated, and less likely to receive public
assistance relative to children placed with an unrelated foster family. In contrast, Hayduk
(2017) exploits state and time variation in the adoption of laws that prioritize kinship
placements and does not detect evidence that they improved children’s physical or mental
health.
I add to this evidence by testing the effects of various types of foster placement. I can
not perform this analysis using the examiner assignment research design because placement
type is endogenous to unobservable characteristics of the child, such as having support from
nearby family members. Therefore, I use OLS to describe how the effects of removal vary
based on initial placement type. Specifically, I estimate the following model:
Yiw = β0 + β1KINSHIPiw + β2UNRELATEDiw + β3GROUPiw + β4Xiw + θr + εiw (A.2)
where β1 represents the association between initial kinship placement and the outcome
relative to children who were not placed into foster care. Similarly, β2 and β3 report this
relationship for initial placement with an unrelated foster family and in a group home
respectively.
Table A.19 shows the results. Overall, placement with relatives was associated with
greater improvements than placement with an unrelated foster family or in a group home.
Notably, the OLS estimates in the main analysis understated the benefits of removal and
overstated the costs relative to the 2SLS estimates. To the extent that this analysis suffers
from similar selection bias, this analysis might offer a lower bound for the effects of each
placement type.
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Table A.19: OLS Effects of Foster Care on Child Outcomes, by Initial Placement Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index of Confirmed Daily Std Math
Child Victim of Attendance Score
Wellbeing Maltreatment Rate
Kinship 0.027*** -0.007** 0.018*** 0.093***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.018)
Unrelated -0.001 -0.003 0.017*** 0.050**
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.025)
Group Home -0.027 0.008 0.005 -0.046
or Institution (0.017) (0.007) (0.008) (0.051)
Comparison Mean 0.000 0.046 0.912 -0.501
Kinship vs Unrelated 0.011 0.410 0.836 0.168
Kinship vs Group 0.002 0.044 0.104 0.010
Unrelated vs Group 0.158 0.165 0.142 0.088
Observations 242,264 242,264 224,925 177,118
Notes. This table reports results from OLS regressions of the outcome variable on
mutually exclusive indicators for initial foster placement types. The mean outcome for
children who were not removed as well as the p-values testing whether the point estimates
for each placement type are statistically different from each other are shown below the
regression results. All regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and zipcode by
investigation year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10, **
p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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A.1.3 Who Takes in Foster Children?
The administrative records in this study do not contain individual level information about
foster parents Moreover, there is limited public data about who takes in foster children.
The best information comes from the American Community Survey (ACS), administered by
the Census Bureau, which includes “foster children” as a category in a question about the
members of a household. However, the ACS is known to understate the number of foster
children in the country by almost half relative to administrative records and is not thought
to be representative. The leading explanations for why the ACS fails to account for so many
foster children are that unrelated families who care for a foster child for only a short amount
of time may not list them as a member of their household and that households who take in
a relative may list them as relatives instead of as foster children (O’Hare, 2007).
With these limitations in mind, Table A.20 describes households with foster children
and compares them to other households with members younger than 18 years old, using
the 2012-2016 five year sample of the ACS. Nationwide, households with foster children were
larger and much lower income. The head of households were older, less likely to be employed,
and more likely to be black. The comparison looks similar when restricted to households in
Michigan.
Table A.20: Descriptive Statistics of Households With and Without Foster Children
USA Michigan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At Least One At Least One At Least One At Least One
Child Under 18 Foster Child Child Under 18 Foster Child
# Adults 2.14 2.25 2.08 2.06
# Children Under Age 18 1.88 2.61 1.89 2.97
Pre-Tax Income $141,431 $69,948 $131,038 $62,067
Head of Household
Married 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.56
White 0.71 0.68 0.77 0.67
Black 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.25
Observations 37,489,148 143,580 1,136,414 5,533
Notes. This table reports descriptive statistics comparing households with and without foster children for the
United States overall and for Michigan. All statistics are weighted estimates from the American Community Survey
2012-2016 five year sample.
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A.1.4 Data Appendix
I use administrative data from the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services
(MDHHS), Michigan Department of Education (MDE), Center for Educational Performance
and Information (CEPI), and Michigan Courts State Court Administrative Office (SCAO)
to test the effects of foster placement on a variety of child outcomes. There is no common
identifier between these administrative data sources, so the files were linked using a probabilistic
matching algorithm. The linkage procedure was identical between the three sources, so I
describe only the match between the child welfare and education data here.
As described in Ryan et al. (2018), the child welfare data were matched to education
records based on first name, last name, date of birth, and gender, and was implemented using
the Link King program. Race/ethnicity was not included in the match because the categories
were different across data systems. The match was restricted to children born between
1989 and 2012 and compared 846,870 individuals of any age who had a child maltreatment
investigation against approximately 5.1 million public school students. 742,269 children
(87.6%) with an investigation matched to a public school record. For each of these matched
records, the Link King software rates the certainty level of the match on a seven-point scale,
ranging from one, a “definite match,” to seven, a “probabilistic maybe.” Overall, 92% of the
matches were rated with a certainty-level of one or two and were kept for analysis.
For my analysis, I restrict the sample to include maltreatment reports that entered the
investigator rotational assignment system and involved children enrolled in public school.
Table A.21 describes each sample restriction, step by step. The first restriction ensures
the maltreatment report entered the rotation assignment system. The second ensures that
nobody in the sample had already been treated. Restrictions three and four limit the
sample to children included in the record linkage. The fifth restriction, like the first, drops
cases unlikely to have been quasi-randomly assigned. The sixth drops a small fraction of
investigations missing pertinent information to construct rotation groups. Restriction seven
makes sure that investigators were assigned enough cases to reliably measure their tendencies,
yet the results are similar if I relax this. The eighth restriction drops a large fraction of
investigations but allows me to observe at least one year of public school records both before
and after the investigation for nearly all investigations. Finally, restriction nine ensures that
I can observe at least one follow-up school year after the investigation and restriction ten
ensures that there were enough children to make within-rotation group comparisons.
This leaves 248,730 investigations of 190,980 children. Some of these children never
enrolled in a Michigan public school after their investigation which, as reported in the
eleventh restriction, are later dropped from the analysis since I do not observe their outcomes.
However, there were 295,892 investigations of children old enough to be enrolled in grades
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one through eleven, meaning only 84.1% matched to a public school student record. The
remaining 47,162 investigations, or 15.9%, are excluded from my analysis. These investigated
children may not have been enrolled in public school for any of the following five reasons:
(1) they were enrolled in private school, (2) they were homeschooled, (3) they had dropped
out of school, (4) they went to school in a different state, or (5) they actually were enrolled
in public school but did not match to a public school record with high certainty. While
excluding these investigations should not influence the internal validity of my results, they
may affect the external validity. To explore this, I compare the investigations included in
my analysis sample to those of school-age children that were excluded, along the observable
characteristics included in the child welfare files.
Table A.22 shows that the investigations excluded from my analysis look relatively similar
to those included. However, they were slightly more likely to be black, a bit older, and more
likely to have occurred during the summer. The increased likelihood of occurring in the
summer suggests that some of the investigations that did not match to public school student
records involved children who lived out-of-state during the school year but were in Michigan
in the summer.
Using this information, as well as publicly available statistics about private school enrollment,
homeschool enrollment, and high school dropout rates, I estimate the relative share of
children that were excluded from my analysis for each of the five reasons listed above. Table
A.23 shows these estimates. This allows me to assess the quality of the match between the
education and child welfare files. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that private school
students make up 4.6% of investigations, homeschool students make up 2.6%, dropouts make
up 2.1%, and children who live in another state make up 3.4%. Therefore, I estimate that
only 3.2% of investigations were of children who were truly enrolled in a Michigan public
school, but did not match to a student record with high enough certainty. These estimates
suggest that the education and child welfare link performed very well.
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Table A.21: Sample Construction
(1) (2)
# Investigations # Children
0. Start with all maltreatment investigations between 2008-2017 1,366,742 657,196
Drop if...
1. Investigation was within one year of a prior case involving the same child 926,407 651,534
2. Investigation occurred after child was placed in foster care 891,883 637,207
3. Child was born before August 1, 1996 818,008 537,371
4. Child was born after December 31, 2012 707,500 476,143
5. Maltreatment report was for sexual abuse 673,349 458,390
6. Investigation records were missing zipcode 663,379 450,338
7. Investigator was assigned fewer than 50 cases 627,580 433,662
8. Child was not enrolled in grades one to eleven in a Michigan 272,153 202,183
public school in year of investigation
9. Investigation occurred during the 2017 or 2018 school year 250,095 191,872
10. Degenerate zipcode by year group 248,730 190,980
11. Never enrolled in Michigan public school after investigation 242,233 186,250
Notes. The final analysis sample contains all child maltreatment investigations in Michigan that entered the rotational assignment
system during the 2008-2016 school year of children enrolled in a public school in grades one through eleven, that was assigned to
investigators who worked at least 50 cases. I check for differential attrition out of the public school system using the sample reported
in step 10 consisting of 248,730 investigations (shown in Table A.1) and, since there is no evidence of differential attrition, the final
analysis sample consists of students who ever enrolled in a Michigan public school after their investigation.
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Table A.22: Comparing Sample to School-Age Children who were Excluded from Analysis
(1) (2)






Other Race 0.01 0.01
Age 10.37 11.63
Had a Prior Investigation 0.58 0.50
Investigated In Summer (June-Aug) 0.22 0.29
Observations 248,730 47,162
Notes. Column one consists of investigations in the analysis sample and those
who would have been included in the analysis sample had they enrolled in a
Michigan public school after their investigation (step ten in Table A.21). Column
two consists of investigations that would have been included in the analysis
sample had the child been enrolled in a Michigan public school in grades one
through eleven during their investigation. That is, the investigation entered the
rotational assignment system, was assigned to an investigator who was assigned
at least 50 investigations, and the child was old enough to have been enrolled in
first grade—at least seven years old.
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0. Enrolled in Public School - Included in analysis sample 84.1%
1. Enrolled in Private School
- Private schools enroll 10% of students in MI (Mack, 2017)
4.6%
- 10% of private school students were low income (White and DeGrow, 2016)
2. Homeschooled
- About 3% of students in MI are home-schooled (CRHE, 2017)
2.6%- 1
3
of home-schooled children in CT had an investigation (OCA, 2018)
- I assume that 20% of homeschooled children in MI did
3. Dropped out of School
- 10% of investigated children not enrolled were ≥16 years old
2.1%- Of these, 21% were enrolled in a MI public school before investigation
4. Went to School in Other State
- Children could have investigation in MI while visiting family
3.4%
- Most likely to be investigated in the summer
- 7.7pp increase in summer investigations among children not in sample
- I assume that half of this increase is from out-of-state children
5.
Enrolled in Public School, But
Did not Match
- 96.8% investigations fall into categories 0-4
3.2%
- The rest were likely to have been enrolled, but did not match
Total 100.0%
Notes. To estimate the share of children with an investigation who fall into each category, I use Baye’s Theorem to calculate, for example, the probability
that a child was enrolled in private school conditional on having a maltreatment investigation. In doing so, I use the following statistics, derived from the data:
P (inv) = 0.23, P (inv|low income) = 0.38, P (inv|high income) = 0.08 and I assume that the probability of being investigated conditional on income level is the
same across public and private schools.
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A.1.5 Reconciling Differences Between the Sample and Outcomes in Doyle
(2007)
Doyle (2007) finds that foster placement reduced earnings and increased criminality for
children ages five to fifteen who were investigated in Illinois between 1990 and 2001. Though
the study accesses both unsubstantiated and substantiated reports, it is limited to children
who had received public assistance before their investigation. To best compare results, I
restrict my analysis of the foster system in Michigan to children in the same age window as
Doyle (2007) who were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch in any school year before their
investigation. I find positive effects of foster care for this comparable sample (Table A.24).
Although the studies focus on different outcomes, there are two promising avenues to
compare the earlier results to this study. First, both study juvenile justice involvement.
Doyle (2007) finds that removal increased the likelihood of appearance before a juvenile
court by about 300%. Although my estimate is somewhat imprecise, I can rule out increases
in juvenile petition filings filed by more than 99%. Assuming foster children were no more
or less likely to have petitions dismissed, then these two outcomes are comparable.
Second, Doyle (2007) finds that removal reduced annual earnings by $1300 for adults at
ages 18 to 28 years old. A back of the envelope calculation using estimates from Deming
et al. (2016) suggests that an increase in standardized math test scores of 0.34 standard
deviations increases earnings at age 25 by about $500.3 Therefore, although the outcomes
are not entirely comparable, the evidence strongly suggests that foster care in Michigan
between 2008 and 2016 did not have the same large and lasting negative effects as it did for
foster children in Illinois between 1990 and 2002.
3I use information from Deming et al. (2016, Table 2) since it is one of the few studies linking test scores
to adult earnings. The study reports that a school accountability program increased 10th grade math scores
for students who had failed their 8th grade exam by 0.19 standard deviations (1.3 scale score points) and
earnings at age 25 by $298. I use this subgroup of students to mirror the low average baseline performance
of children with a report of abuse or neglect.
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Table A.24: Effects of Foster Care on Child Outcomes for Sample Comparable to Doyle (2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Index of Alleged Confirmed Daily Retained Std Math Std Reading Juvenile
Child Victim of Victim of Attendance in Grade Score Score Delinquency
Wellbeing Maltreatment Maltreatment Rate
Foster Care 0.223∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗ -0.067∗∗ 0.061∗∗ -0.025 0.467∗∗ 0.203 -0.026
(0.076) (0.068) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.194) (0.208) (0.040)
Observations 204,909 204,909 204,909 190,620 204,903 156,834 156,802 117,270
Notes. This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of foster care on the dependent variable, using removal stringency to instrument for
foster care. The analysis sample is restricted to children between the ages of five and fifteen during their investigation who were ever eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch prior to the investigation. All regressions include the covariates as listed in the text and zipcode by investigation year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by investigator. *p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to The Effect of Course Shutouts on




Table B.1: Student Initial Education Goal
Included in
Sample Code Description
Yes A Obtain an associate degree and transfer to a 4-year institution
Yes B Transfer to a 4-year institution without an associate degree
Yes C Obtain a two year associate degree without transfer
D Obtain a two year vocational degree without transfer
E Earn a vocational certificate without transfer
F Discover/formulate career interests, plans, goals
G Prepare for a new career (acquire job skills)
H Advance in current job/career (update job skills)
I Maintain certificate or license (e.g., Nursing, Real Estate)
J Educational development (intellectual, cultural); often
recreational course-takers
K Improve basic skills in English, reading, or math
L Complete credits for high school diploma or GED; often
high school students
Yes M Undecided on goal
N To move from noncredit coursework to credit course work




Notes: At application, students are asked to indicate their initial educational goal from the above
list. The sample is restricted to community college students who might consider a bachelors degree at
a four-year institution a reasonable substitute to their current program.
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Table B.2: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Transfers to Nearby Two-Year Schools
within Two Years
Evergreen San Jose Other
Foothill Valley City Two-Year
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS -0.008 0.013** 0.015** 0.017**
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Reduced Form -0.005 0.008* 0.010** 0.011**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
CCM 0.051 0.013 0.013 0.027
Observations (Nl/Nr) 1,977 2,281
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3. The
outcomes are indicators for whether the student transferred to Foothill College
within two years of the waitlist in Column (1), Evergreen Valley College in Column
(2), San Jose City College in Column (3), and any other two-year college in Column
(4). The standard errors are in parentheses, with the control complier means
(CCM) and the reduced form displayed below. All columns include the covariates
listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
‘
142
Table B.3: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Course Load and Persistence, by
Gender
# Courses Enrolled in Concurrent Term Enrolled
Zero One or Two Three or More Next Term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.016 0.014 -0.030 -0.004
(0.020) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
CCM Male 0.108 0.310 0.581 0.689
N Male (Nl/Nr) 963/1,142
Female 0.034* -0.028 -0.006 -0.031
(0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
CCM Female 0.100 0.362 0.537 0.687
N Female (Nl/Nr) 1,012/ 1,131
P-value Male=Female 0.530 0.313 0.575 0.525
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects are estimated
separately by gender. The outcome is an indicator for whether the student took no courses in the
concurrent term in Column (1), took one or two courses in Column (2), or took three or more courses
in Column (3). A course is counted if the student is enrolled after the add/drop date. The outcome
in column (4) is an indicator for whether the student enrolls in any classes the following major term.
The standard errors are in parentheses, with the control complier means (CCM) and p-value from a
test for the difference in point estimates between groups displayed below. All columns include the
covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01)
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Table B.4: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Course Load and Persistence, by
Ethnicity
# Courses Enrolled in Concurrent Term Enrolled
Zero One or Two Three or More Next Term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asian 0.027 -0.006 -0.022 -0.023
(0.022) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031)
CCM Asian 0.094 0.287 0.619 0.758
N Asian (Nl/Nr) 860/988
White 0.022 0.013 -0.035 -0.047
(0.032) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
CCM White 0.121 0.362 0.518 0.654
N White (Nl/Nr) 484/ 517
URM -0.000 -0.016 0.017 0.034
(0.027) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
CCM URM 0.101 0.390 0.509 0.623
N URM (Nl/Nr) 478/617
P-value White=Asian 0.885 0.737 0.820 0.659
P-value URM=Asian 0.425 0.841 0.477 0.274
P-value URM=White 0.598 0.635 0.416 0.190
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects are
estimated separately by ethnicity. The outcome is an indicator for whether the student took
no courses in the concurrent term in Column (1), took one or two courses in Column (2), or took
three or more courses in Column (3). A course is counted if the student is enrolled after the
add/drop date. The outcome in column (4) is an indicator for whether the student enrolls in
any classes the following major term. The standard errors are in parentheses, with the control
complier means (CCM) and p-value from a test for the difference in point estimates between
groups displayed below. All columns include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
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Table B.5: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Course Load and Persistence, by
Course Popularity
# Courses Enrolled in Concurrent Term Enrolled
Zero One or Two Three or More Next Term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 5 0.057 -0.107* 0.050 -0.008
(0.037) (0.064) (0.066) (0.066)
CCM Top 5 0.071 0.304 0.625 0.705
N Top 5 (Nl/Nr) 170/209
Other Courses 0.024 0.003 -0.027 -0.025
(0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
CCM Other 0.107 0.340 0.552 0.687
N Other (Nl/Nr) 1,807/2,072
P-value Top 5= Other 0.401 0.106 0.274 0.803
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects are estimated
separately by popularity of the course. Top five courses are those that are the most frequently
requested. The outcome is an indicator for whether the student took no courses in the concurrent
term in Column (1), took one or two courses in Column (2), or took three or more courses in Column
(3). A course is counted if the student is enrolled after the add/drop date. The outcome in column (4)
is an indicator for whether the student enrolls in any classes the following major term. The standard
errors are in parentheses, with the control complier means (CCM) and p-value from a test for the
difference in point estimates between groups displayed below. All columns include the covariates
listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01)
145
Table B.6: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Course Load and Persistence, by
Waitlisted Subject
# Courses Enrolled in Concurrent Term Enrolled
Zero One or Two Three or More Next Term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
STEM 0.007 0.018 -0.025 -0.011
(0.024) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034)
CCM STEM 0.098 0.294 0.607 0.738
N STEM (Nl/Nr) 678/771
Arts/Humanities 0.053** -0.051 -0.002 0.021
(0.027) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
CCM Arts/Hum. 0.099 0.347 0.554 0.649
N Arts/Hum. (Nl/Nr) 542/663
Social Studies -0.015 -0.007 0.023 -0.092
(0.041) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
CCM Soc. Stud. 0.129 0.355 0.516 0.658
N Soc. Stud. (Nl/Nr) 242/261
Other 0.050* 0.013 -0.063 -0.033
(0.030) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042)
CCM Other 0.105 0.373 0.521 0.680
N Other (Nl/Nr) 515/586
P-value STEM=Arts/Hum 0.194 0.178 0.663 0.532
P-value STEM=Soc. Stud. 0.646 0.717 0.509 0.255
P-value STEM=Other 0.261 0.928 0.500 0.689
P-value Arts/Hum = Soc. Stud 0.164 0.545 0.742 0.124
P-value Arts/Hum= Other 0.940 0.264 0.295 0.348
P-value Soc. Stud.=Other 0.203 0.785 0.259 0.433
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects are estimated separately
by the subject of the waitlisted course. Top five courses are those that are the most frequently requested.
The outcome is an indicator for whether the student took no courses in the concurrent term in Column (1),
took one or two courses in Column (2), or took three or more courses in Column (3). A course is counted
if the student is enrolled after the add/drop date. The outcome in column (4) is an indicator for whether
the student enrolls in any classes the following major term. The standard errors are in parentheses, with
the control complier means (CCM) and p-value from a test for the difference in point estimates between
groups displayed below. All columns include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
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Table B.7: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Transfers to Other Two-Year Schools,
by Ethnicity
Within Within Within Within Within
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Asian 0.012 0.030 0.007 0.007 -0.000
(0.016) (0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
CCM Asian 0.046 0.090 0.148 0.185 0.217
N Asian (Nl/Nr) 860/988
White -0.017 0.028 -0.015 -0.020 -0.042
(0.026) (0.033) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043)
CCM White 0.072 0.117 0.176 0.215 0.257
N White (Nl/Nr) 484/ 517
URM 0.027 0.055* 0.066* 0.072** 0.099**
(0.023) (0.030) (0.034) (0.037) (0.039)
CCM URM 0.049 0.110 0.114 0.175 0.206
N URM (Nl/Nr) 478/617
P-value Asian=White 0.352 0.968 0.641 0.590 0.426
P-value Asian=URM 0.587 0.508 0.171 0.165 0.043
P-value White=URM 0.208 0.556 0.113 0.094 0.014
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects
are estimated separately by ethnicity. The outcomes are indicators for transfers to
other two-year schools at different time horizones: within one through five years of
the waitlisted term. The standard errors are in parentheses, with the control complier
means (CCM) and p-value from a test for the difference in point estimates between
groups displayed below. All columns include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
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Table B.8: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Transfers to Four-Year Schools, by
Ethnicity
Within Within Within Within Within
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Asian 0.014 0.035* 0.057** 0.055* 0.052
(0.012) (0.020) (0.028) (0.032) (0.033)
CCM Asian 0.025 0.063 0.142 0.206 0.237
N Asian (Nl/Nr) 860/988
White -0.017 -0.033 -0.044 -0.016 0.009
(0.020) (0.027) (0.036) (0.040) (0.043)
CCM White 0.046 0.085 0.173 0.212 0.251
N White (Nl/Nr) 484/ 517
URM -0.011 -0.012 -0.031 -0.038 -0.048
(0.014) (0.019) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034)
CCM URM 0.021 0.034 0.092 0.135 0.156
N URM (Nl/Nr) 478/617
P-value Asian=White 0.182 0.042 0.028 0.169 0.431
P-value Asian=URM 0.170 0.091 0.024 0.040 0.036
P-value White=URM 0.800 0.512 0.772 0.664 0.295
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects are
estimated separately by ethnicity. The outcomes are indicators for transfers to four-year
schools at different time horizones: within one through five years of the waitlisted term.
The standard errors are in parentheses, with the control complier means (CCM) and
p-value from a test for the difference in point estimates between groups displayed below.
All columns include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
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Table B.9: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Bachelors Degree Completion, by
Ethnicity
Within Within Within Within Within
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Asian 0.007 0.004 0.016* 0.020 0.063**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.018) (0.025)
CCM 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.040 0.094
N Asian (Nl/Nr) 860/988
White -0.002 -0.008 -0.017 -0.039 -0.075**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.024) (0.031)
CCM 0.007 0.013 0.029 0.068 0.134
N White (Nl/Nr) 484/ 517
URM 0.002 0.002 0.008 -0.014 -0.025
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.016) (0.021)
CCM 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.025 0.058
N URM (Nl/Nr) 478/617
P-value Asian=White 0.279 0.246 0.057 0.050 0.001
P-value Asian=URM 0.276 0.639 0.437 0.160 0.007
P-value White=URM 0.593 0.298 0.121 0.392 0.188
Notes: This table shows results from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3, where effects
are estimated separately by ethnicity. The outcomes are indicators for bachelors degree
completion at different time horizones: within one through five years of the waitlisted
term. The standard errors are in parentheses, with the control complier means (CCM)
and p-value from a test for the difference in point estimates between groups displayed
below. All columns include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
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Table B.10: Reduced Form Effect of Missing a Placebo Cutoff
Enrolled in Transfer to
Zero Courses, Other 2 Year, Observations
Concurrent Term Within 2 Years (Nl/Nr)
Cutoff (1) (2) (3)
0 (Real) 0.016* 0.023** 1,977/2,281
(0.009) (0.010)
1 0.008 0.009 2,281/1,955
(0.010) (0.010)
2 0.014 -0.006 1,955/1,613
(0.011) (0.011)
3 -0.004 0.004 1,613/1,377
(0.013) (0.012)
4 0.019 0.007 1,377/1,269
(0.014) (0.013)
5 -0.009 -0.019 1,269/1,068
(0.015) (0.014)
6 0.019 0.011 1,068/1,024
(0.016) (0.015 )
7 0.002 -0.005 1,024/969
(0.016) (0.015)
8 -0.027 -0.002 969/746
(0.017) (0.016)
9 0.019 0.016 746/684
(0.018) (0.018)
10 0.013 -0.018 684/579
(0.021) (0.019)
Notes: This table shows the coefficient from a regression of the outcome
on an indicator for missing the placebo cutoff- equal to one if the student
has the running variable of the cutoff plus one. For each row, the sample
includes only students with running variable equal to the cutoff value and
one plus the cutoff. The outcome in column (1) is an indicator for being
enrolled in zero courses after drop date in the waitlisted term. The outcome
in column (2) is an indicator for being enrolled in another two-year school
within two years. All columns include the covariates listed in Table 2.4.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01)
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Table B.11: Robustness Checks
No Sample Intend to Course Continuous
Restrictions Transfer Post 2007 Enrollment RDD
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enrolled in 0 Courses 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.025* 0.023**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.012)
Enrolled in 1-2 Courses 0.003 0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.021) (0.016)
Enrolled in 3+ Courses -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.012 -0.017 -0.020
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.021) (0.017)
Observations (Nl/Nr) 30,329/37,103 17,338/20,873 11,932/14,533 1,977/2,281 6,659/12,986
Notes: This table shows the coefficient from a 2SLS regression as in equation 3. Column (1) includes all students, and all
waitlists. Column (2) includes only students who declared an intention to transfer to a four year school upon enrolling at
De Anza, and all waitlists. Column (3) restricts the sample to observations after 2007 and, to increase statistical power,
includes all students and all waitlists. Column (4) uses the sample in the main analysis but uses the waitlist cutoff to
instrument for course enrollment, rather than course section enrollment. Column (5) uses the sample in the main analysis
with a continuous regression discontinuous design with a bandwidth of ten and a linear function form. The standard errors
are in parentheses. All columns include the covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors are clustered at the student
level when more than one observation per student is used, and are robust to heteroskedasticity otherwise. (* p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
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B.2 Covariate Smoothness and Reduced Form Figures Further
from the Cutoff
The main analysis relies on a local randomization approach to identify the effects of course
shutouts on student outcomes. We use local randomization because the running variable is
discrete. As such, the estimates are identified only from variation between students assigned
a running variable of zero and one. Although we do not identify effects off of variation from
values of the running variable further from the cutoff, it may still be useful to see the larger
picture. This section shows a variety of figures in the spirit of a regression discontinuity design
with a continuous running variable to show smoothness in both pre-determined covariates
and discontinuities in the main outcome variables across the cutoff.
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Figure B.1: Covariate Smoothness Across the Waitlist Cutoff
(a) Asian (b) White
(c) Hispanic (d) Black
(e) Other Race (f) Missing Race
Notes. Each dot represents the mean of the residualized covariate, conditioned on the
value of the running variable. The covariates are residualized by term by year fixed
effects, registration priority fixed effects, and indicators for special student categories.
The size of the dot reflects the number of observations in each bin.
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Figure B.1: Covariate Smoothness Across the Waitlist Cutoff
(g) Female (h) Missing Gender
(i) Age (j) Missing Age
(k) Received Financial Aid (l) Missing Financial Aid Receipt
Notes. Each dot represents the mean of the residualized covariate, conditioned on the
value of the running variable. The covariates are residualized by term by year fixed
effects, registration priority fixed effects, and indicators for special student categories.
The size of the dot reflects the number of observations in each bin.
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Figure B.1: Covariate Smoothness Across the Waitlist Cutoff
(m) International Student (n) First Time Student
Notes. Each dot represents the mean of the residualized covariate, conditioned on the
value of the running variable. The covariates are residualized by term by year fixed
effects, registration priority fixed effects, and indicators for special student categories.
The size of the dot reflects the number of observations in each bin.
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Figure B.2: Reduced Form Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Course Load and
Persistence
(a) Enrolled in Zero Courses (b) Enrolled in One or Two Courses
(c) Enrolled in Three or More Courses (d) Enrolled Next Term
Notes. Each dot represents the mean of the residualized outcome, conditioned on
the value of the running variable. The covariates are residualized by the control
variables described in Table 2.4. Enrollment during the waitlisted term is defined
as being enrolled after the add/drop period. The size of the dot reflects the number of
observations in each bin.
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Figure B.3: Reduced Form Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Transfers to Another
Two-Year School
(a) Within One Year (b) Within Two Years
(c) Within Three Years (d) Within Four Years
(e) Within Five Years
Notes. Each dot represents the mean of the residualized outcome, conditioned on the
value of the running variable. The covariates are residualized by the control variables
described in Table 2.4. The size of the dot reflects the number of observations in each
bin.
157
Figure B.4: Reduced Form Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Transfers to a
Four-Year School
(a) Within One Year (b) Within Two Years
(c) Within Three Years (d) Within Four Years
(e) Within Five Years
Notes. Each dot represents the mean of the residualized outcome, conditioned on the
value of the running variable. The covariates are residualized by the control variables
described in Table 2.4. The size of the dot reflects the number of observations in each
bin.
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B.3 Using Time as the Running Variable
The analysis uses a highly discrete running variable, which necessitates local randomization
assumptions. Alternatively, the running variable can be framed as a continuous measure if
it is redefined in terms of registration time. The discrete running variable used in the main
analysis is the “position RV” while this new continuous version is the “time RV.”
Consider the time of day that each waitlisted student made her registration attempt. The
time when the student with a position RV equal to zero signed up for the waitlist creates
a cutoff in registration time. Students who signed up to the waitlist before this time could
enroll in the section during the registration period (ie. had a negative position RV) while
those who signed up after could not (ie. had a positive position RV). Therefore, the time
RV is the amount of time, in hours, between when a student signed up for the waitlist and
when the student with a position RV of zero registered. In this sense, the analysis compares
students who missed the waitlist cutoff to those who just made it, within a window of hours
around the cutoff time.1
Figure B.5 shows the density of the time RV, using the analysis sample without the
restriction of students being within one position of the cutoff. Note that there is a large
spike at zero. This is a mechanical result due to the definition of the time RV. There is not
a natural way to set the cutoff, therefore a position of zero is defined using the position RV
from the main analysis. This forces many students to be at or near the cutoff artificially.
For this reason, the density fails the manipulation test proposed in McCrary (2008) as well
as the more recently proposed test in Cattaneo et al. (2017a). However, there is little chance
that the density is a result of systematic manipulation rather than an artifact of the variable
definition. The main argument for identification is that since the time RV, like the position
RV, depends on the number of other students who drop, students cannot easily control it.
Figure B.6 plots section enrollment rates at the end of the advanced registration period
binned by values of the time running variable. There is a clearly visible jump in enrollment
to the left of the cutoff. Table B.12 shows formal estimates of the first stage and confirms
that there is a discontinuity in the probability of section enrollment. Students who miss the
waitlist cutoff are 82 percentage points more likely to be shut out of their desired section
during the advanced registration period, and similarly unlikely to enroll in their desired
course during advanced registration. These discontinuities are larger than those in the main
1There are 2 edge cases in which it is not possible to compute a time RV for waitlisted students in a
section. First, if enough previously enrolled students drop during the registration period such that everyone
who signed up for the waitlist is able to get a seat, then there is no student with a position RV equal to zero.
Second, if no previously enrolled students drop such that nobody who signed up to the waitlist is able to get
a seat during the registration period, then there is also no student with a position RV equal to zero. The
analysis drops these attempts, which amount to just over 4% of the registration attempts in the sample.
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analysis, which were 64 and 65 percentage points, respectively.
Table B.13 shows the estimates of the LATE on enrollment patterns in the concurrent
term. The results are nearly identical to the main analysis. There is a 2.8 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of taking no courses in the waitlisted term. The analysis cannot
detect a change in the share of students who enroll part-time, or full-time, though the
magnitudes of these are smaller than the drop-out estimate. These results almost perfectly
line up with the main specification; not being able to enroll in a desired section leads to
same-term drop-out.
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Figure B.5: Density of the Time Running Variable
Notes. The time running variable is the amount of time, in hours, between when a
student signed up for the waitlist and when the student with a position RV of zero
registered. The figure censors time running variables smaller than the 10th and greater
than the 90th percentile in order to make it more easily interpretable.
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Figure B.6: First Stage Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Enrollment in the
Waitlisted Section
Notes. Each dot represents section enrollment binned in forty quantiles by the value
of the time running variable, where enrollment is equal to one if the student was
enrolled in the waitlisted section at the end of the advanced registration period. Section
enrollment is equal to zero for students with a time running variable greater than zero
by construction. The time running variable is the amount of time, in hours, between
when a student signed up for the waitlist and when the student with a position RV of
zero registered. The figure censors time running variables smaller than the 10th and
greater than the 90th percentile in order to make it more easily interpretable.
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Table B.12: First Stage Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Enrollment in Waitlisted
Section, Using Time Running Variable
(1) (2)
Enrolled in Section Enrolled in Section
Missed WL Cutoff -0.818∗∗∗ -0.817∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Observations (Nl/Nr) 2404/1285 2403/1282
CCT BW 10.797 10.748
Controls N Y
Notes: Results are from a local linear regression using time as the continuous
running variable. The dependent variable is enrollment in the waitlisted section,
where enrollment is equal to one if the student was enrolled at the end of the
advanced registration period. The bandwidth is calculated according to the
CCT optimal bandwidth selection procedure. The first column does not include
controls while the second controls for the covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table B.13: Effect of Missing the Waitlist Cutoff on Course Load, Using Time Running
Variable
# Courses Enrolled in Concurrent Term
Zero One or Two Three or More
(1) (2) (3)
2SLS 0.028* -0.010 -0.017
(0.016) (0.023) (0.023)
Reduced Form 0.022* -0.008 -0.013
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations (Nl/Nr) 3,057/2,582 3,054/2,574 3,175/2,831
CCT BW 29.877 29.684 35.336
Notes: Results are from a local linear regression using time as the continuous
running variable. The outcome is an indicator for whether the student took no
courses in the concurrent term in Column (1), took one or two courses in Column
(2), or took three or more courses in Column (3). A course is counted if the student
is enrolled after the add/drop date. The bandwidth is calculated according to the
CCT optimal bandwidth selection procedure. The first column does not include
controls while the second controls for the covariates listed in Table 2.4. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to The Effect of Summer Employment on
the Educational Attainment of Under-Resourced Youth
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Table C.1: Balance Tests of Differences Between Junior Police
and Fire Cadet Participants and Age-Eligible Non-Participants
(1) (2)
Participated
Comparison Mean in JPC
Special Education 0.107 0.012
(0.027)
Low Income 0.863 0.025
(0.030)
% Below Poverty Line in Neighborhood 34.678 3.414**
(1.513)
Attendance Rate 0.919 0.005
(0.007)
Chronically Absent 0.283 -0.015
(0.045)
Took 8th Grade Math Test 0.911 -0.006
(0.021)
Proficient on 8th Grade Math Test 0.115 0.029
(0.024)
Standardized 8th Grade Math Score -0.580 0.051
(0.067)
Took 8th Grade Reading Test 0.913 -0.001
(0.022)
Proficient on 8th Grade Reading Test 0.450 -0.018
(0.036)
Standardized 8th Grade Reading Score -0.454 -0.089
(0.070)
N 5,321
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of a baseline
characteristic on an indicator for participated in Junior Police and Fire Cadets
(JPC) and match group fixed effects, where participants have a weight of
one and non-participants have a weight equal to the ratio of participants
to non-participants in their match group. The age-eligible non-participants
are applicants who were born between 1/1/1999 and 7/1/2001 and did not
participate in JPC. Column 1 shows the weighted mean of the baseline
characteristic for non-participants and column 2 shows the coefficient on the
indicator for participation in JPC . All baseline characteristics are measured
in the match year, except for 8th grade test scores. Youth who did not reach
8th grade before the program are not included in the analysis of 8th grade test
scores. Standard errors are clustered by match school. Stars indicate: *p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C.2: Description of the Sample for Each Outcome and the Formula for Outcomes in Follow-up Years One and Two
Sample Description
Follow-up Year One Follow-up Year Two Formula for FY1 and FY2
Enrolled in K12 Grade 11 or below in 2014-2015 SY Grade 10 or below in 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
Attendance Rate Grade 11 or below in 2014-2015 SY Grade 10 or below in 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
and enrolled during 2015-2016 SY and enrolled during 2016-2017 SY
Chronically Absent Grade 11 or below in 2014-2015 SY Grade 10 or below in 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
and enrolled during 2015-2016 SY and enrolled during 2016-2017 SY
Expelled Grade 11 or below in 2014-2015 SY Grade 10 or below in 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
and enrolled during 2015-2016 SY and enrolled during 2016-2017 SY
Took SAT Grade 10 in 2014-2015 SY Grade 9 in 2014-2015 SY or Max of FY1 and FY2
Grade 10 in 2014-2015
but did not take SAT in 2015-2016
SAT Composite Score Took SAT in 2015-2016 SY Took SAT in 2016-2017 and Grade 9 Max of FY1 and FY2
and Grade 10 in 2014-2015 SY in 2014-2015 SY or Grade 10 in 2014-2015
and did not take SAT in 2015-2016
Graduated HS Grade 11 in 2014-2015 SY Grade 10 during 2014-2015 SY Max of FY1 and FY2
and did not Graduate HS or Grade 11 in 2014-2015 SY
in 2014-2015 SY but did not Graduate HS in 2015-2016
Notes. This table describes the samples for each outcome variable in follow-up year one and follow-up year two, as well as the formula
used to calculate the outcome in follow-up years one and two. FY1 indicates follow-up year one and FY2 indicates follow-up year two.
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Table C.2: Description of the Sample for Each Outcome and the Formula for Outcomes in Follow-up Years One and Two
(Continued)
Sample Description
Follow-up Year One Follow-up Year Two Formula for FY1 and FY2
College from HS Grade 12 in 2014-2015 SY Grades 11 or 12 in 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
2 Year College from HS Grade 12 in 2014-2015 SY Grades 11 or 12 in 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
4 Year College from HS Grade 12 in 2014-2015 SY Grades 11 or 12 in 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
College as a HS Grad Graduated HS before 2014-2015 SY Graduated HS before 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
2 Year College as a HS Grad Graduated HS before 2014-2015 SY Graduated HS before 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
4 Year College as a HS Grad Graduated HS before 2014-2015 SY Graduated HS before 2014-2015 SY Avg of FY1 and FY2
Notes. This table describes the samples for each outcome variable in follow-up year one and follow-up year two, as well as the formula
used to calculate the outcome in follow-up years one and two. FY1 indicates follow-up year one and FY2 indicates follow-up year two.
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Table C.3: The Effect of Participation in GDYT on Educational Outcomes in Follow-up Year One
and Follow-up Year Two
Follow-up Year One Follow-up Year Two
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N Comparison Mean Participated N Comparison Mean Participated
Enrolled in K12 6,340 0.965 0.013*** 4,929 0.914 0.014
(0.005) (0.010)
Attendance Rate 5,034 0.889 0.002 3,684 0.878 0.004
(0.004) (0.006)
Chronically Absent 5,034 0.375 0.007 3,684 0.398 -0.013
(0.015) (0.022)
Expelled 6,138 0.002 -0.000 4,547 0.004 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Took SAT 1,956 0.729 0.023 2,593 0.568 0.038*
(0.026) (0.021)
SAT Composite Score 1,487 862.427 0.423 1,525 858.083 -0.530
(6.603) (5.196)
Graduated HS 1,375 0.861 0.006 1,871 0.797 0.038*
(0.019) (0.022)
College from HS 1,073 0.481 0.022 2,484 0.404 -0.001
(0.052) (0.028)
2 Year College from HS 1,073 0.247 0.035 2,484 0.189 0.004
(0.047) (0.024)
4 Year College from HS 1,073 0.234 -0.013 2,484 0.215 -0.005
(0.030) (0.020)
College as a HS Grad 1,701 0.516 0.042 1,701 0.381 0.035
(0.041) (0.045)
2 Year College as a HS Grad 1,701 0.246 0.014 1,701 0.164 0.015
(0.037) (0.033)
4 Year College as a HS Grad 1,701 0.270 0.028 1,701 0.217 0.020
(0.027) (0.033)
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of an educational outcome on an indicator for
participated, a vector of control variables as listed in the text and match group fixed effects, separately for follow-up
year one and follow-up year two. Participants have a weight of one and non-participants have a weight equal to the
ratio of participants to non-participants in their match group. For follow-up year one, column 1 reports the number of
observations in the sample, column 2 reports the weighted mean of the baseline characteristic for non-participants and
column 3 shows the coefficient on the indicator for participation. Columns 4 through 6 show similar results for follow-up
year two. Standard errors are clustered by match school. Stars indicate: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C.4: Balance Tests of Differences Between Participants and Non-Participants, by Subgroup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
9th Grade 10th and Above Median Below Median Not Chronically Chronically
and Below 11 Grade Male Female Math Score Math Score Absent Absent
Special Education 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.016 0.009 -0.000 0.012 0.016
(0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011) (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.032)
Low Income -0.022 -0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.021 0.012 0.007 -0.011
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.017) (0.026)
% Below Poverty Line in Neighborhood -0.495 0.187 0.449 -0.395 0.719 -1.835* 0.059 0.334
(0.887) (0.883) (0.879) (0.665) (0.860) (1.013) (0.948) (1.584)
Attendance Rate 0.005 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.006** 0.021*** 0.002* 0.027***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009)
Chronically Absent 0.021 -0.077*** -0.067** -0.027 -0.023 -0.091***
(0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.034)
Took G8 Math Test 0.001 -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.000
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.024)
Proficient on G8 Math Test 0.035** -0.003 0.035** -0.002 0.027 0.000 0.001 0.021
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.012) (0.021) (0.000) (0.015) (0.020)
Standardized G8 Math Score 0.043 -0.024 0.035 0.008 0.030 -0.006 -0.017 0.035
(0.047) (0.041) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.016) (0.029) (0.059)
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of a baseline characteristic on an indicator for participated and match group fixed effects,
separately for each subgroup. Participants have a weight of one and non-participants have a weight equal to the ratio of participants to non-participants in
their match group. All baseline characteristics are measured in the match year, except for 8th grade test scores. Youth who did not reach 8th grade before the
program are not included in the analysis of 8th grade test scores. Columns 5 and 6 are restricted to youth who reached 8th grade before the program since we
define prior achievement by 8th grade test scores. Standard errors are clustered by match school. Stars indicate: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C.4: Balance Tests of Differences Between Participants and Non-Participants, by Subgroup (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
9th Grade 10th and Above Median Below Median Not Chronically Chronically
and Below 11 Grade Male Female Math Score Math Score Absent Absent
Took G8 Reading Test 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.011
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.022)
Proficient on G8 Reading Test 0.014 0.019 0.015 0.017 0.050* 0.006 0.023 0.025
(0.022) (0.029) (0.028) (0.018) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
Standardized G8 Reading Score -0.003 -0.013 0.003 -0.020 0.029 0.007 -0.023 -0.024
(0.045) (0.052) (0.049) (0.036) (0.053) (0.049) (0.044) (0.050)
N 3900 4036 4789 6748 4949 4901 5842 3204
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of a baseline characteristic on an indicator for participated and match group fixed
effects, separately for each subgroup. Participants have a weight of one and non-participants have a weight equal to the ratio of participants to
non-participants in their match group. All baseline characteristics are measured in the match year, except for 8th grade test scores. Youth who
did not reach 8th grade before the program are not included in the analysis of 8th grade test scores. Columns 5 and 6 are restricted to youth who
reached 8th grade before the program since we define prior achievement by 8th grade test scores. Standard errors are clustered by match school.
Stars indicate: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C.5: Falsification Tests of the Effect of Participation in GDYT on 6th Grade Educational Outcomes, by
Subgroup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
9th Grade 10th and Above Median Below Median Not Chronically Chronically
and Below 11 Grade Male Female Math Score Math Score Absent Absent
Attendance Rate -0.002 0.015*** 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010)
Chronically Absent 0.011 -0.051** -0.023 -0.003 0.005 -0.053** -0.019 -0.026
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.014) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.031)
Took Math Exam -0.006 0.007 0.003 0.005 -0.005 0.002 -0.005 -0.009
(0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.014)
Proficient on Math -0.023 -0.001 -0.025 -0.000 -0.018 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007
(0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.027)
Std Math Score -0.073 -0.036 -0.038 -0.042 -0.032 -0.067 -0.035 -0.028
(0.049) (0.030) (0.040) (0.026) (0.029) (0.050) (0.037) (0.044)
Took Reading Exam -0.012 0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.010 -0.002 -0.003 -0.019
(0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014)
Proficient on Reading -0.027 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.007 0.026
(0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.038)
Std Reading Score -0.083** 0.012 0.001 -0.034 -0.030 -0.037 -0.005 -0.001
(0.038) (0.043) (0.045) (0.031) (0.030) (0.046) (0.039) (0.069)
N 3900 4036 4789 6748 4949 4901 5842 3204
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of a 6th grade educational outcome on an indicator for participated, a
vector of control variables as listed in the text and match group fixed effects, separately for each subgroup. Participants have a weight
of one and non-participants have a weight equal to the ratio of participants to non-participants in their match group. Columns 5 and 6
are restricted to youth who reached 8th grade before the program since we define prior achievement by 8th grade test scores. Standard
errors are clustered by match school. Stars indicate: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C.6: The Effect of Participation in GDYT on Additional Educational Outcomes, by Subgroup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
9th Grade 10th and Above Median Below Median Not Chronically Chronically
and Below 11 Grade Male Female Math Score Math Score Absent Absent
Attendance Rate 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.016)
[0.885] [0.867] [0.879] [0.873] [0.900] [0.865] [0.925] [0.781]
{0.771} {0.981} {0.894} {0.965}
Expelled -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
[0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002]
{0.545} {0.782} {0.149} {0.565}
Took SAT 0.038 0.029 0.033 0.033 -0.003 0.049* 0.011 0.011
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029) (0.022) (0.051)
[0.713] [0.745] [0.710] [0.743] [0.831] [0.707] [0.870] [0.577]
{0.781} {0.995} {0.183} {0.993}
SAT Composite Score -1.045 0.921 6.529 -5.610 7.539 2.957 3.097 -6.487
(5.054) (6.404) (5.683) (5.234) (6.954) (6.007) (6.043) (15.635)
[859.284] [861.239] [853.922] [865.057] [937.142] [793.735] [884.968] [821.039]
{0.817} {0.123} {0.603} {0.476}
2 Year College from HS 0.016 0.010 0.017 0.035 -0.005 -0.031 0.053
(0.029) (0.037) (0.031) (0.044) (0.039) (0.038) (0.044)
[0.197] [0.199] [0.219] [0.213] [0.219] [0.235] [0.196]
{0.883} {0.420} {0.068}
4 Year College from HS -0.012 0.036 -0.041 -0.024 0.014 -0.004 -0.045
(0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.025) (0.037) (0.029) (0.034)
[0.256] [0.176] [0.275] [0.344] [0.128] [0.319] [0.139]
{0.095} {0.338} {0.307}
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of an educational outcome on an indicator for participated, a vector of
control variables as listed in the text and match group fixed effects, separately for each subgroup. Participants have a weight of one and
non-participants have a weight equal to the ratio of participants to non-participants in their match group. Standard errors, which are clustered
by match school, are reported in parenthese and the weighted mean of the baseline characteristic for non-participants is shown in brackets
below. In the even columns, we report the p-value from a test of whether the point estimates are equal across subgroups in curly braces.
Columns 5 and 6 are restricted to youth who reached 8th grade before the program since we define prior achievement by 8th grade test scores.
Stars indicate: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C.6: The Effect of Participation in GDYT on Additional Educational Outcomes, by Subgroup (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
9th Grade 10th and Above Median Below Median Not Chronically Chronically
and Below 11 Grade Male Female Math Score Math Score Absent Absent
College as a HS Grad -0.013 0.052 0.030 0.042 0.007 0.083
(0.056) (0.051) (0.046) (0.089) (0.049) (0.059)
[0.389] [0.487] [0.550] [0.356] [0.532] [0.352]
{0.323} {0.879} {0.162}
2 Year College as a HS Grad -0.057 0.038 0.022 -0.003 -0.040 0.077
(0.056) (0.032) (0.045) (0.069) (0.040) (0.053)
[0.232] [0.206] [0.231] [0.215] [0.215] [0.223]
{0.091} {0.664} {0.024}
4 Year College as a HS Grad 0.044 0.014 0.001 0.051 0.043 0.006
(0.050) (0.036) (0.039) (0.057) (0.047) (0.039)
[0.163] [0.295] [0.336] [0.144] [0.329] [0.138]
{0.614} {0.375} {0.423}
Notes. This table reports the results from a weighted regression of an educational outcome on an indicator for participated, a vector of control
variables as listed in the text and match group fixed effects, separately for each subgroup. Participants have a weight of one and non-participants
have a weight equal to the ratio of participants to non-participants in their match group. Standard errors, which are clustered by match school,
are reported in parenthese and the weighted mean of the baseline characteristic for non-participants is shown in brackets below. In the even
columns, we report the p-value from a test of whether the point estimates are equal across subgroups in curly braces. Columns 5 and 6 are
restricted to youth who reached 8th grade before the program since we define prior achievement by 8th grade test scores. Stars indicate: *p<0.1,
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